

# MAN AND SOCIETY

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# MAN AND SOCIETY

*An Introduction to Social Science*

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*First Printing*

*Library of Congress catalog card number: 60-5157*

The Macmillan Company, New York  
Bren Macmillan Ltd., Galt, Ontario

Printed in the United States of America

TO LAURA GLANCE MANIS AND ELLEN N. F. CLARK

# To The Instructor

The technical difficulties facing the instructor in an introductory college course in social science are many. As in other courses usually taught at the freshman level, the range of student preparation and abilities in this area is great. The willingness of students to study and the fixity of their preconceptions also vary widely. The shock of course requirements in study and thought more often disturbs than encourages the new student. Recognition of this condition by counselors and deans often supports the instructor's own feelings that the level of student effort and thinking must be reduced or, in an occasional semantic variation, made more "relevant."

In addition to these problems of the student, common as they are to all freshman programs, the instructor in social science faces another difficulty—there is a wide variety of interpretations of his subject-matter. For example, is the introductory course to be a sequence of selections from each of the social sciences? If so, shall the introductory course in sociology, for example, be dropped from the curriculum? Should the course in social science be an integration of the separate social sciences? If so, around what themes should it be integrated—relevance to the student, citizenship, social issues, social problems?

This book, *Mans and Society*, is based upon an attempted integration of the social sciences. It is conceived as a program of basic studies, which is here interpreted as a building block or foundation course for the beginning college student. As such, it is not primarily concerned with "relevance," though relevance has been considered throughout. Nor is it directly aimed at producing good citizens in the popular sense of the word, though it is hoped that it may improve citizenship. Rather the aim has been to develop in the student some of the attitudes and techniques of the social scientist.

This goal may be clarified by examining the characteristics of a good social scientist. Interest, objectivity, careful methods, knowledge, analytical ability—these describe the social scientist in his own bailiwick; cultivating these characteristics among students of social science is a desirable, if exceedingly difficult, achievement.<sup>1</sup> Yet, stated broadly, this is the aim of the book. To explain how the editors seek to realize these objectives is the aim of the following.

## THE ROLE OF THE INSTRUCTOR

Whatever the educational process may be, the instructor is clearly a participant in a group activity. He is usually thought of as an intermediary between the textbook

<sup>1</sup> Techniques for testing these abilities are excellently presented in *Critical Thinking in Social Science*, by Paul L. Dressel and Lewis B. Mayhew, of the Social Science Committee of the Cooperative Study of Evaluation in General Education, published by William C. Brown Co., Dubuque, Iowa, 1954.

and the student. On this basis, the function of the instructor is that of lecturing to the student, who is defined as the object. All too often, this means "transmitting the notes of the instructor to the notes of the student without their passing through the minds of either." This procedure is mechanical and routine, when not downright boring. Under such conditions student *motivation* is not likely to be great, nor is much learning to be expected.

As the expert in his field, the instructor obviously possesses greater knowledge than his students. Placing knowledge and ideas before the student, however, will not necessarily make him think. Moreover, the student is apt to have ideas of his own, however fallacious they may at times be. The obvious problem is that of reconciling the views of teacher and student. An obvious prerequisite to the solution of the problem is an atmosphere of good will, within which the contributions of the instructor will be heard and seriously considered. That such an atmosphere presupposes a corresponding willingness on the part of the instructor to hear and seriously consider the views of the student may not be so obvious.

A fundamental assumption herein is that student participation is essential to the development of increased interest, knowledge, and understanding. From this standpoint, the instructor's role is that of *guide* and not of commander. Given the instructor's professional know-how, this need entail no lowering of standards or requirements in knowledge and proficiency. Rather, it is suggested that course goals be achieved through discussion rather than dictation.<sup>2</sup>

Sowing seeds should follow the clearing of weeds. So too the successful acquisition of factual knowledge requires the elimination of misinformation; the ability to analyze and understand must often follow and replace illogical and hasty reasoning. Allowing the student to express ideas and interpretations provides the ground through which successful leadership can foster student interest and learning.

## THE ROLE OF THE STUDENT

Can the student be expected to assume more of the responsibility for learning? Is the student able to assume more responsibility? These important questions are closely linked. There seems to be little doubt that many college students prefer to be told how, what, and when to learn. They are often impatient, frequently unwilling to take the closely reasoned and carefully documented steps necessary to sound conclusions. Memorization of the "answers" in preparation for exams and passing grades is more readily understood and accepted.

If the student is to be motivated sufficiently to insure a desirable level of learning, it is necessary to provide incentives. The promise, or the fear, of examinations is one such incentive. A more satisfying approach is that of providing course materials which are of interest and value to the student. If the classroom is to be more than merely a testing ground or a playground, however, educational procedures must be carefully examined.

A possible solution is that of retaining course materials selected primarily for relevance to course objectives rather than for interest or relevance to the student, while attempting to show the student their importance. For students who are deterred by analytical requirements and who would prefer memorization, the value of analytical abilities needs to be carefully spelled out. But, in addition to this positive goal, the

<sup>2</sup> The reported lack of college influence upon the values of students has been attributed to their relative non-involvement in the intellectual arena. See Philip E. Jacob, *Changing Values in College: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of College Teaching*, Harper & Bros., New York, 1957.

undesirable features and negative consequences of rote learning need to be clarified.

It is true that many students do not want to study hard, but it is also true that many more do not like to be bored. When the choice is clear, it may be questioned whether students will select boredom. If, in addition, student efforts and ideas are actively encouraged, setting high standards need not result in lowering of motivation.

## THE ROLE OF THE TEXTBOOK

The first concern of a textbook is that of including pertinent materials. The criterion of pertinence used for this book is the development of the perspective of the social scientist in the student. To do this, the book begins with a consideration of the importance of different viewpoints for the interpretation of social phenomena. Social science is introduced as one of these perspectives. Following this focus upon the field of social science, an attempt is then made to explore its nature, purposes, and methods.

The content of social science is introduced first with the study of man, rather than the more abstract study of society. The study of man as an integrating theme in social science is not new. Each of the social sciences possesses interpretations of the nature and functioning of the individual. The idea of economic man presupposes an understanding of why men work and why they strike, why they buy and why they sell. Political science deals with voting preferences, political apathy, and the desire for power. Sociology, law, and history also offer explanations of the behavior of man as an individual and as a member of the group. Bringing these interpretations together in the form of a series of elementary questions about man's behavior—work, thought, hates—can be a basis for demonstrating the multi-faceted nature of man as well as an introduction to some of the basic assumptions of the social sciences. Understanding man can also be a pedagogical stepping stone to the more analytic study of society.

If the social sciences deal with the motivations of the individual, they are generally even more concerned with the organization of society. Each of the social sciences focuses on different structures of society while all deal with the same society, primitive or modern. All are concerned with groups, with stability and change, order and disorder, freedom and security. The study of society aims to synthesize these common concerns while introducing the idea of separate areas of study.

Finally, the book concludes with a consideration of each of the social sciences. Here an attempt is made to indicate the ways in which each dissects and analyzes the provinces of its special concern. In this section, the rationale for specialization in the fields of study is introduced. The scope of each discipline is briefly explored and the interests of, and opportunities for, students in advanced study and careers is considered.

Throughout the book, the existence of conflicting ideas and of differences between facts and fictions are indicated.<sup>3</sup> The ideas, arguments and proposals that have shaped and interpreted society—as evolved by Hitler and Churchill, Hoover and Roosevelt, Marx and Freud, Toynbee and Schweitzer, Redfield and Slichter—are here to be read, compared, evaluated. These readings<sup>4</sup> must be examined by the student, under the guidance of able teachers, if they are to acquire knowledge, to develop understanding, and to achieve genuine interest in man and society.



## To The Student

We live in an age when ignorance, prejudice, and stupidity cannot be tolerated. We live at close quarters with both our friends and our enemies. There is little elbow room. Pushing and kicking have always endangered others, but A-bombs, H-bombs, and ultimately Z-bombs threaten the survival of all civilization. The push buttons which can set off endless nuclear explosions must be controlled by self-critical minds. More than ever before we need educated people at the polls, on the job, and in the home.

To cope with this complex, changing world, we need to learn and to think. We can, of course, rely on "experts" but there are so many experts—mostly without credentials. Each bombards us with his ideas and many of them seem reasonable. We are, therefore, apt to listen only to those viewpoints most like our own. This one-sided learning only confirms our prejudgments. As a result, we feel that we know more when in reality we understand less and less. Thus, propaganda replaces knowledge and the critical thinking needed by society becomes impossible.

Least apt to be heard is the social scientist, the philosopher, and the sage. Those who engage in thought seem strange to those who do not think at all. Complex theories are less sensational than slogans. And cautious interpretations possess little of the inspirational powers of hasty dogmas. In the rush of events, we make snap judgments—and then view these judgments as ultimate truths. Today, the enemy is the "Red," yesterday he was the "Hun," tomorrow he may be the "Gook." At each period, the clarity of our judgments is taken for granted. Yet the historian and the political scientist have embarrassingly long memories—and more realistic understandings of international relations. When we cry for high tariffs and low taxes, we rarely consult the economist. "Love at first sight" is a common hope, though its prospects for a successful marriage might be questioned by a sociologist. What social scientists know is seldom recognized; only when they disagree are they noted, sometimes with amusement. One important aim of this book is to introduce some of the verified knowledge of social science to the reader.

It is true, of course, that there are many disagreements among the most thoughtful investigators of man and society. We need to know these issues as well, or perhaps even better, than the areas of agreement. Here, certainly, thinking people need to ponder most. Here where we need to make our own decisions, we should be familiar with the considered opinions of those who have at least thought deeply and well. Another aim of this book is to help you make these important decisions.

You may ask why we pick on you. After all, you are a busy person. To become an accountant, an engineer, a nurse, or a lawyer takes so much time. Why not spend it more profitably in specialization? When experts disagree, how can amateurs decide? To these questions, there is a direct, clear-cut answer. Most important, you cannot

be just a specialist. You will be also a citizen, a consumer, a military target, a parent, and a human being. In these roles, and others, you will need insight, knowledge, and breadth of understanding. If you are to be, in any way, the captain of your fate, you will need the instruments for careful navigation. For only you can make the decisions which are so important to you and your society. These decisions can be made impulsively and foolishly; they can be guided by propaganda and bias, or they can be balanced judgments, made rationally and wisely.

The choices which you will make in the near future are apt to be important ones—career, marriage, philosophy, interests. Ten years or twenty from now, it will be more difficult to start afresh. Will you be satisfied with your decisions? Or will you face each working day with dread, waking with the problem of sticking it out until five o'clock? Will each hour of leisure involve only "killing time?" Or will there be zest in your work, joy in living, widening interests, fresh experiences always in store?

Don't expect to find the answers to all these questions clearly labeled and packaged in this book. As a matter of fact, understanding this book will take a great deal of effort. Much time and thought have been expended by the people whose ideas are presented in the pages which follow. Be willing to give considerable time and effort toward the understanding of them.

## THE PURPOSES OF THE BOOK

We have said that the aims of this book are to acquaint you with the factual information of the social sciences and to help you to make the important decisions of your lifetime. To achieve these aims requires, first of all, knowledge—all kinds of knowledge. You should therefore begin to learn to know yourself—what you are like, your abilities, interests, weaknesses, and prejudices. Since no one lives in absolute solitude, you must acquire knowledge of the nature of others—what they expect of you and what they want for themselves. To obtain such knowledge requires additional knowledge—how to know yourself and how to understand others. Moreover, you will need to be able to distinguish knowledge from false beliefs, facts from fictions, truths from myths. The book is intended to help you acquire this needed knowledge.

While factual knowledge is a basic necessity for making decisions, you will find that genuine understanding is also vital. Facts do not always speak for themselves. The interpretation of facts is not always easy. For while it is true that figures do not lie, it is sometimes true that liars figure. Hence, you should develop the ability to interpret, to analyze, and to understand for yourself. A purpose of this book is to help you develop the ability to understand knowledge.

Another purpose of the book is to acquaint you with the many different explanations of man and his society. These explanations have swayed many minds. To understand the behavior of others—teachers and students, Democrats and Republicans, Socialists and Communists, salesmen and customers, soldiers and philosophers—you must explore the ideas that have captured their imaginations. You will therefore need to acquire the skill of seeing the world through their eyes. Such ability requires careful study and careful consideration of the perspectives which governed their lives.

A final purpose of the book is to acquaint you with the perspective of social science. Man and society is the subject of social science. You will find that the issues which concern you and concern others have been examined, studied, and reflected upon by social scientists. Familiarity with the perspective of social science should help to make some of your decisions intelligent ones.

## THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE BOOK

This book is *primarily* an introduction to social science and to a lesser extent an introduction to the social sciences. By this we mean that the book tries to explain the *common* perspectives, theories, and methods of study of all social sciences. We are less concerned with the differences between such social sciences as economics, political science and sociology. There are *advanced courses* in each of these social sciences which can help you to further your understanding of each field. The editors of this book try to use social science as an integrated point of view, as a way of interpreting the whole relationship of man and society.

The reason for adopting this integrated viewpoint is that in real life man and society are not just a collection of unrelated parts. It is necessary to dissect, but for complete understanding we need to see the whole. For it is unfortunately true that we can miss the forest by seeing only the trees. The medical specialist who sees only "noses," the executive who deals with "employees," and the teacher who grades "students" are apt to forget the whole person. So too the economist may see business as the essence of society, while the political scientist is likely to be concerned only with the machinery of government. Although specialization is needed for advanced understanding, this book is concerned with the unity of man and society.

Since the subject matter of this book is man and society, we must be familiar with the ideas that have influenced man and society. Some of these ideas are traceable to religion, others to science, still others to custom, wishes, opportunism, nationalism, etc. Some of these ideas can be and have been tested in the laboratory, through observation, and by experiment. Whether they can be tested or not, whether demonstrated to be true or shown to be false, the important ideas—those which have seriously affected man and society—are the basic subject matter of the book.

Every human being has ideas about man and society; they are needed for living with others. In a sense, then, all of us are social scientists—though some are more so than others. Part of the subject matter of this book is the viewpoint of social science. We need to know what social science is, what it does, how and what it knows, and even what it does not know.

The content of this book concerns the breadth of all social science—why men behave the way they do, why society functions in the way it does. It is concerned with the problems of war and peace, love and hate, work and thought. It raises the questions: why men *differ* and why they *live together*, why men *hate* and why men *work*, why some men *lead* and others are *led*. It is concerned with man's society, the groups in society, how order is maintained and benefits are distributed. In short, the book is concerned with the basic questions and the many answers about man and society.

## THE METHOD OF THE BOOK

This book consists of "readings" selected to give you an awareness of the different perspectives which men have used in attempting to understand the social world in which they live. We believe these readings are important ones, important because they were written by men who have actually shaped the world in which you live. The threat of atomic warfare, the output of new automobiles, and perhaps the "line" of your date can be linked to the power of their ideas. In fact, some of these men have helped to make you the kind of person you are.

The readings used in this book were chosen because they represent the thoughts

of influential people—scientists, political leaders, philosophers, revolutionists, conservatives, and columnists. Their *interpretations* of man and society may coincide with your own or they may not. This is not our concern. The technique of the book is to provide you with the opportunity for examining ideas, comparing them, analyzing, and evaluating. It is our hope that this method will help you acquire some of the skills and the perspectives of the social scientists.

You may complain that these writers are not clear, even incomprehensible. This may seem true of some of the writings in this book. Yet, do you find it so easy to explain your own thoughts to others—as on examination day? The art of communication is a valuable skill, though few possess it. Some of our authors have important ideas with little literary ability to express them. Because these ideas are important, we must study them.

The book begins by considering social science as a way of understanding man and society. However, the major contents of the volume are divided into two basic parts: *The Study of Man* and *The Study of Society*. The important questions about man and society are contained in these two parts. A re-examination of the viewpoint and the fields of social science conclude the book.

Each part is introduced by a brief presentation of a fundamental topic. Then follows a series of carefully selected readings. These selections form the heart of the book. Each is preceded by a brief statement intended to guide the student and to indicate some of the basic points and questions. The assignment of the student is to study, to examine, to analyze and to evaluate—for himself. The conclusion to each part is a reconsideration of the basic topic in light of the selected readings.

The method of the book involves the free play of facts and ideas. The book requires deep thought and persistent examination of every viewpoint. It involves comparisons of differing, even conflicting conceptions. It presupposes an open, inquiring mind while offering the chance to eliminate one's biases and prejudgments. It can work best through discussion with others, as well as with oneself. It aims to provide the fuel for continuing exploration in the realm of social science.

To understand this book, you will need time—for careful reading, for pondering, for discussion. There is no substitute for study. Others may be able to help you—instructor, classmates, and friends. But the two of you—your book and you, in close companionship, are vital to this introduction to man and society.

## Acknowledgments

The volume is not a product of the editors alone. Its history, like any good history, is a tale in itself. Only the most current and pertinent indebtedness can reasonably be acknowledged.

To the men and women whose ideas are presented herein is owed our greatest obligation. Their writings, often based on careful observation and profound thoughts, are the heart of this volume. Our appreciation is much deserved by the authors, publishers, and other copyright holders for permission to use these writings.

The approach of the book was conceived and executed, for the most part, within the library of Western Michigan University. Special provisions for the use of books and periodicals, space and even access (during "closed" periods) were contributions of the library staff.

Bureaucracy has at times chafed all of us (see the section on "The Organization of Power"). Yet some individuals do rise above "red tape" and "the rules." Professor-administrators Leonard C. Kercher, Robert M. Limpus, and Russell H. Seibert provided encouragement, secretarial aid, typewriters, and even some financial aid.

Friends and former colleagues contributed thoughts, ideas, and advice. Robert Bowers, Bernard C. Fisher, H. Mark Flapan, Bernard N. Meltzer, and Elsworth Woods are among such colleagues and friends.

The Man and Society faculty of the university also merit our thanks for encouraging experimentation, for substantive suggestions, for frank criticisms, and for sheer living through a "time of troubles." For this help and understanding, our thanks go to Professors Myrtle Beinhauer, Chester L. Hunt, George Klein, Robert F. Maher, Roy Olton, Claude S. Phillips, Philip K. Rahbany, Leo C. Stine and Jared S. Wend.

As the volume has gone through experimentation, revision, and preparation for publication, a series of departmental and private secretaries have borne the laborious duties of typing and proofreading. Special recognition goes to our editorial assistant Milton Marovich, who served with distinction as organizer, typist, reader, and friend.

Whatever merits and weaknesses may inhere in this joint enterprise cannot be attributed to any one person. All of us, we are sure, willingly share in a mutual and pleasing responsibility.

Jerome G. Manis  
Samuel L. Clark

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# MAN AND SOCIETY

# Introduction

## *What is Social Science*

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### PREFACE

With these pages, we begin our study of social science. Whatever our acquaintance may be with this subject, we must recognize that the understanding of man and society did not begin with the development of social science. The history of human existence clearly shows that man has always been concerned with himself and with others. Man's eternal search for knowledge is recorded in the story of Adam and in the earliest symbols scratched on the cave walls of antiquity. The Ten Commandments and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights are affirmations of man's concern with the relationships between man and man.

Our continuing fear of war, now intensified by the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, suggests that man's search for self-understanding has made little progress. Indeed, by comparison with our knowledge and use of the atom, self-knowledge and self-control seem to have stood still. We need, therefore, to explore carefully our ideas of man and society in the hope that we can meet the challenge of the H-bomb before it is too late.

Recognizing the need for understanding of man and society is vital and urgent, but it is only a beginning. Certainly, everyone will agree that improved understanding is desirable. On how to achieve it there is much less agreement. There are many who claim it is a futile task, holding that mankind is unable and unwilling to seek self-knowledge. If this be true, then man's fate is sealed: advances in the techniques of mass destruction will be halted only by total annihilation. To accept this point of view is to close the door upon exploration, to prevent advances in understanding, and to increase the gap between technical and human progress.

It must be admitted that the barriers to social knowledge are impressive. Not the least of the difficulties is the very variety of interpretations of man and society. So many able, influential men—presidents and dictators, popes and generals, scientists and philosophers—have held so many divergent ideas. Can their conflicting conceptions be reconciled? Indeed, are they all worth considering?

Not every notion about man and society merits attention. One criterion for selecting examples from the great human storehouse of ideas is their influence upon human action. Democracy and communism are ideas, as well as ideals—ideas that have influenced the course of history, created and destroyed nations, persuaded men to fight and to die. Ideas

such as these deserve our attention and study. If we are to understand man and society, we must understand such ideas. For this reason, this book begins with an examination of some of the important ideas that have shaped our social world. These ideas are considered important because they have served as road maps for living.

To be useful, road maps must be accurate. But, if the guides disagree, can *all* be correct? Which outline of society should we accept? Here we arrive at the crossroads, the crux of the matter. We need standards of judgment—a compass—a criterion for evaluating the alternatives.

We may say that an inner sense can serve as direction finder. But can we distinguish between the accurate compass and the personal prejudice? Before we may dismiss the viewpoint of influential thinkers, we need self-understanding as well as experience and understanding of others. Each of us needs to learn to think for himself before blindly rejecting conclusions reached by great numbers of mankind.

We are told that 50 million Frenchmen can't be wrong. But what shall we do when at times 150 million Americans say they are! Can numbers be our guide? If so, we cannot ignore 500 million Chinese. Rather we must subject all ideas to a more acceptable standard than personal taste or popular opinion.

The standard of this book is the perspective of social science. The aim of the book is to equip the reader with some of the knowledge and the tools used by the social scientist in attempting to understand man and society. There are disagreements among social scientists and these disagreements need to be, and will be, noted. Social scientists, however, do have techniques and information which are widely accepted among themselves, if not by the general public.

To say that social science is a science is not to claim that all science is identical. The nature of social science is influenced as much by its "social" as by its "science" features. The student of social science must accordingly explore these special features—though he may be forewarned of the existence of controversy in the path to understanding.

The methods of the social scientists are of particular importance. As the accepted ways of testing ideas, they serve as the basis for scientific agreement. Here, too, there are conflicts concerning the kinds of techniques to be used and the standards to be set. Nevertheless, there are fundamental methods almost beyond criticism. Agreed upon or not, these methods need to be generally understood by the student of man and society.

This first portion of the book is exploratory. We might call it a "trial run," for we aim mainly to test our instruments rather than solve our problems. At the outset, then, we need to think about these techniques—our methods of perception and direction. Let us therefore begin by examining a few of the influential conceptions of man and society.

## Part I

# Understanding Man and Society

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### INTRODUCTION

Understanding man and society—this is our purpose. And all of us, as individuals living with others, must have some such understanding. All of our actions are guided by our ideas of man and society. When we prepare for a career, it is with the faith that we will be accepted by our group as an accountant, or a teacher, or an engineer. When we marry, we expect that our mates will return our love and share our responsibilities. When we vote, we hope that our candidates will serve us, honestly and intelligently. And yet we know of unsuccessful careers, of divorces, and of corrupt office-holders. Why is this so? Let us take an actual situation, an effort which failed, to begin our study of man and society.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth, sincere and well-meaning Americans sought to solve the problem of alcoholism. Concerned with the crimes, broken homes, and lost jobs accompanying drunkenness, women's organizations, church groups, and employers banded together in order to outlaw the presumed cause of alcoholism—the sale of alcohol. The story of their struggle is a story of devoted effort, heartbreak, and eventually, success. In 1918, the United States approved the Eighteenth Amendment, "the Prohibition Amendment."

Prohibition itself was less successful. It eliminated the distillery, but it was followed by the rumrunner. It closed the tavern, but it opened the "speakeasy." It halted the sale of liquor by the glass, and began the era of "bathtub gin" and the pocket flask. And, what was even worse, it marked the beginning of "bootlegging," "hijacking," gang wars, and other concomitants of organized crime. Respectable people began to trade with law violators. Public officials found that public opinion made law enforcement unpopular—and bribery quite profitable.

Fifteen years of prohibition were ended by repeal of the amendment. However, return to legal production and sale of liquor did not restore the original conditions. Organized gangs turned to new fields—large-scale theft, smuggling, and even murder. Drinking appeared to have become more popular than before. Consumption of alcohol reached new

peaks and new clients in the night club, the cocktail lounge, and the home. Today, it is estimated that five million Americans are alcoholics or problem drinkers.

What lack of understanding led to this debacle? Decades later, we are still not certain. There are, however, certain questions, some of them still unanswered, which were ignored by the proponents of legal measures. For example: *Why do people drink? What will drinkers do if liquor is made illegal? How should legal controls function? What alternatives or substitutes are necessary? These issues were largely ignored. Were they responsible for the failure of this experiment?*

The experience of Prohibition and Repeal is but one of the many efforts of human beings to cope with the needs of social existence. These efforts are based upon interpretations of man and society. At times, these ideas produce fruitful results; at other times, they end in failure. We need, therefore, to consider the nature of man and society in order to understand the forces and the factors responsible for the varying outcomes. To achieve this understanding, we must begin by examining a few of the more significant and widely held views of man and society. The readings which follow are attempts to seek such understanding. From these interpretations we may gain a better appreciation of the tasks and the perspective of social science.

Each article which follows has been selected because it presents an interpretation of man and society. Every article should be read carefully *and* critically. You are *not* asked to accept the ideas presented, but only to try to understand them. What does the author say? Why does he say it? These are the questions to be weighed concerning each selection.



## Pictures in Our Minds

WALTER LIPPMAN

Walter Lippman (1899- ) is most widely known as a syndicated newspaper columnist. He has often been described as the "dean of American political journalism." Few columnists are more widely read and respected by serious readers. Those who read books as well as newspapers know Lippman as a prolific author. His first volume, *A Preface to Politics*, was published in 1913 when Lippman was twenty-four. This book, like the many that followed, revealed the clear, analytic thought and style of the author. In it, he raised searching questions concerning the nature of political society and the political role of the individual. In his later books he reexamined and, in some cases, repudiated, his earlier views concerning morals, religion, international relations, and the process of communication.

In the selection included here,\* Lippman raises a question which plagues the newspaperman and the social scientist alike—how reliable are the pictures in our minds? This is an important question, a fundamental one, for we must be sure of our observations if we are to trust our analyses. Lippman examines our perceptions by considering some of the sources of distortion.

There is an island in the ocean where in 1914 a few Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Germans lived. No cable reaches that island, and the British mail steamer comes but once in sixty days. In September it had not yet come, and the islanders were still talking about the latest newspaper which told about the approaching trial of Madam Caillaux for the shooting of Gaston Calmette. It was, therefore, with more than usual eagerness that the whole

colony assembled at the quay on a day in mid-September to hear from the captain what the verdict had been. They learned that for over six weeks now those of them who were English and those of them who were French had been fighting in behalf of the sanctity of treaties against those of them who were Germans. For six strange weeks they had acted as if they were friends, when in fact they were enemies.

But their plight was not so different from that of most of the population of Europe. They had been mistaken for six weeks, on the

\* From *Public Opinion*, pp. 3-5, 13-16, by Walter Lippman, copyright 1922, reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Co.

continent the interval may have been only six days or six hours. There was an interval. There was a moment when the picture of Europe on which men were conducting their business as usual, did not in any way correspond to the Europe which was about to make a jumble of their lives. There was a time for each man when he was still adjusted to an environment that no longer existed. All over the world as late as July 25th men were making goods they would not be able to import, careers were being planned, enterprises contemplated, hopes and expectations entertained, all in the belief that the world as known was the world as it was. Men were writing books describing that world. They trusted the picture in their heads. And then over four years later, on a Thursday morning, came the news of an armistice, and people gave vent to their unutterable relief that the slaughter was over. Yet in the five days before the real armistice came, though the end of the war had been celebrated, several thousand young men died on the battlefields.

Looking back we can see how indirectly we know the environment in which nevertheless we live. We can see that the news of it comes to us now fast, now slowly; but that whatever we believe to be a true picture, we treat as if it were the environment itself. It is harder to remember that about the beliefs upon which we are now acting, but in respect to other peoples and other ages we flatter ourselves that it is easy to see when they were in deadly earnest about ludicrous pictures of the world. We insist, because of our superior hindsight, that the world as they needed to know it, and the world as they did know it, were often two quite contradictory things. We can see, too, that while they governed and fought, traded and reformed in the world as they imagined it to be, they produced results, or failed to produce any, in the world as it was. They started for the Indies and found America. They diagnosed evil and hanged old women. They thought they could grow rich by always selling and never buying. A caliph, obeying what he conceived to be the Will of Allah, burned the library at Alexandria.

The only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the

feeling aroused by his mental image of that event. That is why until we know what others think they know, we cannot truly understand their acts. I have seen a young girl, brought up in a Pennsylvania mining town, plunged suddenly from entire cheerfulness into a paroxysm of grief when a gust of wind cracked the kitchen window-pane. For hours she was inconsolable, and to me incomprehensible. But when she was able to talk, it transpired that if a window-pane broke it meant that a close relative had died. She was, therefore, mourning for her father, who had frightened her into running away from home. The father was, of course, quite thoroughly alive as a telegraphic inquiry soon proved. But until the telegram came, the cracked glass was an authentic message to that girl. Why it was authentic only a prolonged investigation by a skilled psychiatrist could show. But even the most casual observer could see that the girl, enormously upset by her family troubles, had hallucinated a complete fiction out of one external fact, a remembered superstition, and a turmoil of remorse, and fear and love for her father.

Abnormality in these instances is only a matter of degree. When an Attorney-General, who has been frightened by a bomb exploded on his doorstep, convinces himself by the reading of revolutionary literature that a revolution is to happen on the first of May, 1920, we recognize that much the same mechanism is at work. The war, of course, furnished many examples of this pattern: the casual fact, the creative imagination, the will to believe, and out of these three elements, a counterfeit of reality to which there was a violent instinctive response. For it is clear enough that under certain conditions men respond as powerfully to fictions as they do to realities, and that in many cases they help to create the very fictions to which they respond. Let him cast the first stone who did not believe in the Russian army that passed through England in August, 1914, did not accept any tale of atrocities without direct proof, and never saw a plot, a traitor, or a spy where there was none. Let him cast a stone who never passed on as the real inside truth what he had heard someone say who knew no more than he did.

In all these instances we must note par-

ticularly one common factor. It is the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment. To that pseudo-environment his behavior is a response. But because it is behavior, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo-environment where the behavior is stimulated, but in the real environment where action eventuates. If the behavior is not a practical act, but what we call roughly thought and emotion, it may be a long time before there is any noticeable break in the texture of the fictitious world. But when the stimulus of the pseudo-fact results in action on things or other people, contradiction soon develops. Then comes the sensation of butting one's head against a stone wall, of learning by experience, and witnessing Herbert Spencer's tragedy of the murder of a Beautiful Theory by a Gang of Brutal Facts, the discomfort in short of a maladjustment. For certainly, at the level of social life, what is called the adjustment of man to his environment takes place through the medium of fictions.

By fictions I do not mean lies. I mean a representation of the environment which is in lesser or greater degree made by man himself. The range of fiction extends all the way from complete hallucination to the scientists' perfectly self-conscious use of a schematic model,

or his decision that for his particular problem accuracy beyond a certain number of decimal places is not important. A work of fiction may have almost any degree of fidelity, and so long as the degree of fidelity can be taken into account, fiction is not misleading. In fact, human culture is very largely the selection, the rearrangement, the tracing of patterns upon, and the stylizing of, what William James called "the random irradiations and resettlements of our ideas."<sup>1</sup> The alternative to the use of fictions is direct exposure to the ebb and flow of sensation. That is not a real alternative, for however refreshing it is to see at times with a perfectly innocent eye, innocence itself is not wisdom, though a source and corrective of wisdom.

For the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it. To traverse the world men must have maps of the world. Their persistent difficulty is to secure maps on which their own need, or someone else's need, has not sketched in the coast of Bohemia.

<sup>1</sup> James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 639.

## Some American Assumptions

ROBERT S. LYND

What are the "pictures in the minds" of Americans? No inventory is here possible. But a meaningful selection of the basic ideas held by many of us is presented below. The author Robert S. Lynd (1892- ) is a distinguished social scientist, best known for *Middletown* (1929) and *Middletown in Transition* (1937). With his wife as co-researcher and co-author, Lynd studied and described a typical American community. The two books are considered pioneering landmarks in the careful, objective, and systematic study of a people.

This selection is taken from *Knowledge for What*.<sup>\*</sup> In this important book Lynd raises searching questions concerning the purposes and uses of social knowledge. As you read the article, ask yourself whether these beliefs are similar to your own. Are they correct? Taken all together, what do they suggest about our "road maps" for living?

The following suggest some of these outstanding assumptions in American life:

1. The United States is the best and greatest nation on earth and will always remain so.
2. Individualism, "the survival of the fittest," is the law of nature and the secret of America's greatness; and restrictions on individual freedom are un-American and kill initiative.

*But:* No man should live for himself alone; for people ought to be loyal and stand together and work for common purposes.

3. The thing that distinguishes man from the beasts is the fact that he is rational; and therefore man can be trusted, if let alone, to guide his conduct wisely.

*But:* Some people are brighter than others; and, as every practical politician and businessman knows, you can't afford simply to sit back and wait for people to make up their minds.

4. Democracy, as discovered and perfected by the American people, is the ultimate form of living together. All men are created free and equal, and the United States has made this fact a living reality.

*But:* You would never get anywhere, of course, if you constantly left things to popular vote. No business could be run

<sup>\*</sup> From *Knowledge for What*, pp. 60-62, by Robert S. Lynd, copyright 1939, reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

that way, and of course no businessman would tolerate it.

5. Everyone should try to be successful.

*But:* The kind of person you are is more important than how successful you are.

6. The family is our basic institution and the sacred core of our national life.

*But:* Business is our most important institution, and, since national welfare depends upon it, other institutions must conform to its needs.

7. Religion and "the finer things of life" are our ultimate values and the things all of us are really working for.

*But:* A man owes it to himself and to his family to make as much money as he can.

8. Life would not be tolerable if we did not believe in progress and know that things are getting better. We should, therefore, welcome new things.

*But:* The old, tried fundamentals are best; and it is a mistake for busybodies to try to change things too fast or to upset the fundamentals.

9. Hard work and thrift are signs of character and the way to get ahead.

*But:* No shrewd person tries to get ahead nowadays by just working hard, and nobody gets rich nowadays by pinching nickels. It is important to know the right people. If you want to make money, you have to look and act like money. Anyway, you only live once.

10. Honesty is the best policy.

*But:* Business is business, and a businessman would be a fool if he didn't cover his hand.

11. America is a land of unlimited opportunity, and people get pretty much what's coming to them here in this country.

*But:* Of course, not everybody can be boss, and factories can't give jobs if there aren't jobs to give.

12. Capital and labor are partners.

*But:* It is bad policy to pay higher wages

than you have to. If people don't like to work for you for what you offer them, they can go elsewhere.

13. Education is a fine thing.

*But:* It is the practical men who get things done.

14. Science is a fine thing in its place and our future depends upon it.

*But:* Science has no right to interfere with such things as business and our other fundamental institutions. The thing to do is to use science, but not let it upset things.

15. Children are a blessing.

*But:* You should not have more children than you can afford.

16. Women are the finest of God's creatures.

*But:* Women aren't very practical and are usually inferior to men in reasoning power and general ability.

17. Patriotism and public service are fine things.

*But:* Of course, a man has to look out for himself.

18. The American judicial system insures justice to every man, rich or poor.

*But:* A man is a fool not to hire the best lawyer he can afford.

19. Poverty is deplorable and should be abolished.

*But:* There never has been enough to go around, and the Bible tells us that "The poor you have always with you."

20. No man deserves to have what he hasn't worked for. It demoralizes him to do so.

*But:* You can't let people starve.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In Chapter XII of *Middletown in Transition* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1937), dealing with "The Middletown Spirit," the author has attempted to set down a more extended list of these "of course" assumptions relevant to that particular city. With allowances for the heavily native-born, Protestant, small-city, Middle Western character of Middletown's population, most of the assumptions there set down would probably apply widely throughout the country.

## The Human Jungle

HERBERT SPENCER

"Survival of the fittest"—this famous phrase which has illuminated the conception of evolution is the keynote of the article which follows below. In this selection,\* Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) presents his conception of human nature and human progress. These views, which preceded Darwin's publication of *On the Origin of Species* by a decade, were largely self-discovered. For Spencer, a thoroughgoing individualist, had rejected an opportunity to attend Cambridge in order to fend for himself. Instead, at the age of 17, he obtained employment with a railroad where he learned engineering. Later, he became a contributor to various periodicals and then an editor. Throughout his life he wrote voluminously.

Spencer was a life-time believer in the inevitability of progress. He saw life moving from simplicity to complexity and from lower to higher intelligence. He felt that this progress would take place through the elimination of the unfit. He therefore felt that what benefited the individual inevitably benefited the society and vice versa. He concluded that the freer, the more capable, and the more independent the individual became, the better for society.

Does this interpretation apply to the relationships between man and man, between family members, work associates, and classmates? In fact, one test of this viewpoint is by study of ourselves, our wants and our conduct toward others. From these considerations, we may better evaluate the validity of this interpretation.

Pervading all nature, we may see at work a stern discipline, which is a little cruel that it may be very kind. That state of universal warfare maintained throughout the lower creation, to the great perplexity of many worthy people, is at bottom the most merciful provision which the circumstances admit of. It is

much better that the ruminant animal, when deprived by age of the vigor which made its existence a pleasure, should be killed by some beast of prey than that it should linger out a life made painful by infirmities and eventually die of starvation. By the destruction of all such, not only is existence ended before it becomes burdensome, but room is made for a younger generation capable of the fullest enjoyment; and, moreover, out of the very act of substitution happiness is derived for a tribe

\* From *Social Statics* by Herbert Spencer, first published in 1850, pp. 288-92 of 1954 edition issued by the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation.

of predatory creatures. Note further that their carnivorous enemies not only remove from herbivorous herds individuals past their prime, but also weed out the sickly, the malformed, and the least fleet or powerful. By the aid of which purifying process, as well as by the fighting, so universal in the pairing season, all vitiation of the race through the multiplication of its inferior samples is prevented; and the maintenance of a constitution completely adapted to surrounding conditions, and therefore most productive of happiness, is insured.

The development of the higher creation is a progress toward a form of being capable of a happiness undiminished by these drawbacks. It is in the human race that the consummation is to be accomplished. Civilization is the last stage of its accomplishment. And the ideal man is the man in whom all the conditions of that accomplishment are fulfilled. Meanwhile the well-being of existing humanity and the unfolding of it into this ultimate perfection are both secured by that same beneficent, though severe, discipline to which the animate creation at large is subject: a discipline which is pitiless in the working out of good: a felicity-pursuing law which never swerves for the avoidance of partial and temporary suffering. The poverty of the incapable, the distresses that come upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle, and those shoulderings aside of the weak by the strong, which leave so many "in shallows and in miseries," are the decrees of a large, far-seeing benevolence. It seems hard that an unskillfulness which with all his efforts he cannot overcome should entail hunger upon the artisan. It seems hard that a laborer incapacitated by sickness from competing with his stronger fellows should have to bear the resulting privations. It seems hard that widows and orphans should be left to struggle for life or death. Nevertheless, when regarded not separately, but in connection with the interests of universal humanity, these harsh fatalities are seen to be full of the highest beneficence—the same beneficence which brings to early graves the children of diseased parents and singles out the low-spirited, the intemperate, and the debilitated as the victims of an epidemic.

There are many very amiable people—people over whom in so far as their feelings are

concerned we may fitly rejoice—who have not the nerve to look this matter fairly in the face. Disabled as they are by their sympathies with present suffering, from duly regarding ultimate consequences, they pursue a course which is very injudicious and in the end even cruel. We do not consider it true kindness in a mother to gratify her child with sweetmeats that are certain to make it ill. We should think it a very foolish sort of benevolence which led a surgeon to let his patient's disease progress to a fatal issue rather than inflict pain by an operation. Similarly, we must call those spurious philanthropists, who, to prevent present misery, would entail greater misery upon future generations. All defenders of a Poor Law must, however, be classed among such. That rigorous necessity which, when allowed to act on them, becomes so sharp a spur to the lazy and so strong a bridle to the random, these paupers' friends would repeal, because of the wailings it here and there produces. Blind to the fact that under the natural order of things, society is constantly excreting its unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating, faithless members, these unthinking, though well-meaning, men advocate an interference which not only stops the purifying process but even increases the vitiation—absolutely encourages the multiplication of the reckless and incompetent by offering them an unfailing provision, and discourages the multiplication of the competent and provident by heightening the prospective difficulty of maintaining a family. And thus, in their eagerness to prevent the really salutary sufferings that surround us, these sigh-wise and groan-foolish people bequeath to posterity a continually increasing curse.

Returning again to the highest point of view, we find that there is a second, and still more injurious mode in which law-enforced charity checks the process of adaptation. To become fit for the social state, man has not only to lose his savageness, but he has to acquire the capacities needful for civilized life. Power of application must be developed, such modification of the intellect as shall qualify it for its new tasks must take place; and, above all, there must be gained the ability to sacrifice a small immediate gratification for a future great one. The state of transition will of course be an unhappy state. Misery inevitably results

from incongruity between constitution and conditions. All these evils, which afflict us and seem to the uninitiated the obvious consequences of this or that removable cause, are unavoidable attendants on the adaptation now in progress. Humanity is being pressed against the inexorable necessities of its new position—is being molded into harmony with them and has to bear the resulting unhappiness as best it can. The process must be undergone, and the sufferings must be endured. No power on earth, no cunningly devised laws of statesmen, no world-rectifying schemes of the humane, no communist panaceas, no reforms that men ever did broach or ever will broach can diminish them one jot. Intensified they may be, and are; and in preventing their intensification, the philanthropic will find ample scope for exertion. But there is bound up with the change a normal amount of suffering, which cannot be lessened without altering the very laws of life. Every attempt at mitigation of this eventuates in exacerbation of it. All that a Poor Law or any kindred institution can do is partially to suspend the transition—to take off for a while from certain members of society the painful pressure which is effecting their transformation. At best this is merely to postpone what must ultimately be borne. But it is more than this: it is to undo what has already been done. For the circumstances to which adaptation is taking place cannot be superseded without causing a retrogression—a partial loss of the adaptation previously effected; and as the whole process must sometime or other be passed through, the lost ground must be gone over again and the attendant pain borne afresh. Thus, besides retarding adaptation, a Poor Law adds to the distress inevitably attending it.

At first sight these considerations seem conclusive against all relief to the poor—voluntary

as well as compulsory; and it is no doubt true that they imply a condemnation of whatever private charity enables the recipients to elude the necessities of our social existence. With this condemnation, however, no rational man will quarrel. That careless squandering of pence which has fostered into perfection a system of organized begging; which has made skillful mendicancy more profitable than ordinary manual labor; which induces the simulation of palsy, epilepsy, cholera, and no end of diseases and deformities; which has called into existence warehouses for the sale and hire of imposter's dresses; which has given to pity-inspiring babes a market value of 9d. per day—the unthinking benevolence which has generated all this cannot but be disapproved by everyone. Now it is only against this injudicious charity that the foregoing argument tells. To that charity which may be described as helping men to help themselves it makes no objection—countenances it, rather. And in helping men to help themselves, there remains abundant scope for the exercise of a people's sympathies. Accidents will still supply victims on whom generosity may be legitimately expended. Men thrown upon their backs by unforeseen events, men who have failed for want of knowledge inaccessible to them, men ruined by the dishonesty of others, and men in whom hope long delayed has made the heart sick may, with advantage to all parties, be assisted. Even the prodigal, after severe hardship has branded his memory with the unbending conditions of social life to which he must submit, may properly have another trial afforded him. And although by these ameliorations the process of adaptation must be remotely interfered with, yet in the majority of cases it will not be so much retarded in one direction as it will be advanced in another.



## Stimulus and Response

EDWARD L. THORNDIKE

In this selection,\* an eminent American psychologist suggests a new and modern interpretation of man's behavior. Viewing man as a mechanism, Edward L. Thorndike (1874-1949) contends that the same individual responds to the same situation with the same behavior. And is it not true that some individuals are characteristically aggressive while others are basically shy and seclusive?

Upon this conception of human nature, Thorndike pioneered a wholly new field—educational psychology. He developed methods of testing personality and intelligence, and devised procedures for adapting education to the specific nature of the child. The educational outlook of the present reflects some of the basic assumptions and techniques of this outstanding student of human behavior.

Yet, scientific or not, we need to ask ourselves whether this conception is true. Are men automatic, reacting mechanisms? Are will, purpose, and aspirations a part of man? Or is it rather true that man is only another organism, subject to the same forces and laws as the electron, the amoeba, and the ape?

A typical reflex, or instinct, or capacity," as a whole, includes the ability to be sensitive to a certain situation, the ability to make a certain response, and the existence of a bond or connection whereby that response is made to that situation. For instance, the young chick is sensitive to the absence of other members of his species, is able to peep, and is so organized that the absence of other members of the species makes him peep. But the tend-

ency to be sensitive to a certain situation may exist without the existence of a connection therewith of any further exclusive response, and the tendency to make a certain response may exist without the existence of a connection limiting that response exclusively to any single situation. The three-year-old child is by inborn nature markedly sensitive to the presence and acts of other human beings, but the exact nature of his response varies. The original tendency to cry is very strong, but there is no one situation to which it is exclusively bound.

Original nature seems to decide that the

\* From *The Original Nature of Man*, pp. 6-8, by Edward L. Thorndike, copyright 1923, reprinted by permission of Teachers College, Columbia University.

individual will respond somehow to certain situations more often than it decides just what he will do, and to decide that he will make certain responses more often than it decides just when he will make them. So, for convenience in thinking about man's unlearned equipment, this appearance of *multiple response* to one same situation and *multiple causation* of one same response may be taken roughly as the fact.

It must not, however, be taken to mean that the result of an action set up in the sensory neurones by a situation is essentially unpredictable—that, for instance, exactly the same neurone-action (paralleling, let us say, the sight of a dog by a certain two-year-old child) may lead, in the two-year-old, now to the act of crying, at another time to shy retreat, at another to effusive joy, and at still another to curious examination of the newcomer, all regardless of any modification by experience. On the contrary, *in the same organism the same neurone-action will always produce the same result—in the same individual the really same situation will always produce the same response.*

The apparent existence of an original sensitivity unconnected with any one particular response, so that apparently the same cause produces different results, is to be explained in one of two ways. First, the apparently same situations may really be different. Thus, the sight of a dog to an infant in its mother's arms is not the same situation as the sight of a dog to an infant alone on the doorstep. Being held in its mother's arms is a part of the situation that may account for the response of mild curiosity in the former case and fear in the latter. Second, if the situations are

really identical, the apparently same organism really differs. Thus a dog seen by a child, healthy, rested, and calm, may lead to only curiosity, whereas, if seen by the same child, ill, fatigued, and nervously irritable, it may lead to fear. The organism may differ by being differently disposed in its sensory apparatus, in its associative or connecting apparatus, in its motor neurones, in its muscular condition, or in other organs concerned in the response. These pre-dispositions may come through conditions of nutrition, poisoning, fatigue, co-operative stimulation, etc., etc.

Similarly, the really same response is never made to different situations by the same organism. When the same response seems to be made to different situations, closer inspection will show that the responses do differ; or that the situations were, in respect to the element that determined the response, identical; or that the organism is itself different. Thus, though "a ball seen," "a tin soldier seen," and "a rattle seen" alike provoke "teaching for," the *total* responses do differ, the central nervous system being provoked to three different responses manifested as three different sense-impressions—of a ball, of a tin soldier, and of a rattle. Thus, if "ball grasped," "tin soldier grasped," and "rattle grasped" alike provoke "throwing," it is because only one particular component, common to the three situations, is effective in determining the act. Thus, if a child now weeps whenever spoken to, whereas before he wept only when hurt or scolded, it is because he is now exhausted, excited, or otherwise changed.

The original connections between situation and response are never due to change in its true sense.

## The Artist Lifts the Veil

HENRI BERGSON

So many views of man and society—yes, and all seem to make sense. How can those who study the complexity of human life distinguish the accurate from the erroneous? Indeed, is it not possible that all these pictures are no more than fictions, delusions, and misrepresentations? To understand man and society, we need to know not only what man is like, but also how accurate man's vision of himself can be; and if man's devices for studying others are subject to distortion, these instruments of observation (and hence direction) must be carefully evaluated.

Henri Bergson, philosopher and Nobel prize winner, offers an interpretation of man's ability to interpret. Bergson, who was born in France in 1859 and died in 1941, was an expositor of the philosophy of creative evolution. He identified the life-force or *élan vital* as the basis of human action and understanding. In the selection which follows,\* he explores the element in man which he feels is most necessary to comprehension. This intuitional capacity he attributes to those who have the ability and the willingness to understand their surroundings.

What is the object of art? Could reality come into direct contact with sense and consciousness, could we enter into immediate communion with things and with ourselves, probably art would be useless, or rather we should all be artists, for then our soul would continually vibrate in perfect accord with nature. Our eyes, aided by memory, would carve out in space and fix in time the most inimitable of pictures. Hewn in the living marble of the human form, fragments of

statues, beautiful as the relics of antique statuary, would strike the passing glance. Deep in our souls we should hear the strains of our inner life's unbroken melody,—a music that is oftentimes gay, but more frequently plaintive and always original. All this is around and within us, and yet no whit of it do we distinctly perceive. Between nature and ourselves, nay, between ourselves and our own consciousness a veil is interposed: a veil that is dense and opaque for the common herd,—thin, almost transparent, for the artist and the poet. What fairy wove that veil? Was it done in malice or in friendliness? We had to

\* From *Laughter*, pp. 150-57, by Henri Bergson, copyright 1912, reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Co.

live, and life demands that we grasp things in their relations to our own needs. Life is action. Life implies the acceptance only of the *utilitarian* side of things in order to respond to them by appropriate reactions: all other impressions must be dimmed or else reach us vague and blurred. I look and I think I see, I listen and I think I hear, I examine myself and I think I am reading the very depths of my heart. But what I see and hear of the outer world is purely and simply a selection made by my senses to serve as a light to my conduct; what I know of myself is what comes to the surface, what participates in my actions. My senses and my consciousness, therefore, give me no more than a practical simplification of reality. In the vision they furnish me of myself and of things, the differences that are useless to man are obliterated, the resemblances that are useful to him are emphasized; ways are traced out for me in advance along which my activity is to travel. These ways are the ways which all mankind has trod before me. Things have been classified with a view to the use I can derive from them. And it is this classification I perceive, far more clearly than the colour and the shape of things. Doubtless man is vastly superior to the lower animals in this respect. *It is not very likely that the eye of a wolf makes any distinction between a kid and a lamb; both appear to the wolf as the same identical quarry, alike easy to pounce upon, alike good to devour.* We, for our part, make a distinction between a goat and a sheep; but can we tell one goat from another, one sheep from another? The *individuality* of things or of beings escapes us, unless it is materially to our advantage to perceive it. Even when we do take note of it—as when we distinguish one man from another—it is not the individuality itself that the eye grasps, i.e. an entirely original harmony of forms and colours, but only one or two features that will make practical recognition easier.

In short, we do not see the actual things themselves; in most cases we confine ourselves to reading the labels affixed to them. This tendency, the result of need, has become even more pronounced under the influence of

function and commonplace aspect of the thing, intervenes between it and ourselves, and would conceal its form from our eyes, were that form not already masked beneath the necessities that brought the word into existence. Not only external objects, but even our own mental states, are screened from us in their inmost, their personal aspect, in the original life they possess. When we feel love or hatred, when we are gay or sad, is it really the feeling itself that reaches our consciousness with those innumerable *fleeting shades* of meaning, and deep resounding echoes that make it something altogether our own? We should all, were it so, be novelists or poets or musicians. Mostly, however, we perceive nothing but the outward display of our mental state. We catch only the impersonal aspect of our feelings, that aspect which speech has set down once for all because it is almost the same, in the same conditions, for all men. Thus, even in our own individual, individuality escapes our ken. We move amidst generalities and symbols, as within a tilt-yard in which our force is effectively pitted against other forces; and fascinated by action, tempted by it, for our own good, on to the field it has selected, we live in a zone midway between *things and ourselves, externally to things, externally also to ourselves.* From time to time, however, in a fit of absentmindedness, nature raises up souls that are more detached from life. Not with that intentional, logical, systematical detachment—the result of reflection and philosophy—but rather with a natural detachment, one innate in the structure of sense or consciousness, which at once reveals itself by a virginal manner, so to speak, of seeing, hearing, or thinking. Were this detachment complete, did the soul no longer cleave to action by any of its perceptions, it would be the soul of an artist such as the world has never yet seen. It would excel alike in every art at the same time; or rather, it would fuse them all into one. It would perceive all things in their native purity: the *forms, colours, sounds of the physical world as well as the subtlest movements of the inner life.* But this is asking too much of nature. Even for

ten to direct the perception to the need. And since each direction corresponds to what we call a *sense*—through one of his senses, and through that sense alone, is the artist usually wedded to art. Hence, originally, the diversity of arts. Hence also the speciality of predispositions. This one applies himself to colours and forms, and since he loves colour for colour and form for form, since he perceives them for their sake and not for his own, it is the inner life of things that he sees appearing through their forms and colours. Little by little he insinuates it into our own perception, baffled though we may be at the outset. For a few moments at least, he diverts us from the prejudices of form and colour that come between ourselves and reality. And thus he realises the loftiest ambition of art, which here consists in revealing to us nature. Others, again, retire within themselves. Beneath the thousand rudimentary actions which are the outward and visible signs of an emotion, behind the commonplace, conventional expression that both reveals and conceals an individual mental state, it is the emotion, the original mood, to which they attain in its undefiled essence. And then, to induce us to make the same effort ourselves, they contrive to make us see something of what they have seen: by rhythmical arrangement of words, which thus become organised and animated with a life of their own, they tell us—or rather suggest—things that speech was not calculated to express. Others delve yet deeper still. Beneath

these joys and sorrows which can, at a pinch, be translated into language, they grasp something that has nothing in common with language, certain rhythms of life and breath that are closer to man than his inmost feelings, being the living law—varying with each individual—of his enthusiasm and despair, his hopes and regrets. By setting free and emphasising this music, they force it upon our attention; they compel us, willy-nilly, to fall in with it, like passers-by who join in a dance. And thus they impel us to set in motion, in the depths of our being, some secret chord which was only waiting to thrill. So art, whether it be painting or sculpture, poetry or music, has no other object than to brush aside the utilitarian symbols, the conventional and socially accepted generalities, in short, everything that veils reality from us, in order to bring us face to face with reality itself. It is from a misunderstanding on this point that the dispute between realism and idealism in art has risen. Art is certainly only a more direct vision of reality. But this purity of perception implies a break with utilitarian convention, an innate and specially localised disinterestedness of sense or consciousness, in short, a certain immateriality of life, which is what has always been called idealism. So that we might say, without in any way playing upon the meaning of the words, that realism is in the work when idealism is in the soul, and that it is only through ideality that we can resume contact with reality.

# The Task of Social Science

ALBION W. SMALL

There are, indeed, many ways of viewing man and society—popular, moral, philosophical, mechanical, and others. But which is most true; which is best, and which is most useful? One valuable perspective is that of social science, the perspective of *this book*. Our aim is to acquaint the student with this view of man and society, to introduce social science and not to indoctrinate. The present selection is such an introduction.

Albion W. Small (1834–1926) became interested in sociology while attending Newton Theological Institute. Throughout his lifetime, he was concerned with the moral betterment of man, and he became convinced that social science could aid in achieving that goal. In this selection,\* Small suggests how we may take up the study of man in his relationship to other men. What is the task of social science and how is it to be carried out?

Here then is the task of today's social science: *To interpret, in all their relations, the visible careers of men as expressions of their various mental reactions.*

Let me put this in a more commonplace way. Every man born into the world faces the problem: *What sort of a place is this world anyway, and how can we make the most out of it?* Not one man in a million ever reduces his life problem to this general expression; but if you could have before you a chart of all the actions ever performed by every man that has ever lived, you would find this general question implied by every record which you could examine. You would not find in the

whole exhibit an act that was not either some petulant revolt against a given lot in life, in a conscious or unconscious attempt to test the character of the world by resisting it; or some more or less bold prying into the possibilities of life by deliberate trial of different ways of doing things; or sleepy acquiescence in the fated lot, and submission to the impression that the best to be done is to grin and bear it as well as one may.

Whether we are active or merely passive occupants of our posts in life, we make or we at least accept a tacit interpretation of our place. We therewith adopt a more or less restricted program of life as a scheme of action which is within our range of possibility.

Now this appraisal of our lot, and this fitting of our program to it, are involved in the

\* Reprinted from *The Meaning of Social Science*, pp. 89–95, 114–15, by Albion W. Small, by permission of The University of Chicago Press.

life of the dullest and stupidest whether they are at all conscious of it or not. These processes are in the thoughts by day and the dreams by night of a rare few in every society. In some partial form they come up in the consciousness of all but the most sodden, at certain intervals. In either case men imply or they bluntly ask this question: *What sort of a world is this at bottom, and what is it worth while to try to do in it?*

This also turns out to be the great question of science. It is the problem of science in a nutshell. All the astronomies, and geologies, and physics, and chemistries, and biologies, and anthropologies, and histories, and so on through the philosophies, are merely different ways of working out an answer to the central human problem: Of what sort is the world and to what uses can we put it? Science has its place in this big mix that we call life, as the agent of all men in getting as near as possible to an answer to this central question. Science has other minor meanings, just as there are incidental meanings to food besides the sustaining of life. But the meaning that would call for science in the economy of human life, if all its other uses were taken away—just as the life-sustaining functions of food would be in demand if all its subordinate uses were cut off—the primary and chief function of science is to act as all the people's proxy in finding out all that can be known about what sort of a world this is, and what we can do in it to make life most worth living.

I take it for granted that no argument about this proposition is necessary, so far as the physical sciences are concerned. I therefore start with the blanket reservation that there is no possible phase of human experience which is detachable utterly from its physical conditions. With this reservation in mind, I am confining myself to the social phases of science.

By far the greater mass of men do not consciously get beyond the question: How can we make the earth furnish the means of feeding us? Those who do get beyond this question find that it is but a step to the problem: Supposing we have found out how to make the soil furnish food, how can we be sure that our fellow-men will let us eat it? The two

questions became involved at the Cain and Abel stage of human experience and have been compounding their complications ever since.

Assuming that other people are constantly working out the answer to the first question, the big problem of social science is: *What is the character of that world which is made up of human beings, and which determines our chances of eating the food which the earth provides?*

If you have noticed the titles of my later lectures, you have seen that I had in mind not the mere knowledge phase of science, but the application of knowledge as a working rule. I shall come to that in its turn, but I am concerned here with the center from which all scientific operations must be carried on, the scientific Greenwich meridian, the point of orientation from which we may take reliable bearings throughout the most complicated researches in which we may find ourselves involved.

Now the cardinal fact for social science to keep in view, the point of attachment of all its different radiations, is so obvious, it is so commonplace, it is so matter-of-fact, that when I put it into words you may think I am either trying to deceive you, or that I have deceived myself. You do not want to be put off with platitudes. You want a profound scientific principle. I shall have to face your certain disappointment at what I have to say on this phase of the subject. It will affect you as an entirely empty form of words. It is empty, however, not because it is untrue, but because it is in the class of those ultimate truths to which we do not expect to conform until the millennium. It is like the moral axiom: "Everybody ought to do the right thing." Nobody denies such a proposition, because the evidence in support of the denial would be hard to get; but few people would admit that such a commonplace can do much to change things as they are. In reality, human experience is made up of indirect ways of demonstrating by experience that so-called practical affairs are crude barbarities until they apply such moral axioms as regulators of conduct.

Let me further prepare your minds for the pivotal platitude which I shall express in a moment, by recalling the notorious fact that

all through the centuries during which human thought was vision-mongering before it began to be scientific, its essential vice was contempt for the commonplace, and traipsing off to something more impressive. Nobody knows, for instance, how many ages it was after people could count four, until they observed that two and two always count up four. We have records of several thousands of years of mythologizing about the movements of the heavenly bodies, before anyone was so vulgar as to drag orchard-windfalls into the case, and to suppose that there was anything in common between them and the orbits of the planets.

Now the social sciences need the same homily which the rustic father gave his son when the boy was starting out to make a fortune in the great world: "If you ever run up against anyone you're scairt of, John, remember they're only jest folks after all."

The social sciences are dealing with "jest folks." We have constructed in the name of science imposing systems of abstractions and generalizations about human experience. These conceptions would lose very much of their impressiveness, and on the whole would present a pathetic appeal for repair and renovation, if they were reconsidered by means of this test.

The center of orientation, then, for the social sciences, is the fact that the reality which they are attempting to report and interpret is simply: men paying attention to different objects, men finding other men the most difficult objects of attention, men forming valuations in view of their objects of attention, men adopting purposes in the line of their valuations, men selecting means of accomplishing the purposes, men applying the means in efforts to realize the purposes, men passing into changed personal equations in the course of these endeavors, men applying their modi-

fied personality to objects of attention which may themselves meanwhile have remained constant or in their turn may have been modified; and so on, with altered ratios of the terms, through recurring cycles, which so far as we know are endless, in which the element of central and final significance for our intelligence is the men, the cooperating men, the conflicting men, forever expressing themselves, forever becoming something they were not, forever stopping short of their promises, forever renewing their promises, but in spite of everything and because of everything forever giving all the value that we can discover to the whole experience.

. . . . .  
The common object of social science is *men acting*. At present the older social sciences more than the sociologists are seduced by the witchery of words. They think they are still dealing with men acting, when they are becoming fascinated by abstractions from men symbolized in pretentious general terms. The consequence is that they really substitute a make-believe world, an apocryphal world, for the human world.

The corrective of falsifying abstraction is orientation upon the real object. The central questions for social science are: What have men done and how and why, and what light does this experience throw upon what remains to be done, and how to do it?

To answer these questions the apparatus of all the social sciences will be required. Our answers will be reliable in the degree in which we learn to use all the apparatus by co-operative methods in the common labor of the social sciences. The central task of social science is to understand past and present men, and to derive from this knowledge valuations of both ends and means for the use of the men we shall be tomorrow.



## Part I

# Understanding Man and Society

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### CONCLUSION

In this section, we have examined some of the interpretations of man and society. These viewpoints are but a few of the ideas that have interested or influenced mankind. Nor are books and libraries the only places that such ideas may be found. Every human meeting place—the home, the school, the church, and the tavern—is a storehouse of these conceptions. Our political discussions, our complaints about taxes, and our gossip about neighbors are reflections of our ideas of man and society.

It is true that these ideas are seldom made explicit. When we decide how to spend the evening, we rarely examine our underlying reasons for preferring television to studying calculus. Nor do we often ask ourselves why we disagreed with our friends over the relative merits of candidates for public office. Yet, implicit or not, all of us have ideas about what is true and what is false, what is good and what is bad.

The aim of this section has been to consider the significance of differing ideas of man and society. All of us concede that the ideas of others are apt to be wrong. What we need to understand is the reason for the diversity of these ideas. We need first of all to recognize that these are *ideas*, or as Lippman puts it "pictures in our heads." The pictures are "fictions," not necessarily false, nor necessarily true. They are our attempts to grasp and comprehend the world about us. However, the complexity of this world and the speed at which it changes hamper us in the search for understanding. As a consequence, the images which we create are apt to be oversimplifications, if not distortions.

The importance of the pictures in our minds needs to be recognized. True or false, they serve as guideposts for social living. Travelling through the maze of society, we depend upon our mental road maps in order to reach our goals. Rarely do we question their accuracy even when we appear to be lost. On occasion, we learn that others have different, conflicting routes or maps. How often do we trouble to compare the divergent pictures in our minds?

The "road maps" which were considered in this section have been included because they illustrate some of the significant interpretations of man and society. What person has

not been urged to take up the glorious struggle for wealth and power? Who has not heard that it is a "dog eat dog" world? Have we not often been told, "Have fun; you only live once." These viewpoints are important because they have influenced human behavior.

The amount of influence which ideas have had is no measure of their usefulness or their truth. The "hardheaded" businessman may insist that his views are realistic. To the artist, these same views may appear superficial and "thickheaded." Yet artist and businessman alike may be treated as fools by the unscrupulous opportunist or as automatic recording mechanisms by the physiological psychologist.

Which of these views is correct? Is society a jungle, in which "tooth and claw" are the only laws? Are men impelled by the desire for power, or the search for understanding, or the struggle for survival? In actuality, how can such questions be answered? It must be recognized that there are many ways of viewing man and society. We may be guided by humane values, by artistic preferences, by business interests, or by political aspirations. Each of these, and various others, has its own rationale and its own justification; thus we have "art for art's sake" or "business is business." But art is not an answer to business, nor is religion a refutation of politics. All involve interpretations of man and society, interpretations which may differ from each other at times and which may coincide at other times.

Social science too is a point of view. But it is a point of view which needs to be understood on its own terms. It presupposes an open mind and a willingness to work. It suggests that we view men with neither fear nor awe, neither as tools nor as fools, but as men acting in various ways toward each other. It requires, first of all, an understanding of the meaning of social science: To this end, let us turn our attention.

## Part II

# The Meaning of Social Science

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### INTRODUCTION

*"He's so different from the rest of them. He seems to be an exception to the rule."*

*"Yes, but don't forget that the exception proves the rule."*

Does the exception prove the rule? If you throw a ball into the air and it stays up in the air, does this exception prove the rule of gravity? If not, where does the conception come from? Curiously, the idea that the exception proves the rule has been a wholly scientific one—not as it is popularly interpreted, however. The dictionary tells us that the term "prove" implies testing as well as verification. And it is in this sense of inquiry rather than conclusion that "prove" has been used in the past. Hence, to say that the exception proves the rule is to say that the exception *tests* the rule. In fact, we may even contend that the expression implies that the exception *disproves* the rule.

This little confusion concerns the *method* of science. For, above all, the scientist does *not* set out to prove his ideas but rather to study them, to subject them to critical test. All the methods of science are characterized by the attempt to arrive at truths, rather than to confirm the private biases of the individual. Objectivity and accuracy are also the basic tools of social science.

Although we may conclude that science is a broad term including all areas of systematic study, the problem still remains of determining what is social science. There are differences between the physicist doing research in his laboratory and the economist studying a union or a corporation, between the engineer and the social worker. The readings in this part deal with these differences.

As you study, note in your own mind what you judge to be differences between social and natural sciences. Are the differences simply those resulting from the fact that social science deals with men? Are the differences largely the result of difficulties in approaching human beings who, understandably, may resent being studied as chemists study atoms? Are there unique techniques in social science appropriate to social science alone? Since so much of social science is concerned with the thoughts and emotions of men, may

it not be that inquiry into these matters necessitates special methods of study? Furthermore, to what extent are our conclusions in social science—how men behave, for example—affected by what we judge *ought* to be the behavior of men? Can social scientists detach themselves so completely from the outcome of social behavior as to resemble the cold and dispassionate natural scientist? Indeed, is the natural scientist as coldly detached as commonly assumed?

The procedures of social science involve more than the effort to remain unbiased. The social scientist has at his disposal a variety of tools. Some of these are shared with other sciences; some are unique to social science. The diversity of the methods is a result of the very nature of social science, influenced as it is by both its scientific and its social character.

To understand man and society, it is necessary to understand the perspectives and the methods by which social scientists carry out their studies. Knowledge of these techniques can help us to evaluate appraisals by others.

## Social Science and the Senate

GEORGE LUNDBERG

Here is a brief description of a Congressional debate concerning the meaning of social science. It was an important one for the financial and the political future of social science. You should note both the ideas about social science and the consequences of these ideas. You should ask yourself why these ideas exist and why the consequences follow from them.

The author of this selection \* is entirely in *disagreement* with the consensus of the Senate. George Lundberg (1895- ) is a professor of sociology and statistics at the University of Washington. He is a former president of the American Sociological Society. He has also authored *Foundations of Sociology* (1939) and *Can Science Save Us* (1947).

On July 3, 1946, the United States Senate passed a bill to establish a National Science Foundation, after excluding the section designed to make the provisions of the bill applicable also to the social sciences. Since the social sciences must perhaps depend in the future largely on public provision for their advancement, the reasons assigned for excluding them in the most comprehensive legislation yet proposed for the advancement of science is a matter of some interest from several points of view. In the first place, the discussion of the matter in the committee hearings and on the floor of the Senate gives us some indication of the present attitude of legislators toward the social sciences. In the second

place, an analysis of this attitude affords us clues as to the nature of the obstacles to be overcome before the social sciences can expect to share the prestige and the support accorded the other sciences.

The present article will deal only with the public expression of attitudes as found in the *Congressional Record* for July 1-3, 1946, and in the reports of the preceding committee hearings. I have no "inside" information regarding the "real" or "true" views of everyone concerned, or of lobbies or "politics" involved. Likewise this article does not deal with the efforts of individuals and organizations for or against the inclusion of the social sciences, except as these find expression in the published record. Finally, I am not primarily concerned with a criticism of the senators opposing the legislation as a whole or the inclusion of the

\* From "The Senate Ponders Social Science," by George Lundberg, *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 64 (1947), pp. 397-400. Reprinted by permission.

social sciences in particular. Their attitudes may be regarded as entirely sincere and as a true reflection of public opinion on the subject of the social sciences. It is more pertinent to inquire into the possibly legitimate grounds for such views as exist, in the actual behavior of social scientists themselves at present. While taking this impersonal view of the Senate's action, it is proper to compliment the sponsors and certain supporters of the bill on their earnest efforts on its behalf. Special credit in this connection is deserved by Senator Magnuson, of Washington, Senator Kilgore, of West Virginia, Senator Fulbright, of Louisiana, and Senator Thomas, of Idaho.

The bill as reported favorably by the Committee on Military Affairs included the social sciences. Let us therefore consider first the record of the bill on the Senate floor, confining ourselves to the discussion leading up to the exclusion of the social sciences. Later we shall review the more extensive discussions of the subject at the hearings.

On the first day of the debate Senator Radcliffe, of Maryland (A.B., Johns Hopkins, 1897, and Ph.D., 1900), made certain justifiable remarks regarding the danger of crackpots and "applied" social science research with specific references to "men addicted to isms" (8166) and "wild-eyed so-called research" (8167). (Senator Radcliffe, however, voted for the inclusion of the social sciences.) At this point also there arose the question as to the definition of social science. Senator Fulbright had the floor, and the following discussion ensued:

Senator Fulbright: I asked an able scientist yesterday if he would define social science. I had been worrying about that. He said in his definition, "In the first place I would not call it science. What is commonly called social science is one individual or group of individuals telling another group how they should live" (8164).

Senator Willis (B.A., Wabash College, 1896; M.A., honoris causa, 1902): I wonder if that is not a pretty good definition (8164).

*It may be stated here that the general tone of the discussion throughout the three days indicated that most senators were of the opinion that the above was a pretty good definition. There is evidence too that one reason*

why provision for research in the social sciences appeared to the senators to be unnecessary was that, after all, we already know the answer to social problems. For example, Senator Willis delivered himself of the following: "It is a question of keeping selfishness in restraint, that is all" (8165).

I suspect that the above represents a major type of reason for the exclusion of the social sciences from the provisions of Senate Bill 1850. However, the assigned reasons which finally were conclusive seem to have to do with the feeling that the legislation was for the purpose of promoting basic research and that the most that could ever be true of the social sciences was that they had to do with practical applications and planning. For example, Senator Hart, of Connecticut (Naval Academy, 1897, Admiral, Ret., 1945), one of the two principal opponents of the inclusion of the social science provision, made the following statement:

Senator Hart: Support of social science and research should be limited to studies and planning. That is a very good and practical reason why the social sciences should be omitted entirely from the bill which is primarily for improvement in the basic sciences . . . (8216). The fact is that social studies and basic science are not sufficiently alike either to be joined by the same legislation or to be administered by the same organization (8217).

This point of view was also much stressed by the chief opponent of the social science provision, Senator Smith, of New Jersey (B.A., Princeton, 1901; LL.B., Columbia, 1904; LL.D., honoris causa, Brussels, 1930, Princeton, 1945; Executive Secretary of Princeton University, 1919-27, lecturer, Department of Politics, Princeton University, 1927-30). Both Senator Smith and Senator Hart had recently become members of the Senate to fill unexpired terms and both had served only about one year. There was on the part of the senators much deference to Senator Smith on account of what is referred to as "his distinguished academic career" as giving him special qualifications to speak on this subject.

Senator Smith: I should like to see the social sciences given aid, but I think their problem is

such a different one that the two should not be joined in this bill . . . (8233). (*Social science research*) definitely has nothing to do with this bill. The bill has to do with basic research in pure sciences as they are understood in the academic world (8237).

Consider the further remarks of Senators Hart and Smith:

Senator Hart: In the first place, no agreement has been reached with reference as to what social science really means. It may include philosophy, anthropology, all the racial questions, all kinds of economics including political economics, literature, perhaps religion, and various kinds of ideology . . . There is no connection between the social sciences, a very abstract field, and the concrete field which constitutes the other subjects to be dealt with by the proposed science foundation. Mr. President, this may well be a field in which the Government should proceed to foster and subsidize research; but I submit that it has no place in this bill. This is a bill for the promotion of research in the fundamentals of natural sciences. . . . Furthermore, Mr. President, what to my mind is one of the greatest objections to its inclusion in the bill is the fact that no board, no administrative organization which we could set up could possibly be adequately qualified to administer such policies and carry on work in two fields so absolutely diverse . . . (8348-49).

Senator Smith: I have conceived of this bill, as I have said so many times, as a bill for research in pure science, not in applied science but in pure science. We are trying to subsidize pure science, the discovery of truth. This has nothing to do with the theory of life, it has nothing to do with history, it has nothing to do with law, it has nothing to do with sociology (8349).

This latter view of the case, coming from a man regarded as an authority on the matter at hand, seems to have carried the day. The principal voice raised to the contrary was that of Senator Thomas, of Utah, who toward the close of the debate delivered the following:

Senator Thomas: Mr. President, no invention, no patent, no scientific development amounts to anything for the benefit of the people anywhere

unless it has its social aspect, and for us to assume that we can carry on this great political institution, the Government of the United States, and cause it to develop for the benefit of the people of the United States, without having reference to that great branch of knowledge which is called social science, would be to make the mistake of all time. . . . If we insert limitations barring social science in this bill, which establishes a great foundation, they will cripple—probably forever—the very things that government wishes to do most (8349).

. . . . .  
A study of the three-day debate on Senate Bill 1850 shows that the matter of the inclusion of the social sciences received no considerable amount of the total attention, which was devoted to other aspects of the National Science Foundation proposal. The question of the inclusion of the social sciences was definitely a side issue. The whole proposal for a National Science Foundation was apparently a somewhat mysterious subject to most of the senators. The following remark is significant in this connection:

Senator Hawkes: I wish to say that I am in favor of scientific development, but I personally do not believe that this body understands what it is doing. I have talked to any number of senators and all seem to be at sea and in a fog as to what we are asked to do (8265).

The main reason that the bill finally passed even with the social sciences excluded seems to have been a general feeling that perhaps the legislation had something to do with the atomic bomb or protection thereof. Coming up, as the bill did, toward the close of a legislative session, there is every reason to believe that Senator Hawkes' observations are correct. The vote to exclude the social sciences, therefore, should perhaps not be taken as reflecting any considered hostility or opposition on the part of the Senate, but simply as a reflection of the common feeling that the social and physical sciences have nothing in common and that at best the social sciences are a propagandist, reformist, evangelical sort of cult.

# The Art of Social Science

ROBERT REDFIELD

Is social science really *science*? Or is it merely one man's opinion against another's? If social science were really scientific, would there be so much controversy? Perhaps where there is smoke, there may be fire. And if social science is not widely accepted, is it not because human behavior cannot be studied in the same way that we analyze atoms and bacteria?

Robert Redfield (1897-1958) was an anthropologist. His field studies are familiar to all social scientists. These include: *Tepoztlán: A Mexican Village* (1930); *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (1941); *Peasant Society and Culture* (1956) and many others. These actual experiences led him to formulate the view presented in this selection,\* that the practice of social science is an art. Does this mean that it is a waste of time to study man and society?

It is the example of the natural sciences which social scientists have on the whole striven to imitate. In the short history of social science its practitioners have turned their admiring gazes toward their neighbors on the scientific side. They have looked that way, perhaps, because the natural sciences were the current success. They have looked that way, surely, because when the students of human nature in society came to think of themselves as representing one or more disciplines, with professors and places in universities and in national councils, social science was not very

scientific: it was speculative and imprecise. To achieve identity, it had to grow away from the making of personally conceived systems of abstract thought. It had to learn to build, a brick at a time, and to develop procedures that would make the building public and subject to testing.

But now the invention and the teaching of special procedures have received too exclusive an emphasis in the doing of social science and in the making of social scientists. In places the invention and the teaching of special procedures have gone ahead of the possibility of finding out anything very significant with their aid. It is certainly desirable to be precise about something worth knowing. It is good to teach men and women who are

\* Reprinted from "The Art of Social Science" by Robert Redfield, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 54 (1948), pp. 188-90, by permission of The University of Chicago Press.



to be social scientists how to use the instruments of observation and analysis that have been developed in their disciplines. But it is not good to neglect that other equally important side of social science.

To identify social science very closely with the physical sciences is to take one view of the education of social scientists: to think of that education chiefly in terms of formal method and formal knowledge of society already achieved and to be taught. Then programs for making social scientists will be made up of training in techniques and the opportunity to take part in some kind of research in which the procedures are already determined and the problems set by some established master. Then the holder of a fellowship will go to a school, where a way of working is well known and well fixed, and he will acquire the procedural competences taught at that school.

If this is all we do for young students of society, we are likely to have proficient technicians, but we are not likely to have great social scientists or to have many books written that are as illuminating and as influential as those by Sumner, Veblen, and de Tocqueville.

It would be well to give some attention to the humanistic aspect of social science. Part of the preparation of good social scientists is humanistic education. As what is called general education, or liberal education, is largely humanistic, it follows that the social scientist has two interests in liberal education. Like the physicist, like everybody else, the social scientist needs liberal education in his role as a citizen. But, in addition, he needs liberal humanistic education in his role as a social scientist.

The art of social science cannot be inculcated, but, like other arts, it can be encouraged to develop. The exercise of that art can be favored by humanistic education. If the social scientist is to apprehend, deeply and widely and correctly, persons and societies and cultures, then he needs experience, direct or vicarious, with persons, societies, and cultures. This experience is partly had through acquaintance with history, literature, biography, and ethnography. And if philosophy gives some experience in the art of formulating and in thinking about widely inclusive generalizations, then the social scientist needs acquaint-

ance with philosophy. There is no longer any need to be fearful about philosophy. The time when young social science was struggling to make itself something different from philosophy is past. Now social science is something different. Now social scientists need to learn from philosophy, not to become philosophers, but to become better social scientists. The acquaintance with literature, biography, ethnography, and philosophy which is gained in that general education given in high schools and colleges is probably not rich enough or deep enough for some of those who are to become social scientists. The opportunities for advanced education given to some who appear to have exceptional gifts as students of man in society may well consist of the study of Chinese or East Indian culture, or of the novel in Western literature, or of the history of democracy.

The humanistic aspect of social science is the aspect of it that is today not well appreciated. Social science is essentially scientific in that its propositions describe, in general terms, natural phenomena; in that it returns again and again to special experience to verify and to modify these propositions. It tells what is, not what ought to be. It investigates nature. It strives for objectivity and accuracy. It employs hypotheses and formal evidence; it values negative cases; and, when it finds a hypothesis to be unsupported by the facts, it drops it for some other which is. But these are all aspects of social science so well known that it is tedious to list them again. What is less familiar, but equally true, is that to create the hypothesis, to reach the conclusion, to get, often, the very first real datum as to what are A's motives or what is the meaning of this odd custom or that too-familiar institution, requires on the part of one who studies persons and societies, and not rocks or proteins, a truly humanistic and freely imaginative insight into people, their conventions and interests and motives, and that this requirement in the social scientist calls for gifts and for a kind of education different from that required of any physicist and very similar to what is called for in a creative artist.

If this be seen, it may also be seen that the function of social science in our society is a double function. Social science is cus-

tomarily explained and justified by reason of what social science contributes to the solution of particular problems that arise in the management of our society, as a help in getting particular things done. As social scientists we take satisfaction in the fact that today, as compared with thirty years ago, social scientists are employed because their employers think that their social science is applicable to some practical necessity. Some knowledge of techniques developed in social science may be used: to select taxicab drivers that are not likely to have accidents; to give vocational guidance; to discover why one business enterprise has labor troubles while a similar enterprise does not; to make more effective some governmental program carried into farming communities; to help the War Relocation Authority carry out its difficult task with Japanese-Americans.

All these contributions to efficiency and adjustment may be claimed with justice by social scientists. What is also to be claimed, and is less commonly stressed, is that social science contributes to that general understanding of the world around us which, as we say, "liberalizes," or "enriches." The relation of social science to humanistic learning is reciprocal. Social scientists need humanistic learning the better to be social scientists. And the understanding of society, personality, and human nature which is achieved by scientific methods returns to enrich that humanistic understanding without which none can become human and with which some few may become wise. Because its subject matter is humanity, the contribution of social science

to general, liberal education is greater than is the contribution of those sciences with subject matter that is physical. In this respect also, creative artist and social scientist find themselves side by side. The artist may reveal something of universal human or social nature. So too may the social scientist. No one has ever applied, as a key to a lock, Sumner's *Folkways* or Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* or James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. These are not the works of social science that can be directly consulted and applied when a government office or a business concern has an immediate problem. But they are the books of lasting influence. Besides what influence they have upon those social scientists who come to work in the government office, or the business concern, in so far as they are read and understood and thought about by men and women who are not social scientists, or even as they are communicated indirectly by those who have read them to others, they are part of humanistic education, in the broad sense. Releasing us from our imprisonment in the particular, we are freed by seeing how we are exemplifications of the general. For how many young people has not Sumner's book, or Veblen's book, or some work by Freud, come as a swift widening of the doors of vision, truly a liberation, a seeing of one's self, perhaps for the first time, as sharing the experiences, the nature, of many other men and women? So I say that social science, as practiced, is something of an art and that, as its best works are communicated, it has something of the personal and social values of all the arts.

## Facts and Values in Social Science

F.S.C. NORTHROP

Imagine two chemists discussing the composition of a liquid. Each says that his formula is correct. How do they decide? Note that neither claims the formula ought to be the correct one but only that it is or is not! Nor is either concerned about the "wishes" or the "hopes" of their chemicals. Compare, however, the way in which we study unions, divorce, legislation, political parties, taxes, and juvenile delinquency. We are not content with description, no matter how accurate. We insist rather that this is good and that is bad.

The implications of this situation for science are considered in this selection \* by a philosopher of science, F.S.C. Northrop.

In natural science there are only problems of fact. Having found, upon the verification of Kepler's three laws of planetary motion, that planets move in an orbit which is an ellipse, astronomers do not face the normative problem concerning whether the planets should not do squads right in an orbit which is a rectangle.

But social institutions, being in part at least man-made, confront the scientist with two quite different questions: (1) What is the character of social institutions in fact? This is a question comparable to the astronomer's question with respect to the solar system; and (2) How ought social institutions to be? Even

though murder and unemployment exist, should one or the other or both be outlawed? Even though actual social organization in a given society be monarchical, should it not be replaced by social organization of a democratic, a socialist or a communist form?

The first of these two types of question is factual; the second is normative. Thus, whereas natural science faces only problems of fact, social science is confronted with problems of fact and with problems of value.

The generalizations appropriate for these two types of problem are fundamentally different. Also, the scientific method appropriate for determining the one type of generalization is quite different and very inappropriate for determining that of the other.

But unless it is realized that science begins with the problem or problems which initiate

\* From *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*, pp. 255-57, by F.S.C. Northrop, copyright 1947, reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Co.

inquiry, not with facts or with some preconceived method, this basic difference between the two types of problem in social science is not noted, and the need for different scientific methods to resolve the different types of problems is not recognized.

When such oversights occur, confusion results. Normative theories presenting reforms are put forward as if they were factual theories of what is or will be inevitably the case. Or factual information or factual theories are put forward as if they were relevant for confirming or denying normative proposals. Or, what is most usually the case, the end-product is a theory which is neither a verified factual theory of what is the case nor a verified normative theory of what should be the case but a worthless hodge-podge of the two.

It is important to have different names for these two types of theory in social science. It seems appropriate to call them factual social theory and normative social theory respectively.

A factual social theory is one which is false if it is not in complete accord with what is the case. Such a theory of the present social

order in the United States will be one that describes existing conditions as they are. It will involve hypotheses and go beyond mere description, but its unique characteristic will be that if there is even one fact out of accord with it, the factual social theory to that extent will not be scientifically verified.

A normative social theory designates what ought to be, rather than what is. Classical Anglo-American democracy, British Labor Government Socialism, Roman Catholic Thomism and Soviet Russian Communism are *normative social theories*. None corresponds perfectly to any *de facto* state of affairs anywhere. They designate possible ideals, rather than the actual. Thus, by its very nature a normative social theory differs always in part and perhaps even *in toto* from what is in fact the case.

This means that the scientific method for determining normative social theory cannot be that of natural science applied to social facts. The latter method is appropriate for factual social theory. It is inappropriate for normative social theory.

## *The Method of Social Science*

ERNEST GREENWOOD

In this selection, a specialist in the field of social work summarizes the procedures of social science. He also compares pure research in social science and the applications of social knowledge. The viewpoint of this article needs to be compared with the preceding interpretations. What similarities can be noted? What differences are there? Can these be reconciled?

The article from which this excerpt is taken is by Ernest Greenwood.\* Try to summarize the basic methods of social science as they are described below.

A science may be defined as a system of descriptive propositions about some aspect of nature. The social sciences differ from the physical and biological ones in their attempts to describe the highest organization of nature, viz., the characteristics and the products of human behavior as it occurs within social configurations. Each of the social sciences abstracts from the total behavior complex one single differentiating aspect. Thus all social sciences study the same materials, but each from a separate frame of reference. This artificial partialization of reality is justified on the grounds of efficiency. There can be as many independent social sciences as major disun-

guishing references for viewing the social world.

The descriptive propositions of every science, the social sciences included, possess a generalizing character. Scientists are uninterested in single and completely unique events *per se*. Instead, their aim is to discover under the surface layer of diversity the thread of uniformity. Around a discovered uniformity a logical class is constructed; about the class and its observed pattern a descriptive generalization is formulated. Scientists are alert to opportunities for combining comparable classes into a broader class and for formulating a wider and more abstract generalization to comprehend the discrete generalizations thereby embraced. Thus are generated scientific laws. An example is the sociological law: *Human groups characterized by internal organization and relative permanence eventually develop subcultures of their own.* The latter links up

\*Reprinted from "Social Science and Social Work: A Theory of Their Relationship," by Ernest Greenwood, *The Social Service Review*, Vol. 29 (1953), pp. 20-33, by permission of The University of Chicago Press.

a series of generalizations about human groups. Laws, in turn, may be connected to one another to yield more general formulations of even higher abstraction. It is through such interlocking and pyramiding of its generalizations that a social science achieves a system of interrelated propositions, which, with all their elaborations, ramifications, and rationalizations, constitute its body of theory.

The mental process which we have just summarized is customarily referred to in the technical literature as the *construction of theoretical models* of the social world. In other words, the formulations of social scientists are their conceptions of the order that appears to them to be operating underneath the chaotic façade of observables. Scientists constantly seek increasingly closer approximation of their theoretical models to the reality that the latter purport to describe. The process is analogous to curve-fitting in descriptive statistics, where the aim is to find a formula that will yield minimum deviations of the actual points from the plotted curve. The function of research in the service of a social science is to test the accuracy of its theoretical models, so as to bring about maximum correlation between these descriptive formulations and the social phenomena thus described.

The research process consists of two components, the logical and the technical; the logical both precedes and succeeds the technical. In the initial phase of the research process we move from the theoretical formulation which is to be validated to an operational hypothesis which is subsequently tested. The hypothesis itself is a consequent of the theory and is reached through a deductive chain. When we deduce a hypothesis, we indulge in a prediction from the theory; by implication we are saying: "If this theoretical model is correct, then such and such facts will be observed under such and such conditions." Phase two consists of the actual test of the hypothesis and is primarily technical in nature. Now we construct a study design to fit the hypothesis and move through the steps called for by the design. This means conducting the observations, where possible, under experimental conditions and with mensurative devices; recording the observations; and subjecting the observational data to analysis. Interpretation, the final phase

of the research process, is also logical. Here we evaluate the degree of consistency between the empirical results and the theory under examination. If the test of the operational hypothesis yields results consistent with the theory, the latter has been validated. If the results are inconsistent with the theory, the latter must be reformulated to accommodate the deviation. Then the new formulation is resubmitted to similar validation.

The logical and technical operations of research must be communicable by one scientist to another, so that a second scientist may be able to verify his colleague's work. There is a tendency among social workers to equate scientific research with technique and to believe that because an investigation employs observational devices, recording gadgets, and statistical manipulations, it is *ipso facto* scientific. Techniques are undeniably important in insuring the refinement and standardization of observations. But accurate observation is only one of the two desiderata of scientific research, the other being its theoretical significance. Research, to be scientific, must proceed from a body of theory and feed back into that theory; its goal always is to test and to expand scientific theory. It is this fact which imparts to the findings of scientific research their cumulative character. A dozen separate research projects testing a dozen different hypotheses deduced from the same piece of theory will produce results that can be summed.

In his efforts to develop theory, the social scientist need not be, and very often is not, concerned with its applicability. He subordinates the requirement of utility to that of theoretical significance. Scientific investigation, the object of which is knowledge for its own sake, is referred to as "pure" or "basic" research and has been confined traditionally to the university setting. While the scientist personally may be motivated by curiosity to know for the sake of knowing, society is motivated to support him in his activity by the faith that the pure knowledge he produces will eventually prove useful. The history of science is a confirmation of this faith. The most important technological advances of modern times had their genesis in scientific discoveries which originally carried no practical significance. Faraday's discovery of the principle of mag-

netoelectricity is a classic case in point. The story is that, when he was asked what use he saw in his discovery, Faraday answered: "Of what use is a newborn babe?"

There are workers in every social science who are less interested in pure research and are more enticed by the possibilities of applying pure knowledge to the solution of problems arising out of human relationships. These are the social scientists who are drawn out of the university by the administrators of industrial, commercial, military, educational, health, welfare, and other organizations, to assist in the solution of problems arising in these settings. It is the applied research performed by these social scientists which converts social science theory into utilitarian forms and structures.

Viewed ideally, the conversion process may be broken down as follows: The social scientist first attempts to classify the professional's problem as a specimen within a large class of phenomena already identified and described by his science. Having done this, he then brings to bear upon the problem the generalizations which his science has formulated about this class. These formulations serve as his conceptual tools for observing the problem intensively, isolating its elements, and reordering them, so that they are seen in a new light. As a result, alternative solutions to the problem begin to emerge, each of which is tested. Around the successful solution a generalizing proposition is formulated which may henceforth serve as a guide for action whenever this type of problem recurs; the latter is a *principle*. It is in this manner that scientific laws are converted into principles.

Because of the differential emphases of pure and applied research, a notion is widely current that two distinctly different types of social science exist, viz., theoretical or pure social science, on the one hand, and applied social science, on the other. This view would consider general sociology as a theoretical science and, for example, industrial sociology as an applied social science. The trend in the scientific literature is to regard the latter view as misconceived. That scientists within the same discipline work in different settings and have different immediate objectives must not obscure the unity both in their methods and

in their ultimate results. In the first place, the methods employed in both types of scientific inquiry are identical. In both instances the research consists of logical and technical operations which are communicable, repeatable, and verifiable. The aim of applied research is also generalization about classes; the concern is not with individual and specific problems, but with a class of problems. The implied question for investigation always is: What type of action is indicated in a given type of situation to achieve a given type of goal? However, the classes investigated are narrower than in pure research; thus an industrial sociologist is interested in industrial conflict rather than in social conflict in general.

In the second place, applied research is theory-related, just as pure research is. In the process of applying scientific theory to problem solving, the applied researcher tests its validity. If the theoretical propositions of a social science are accurate models of social reality, the researcher should be able to extrapolate from them to type problems and to evolve fitting principles for them. A theoretical model that cannot be applied is incorrect. Should the extrapolation from theory fail to yield the anticipated solution, it might indicate that the theory required revision; and the problem situation might furnish the very clues suggesting the lines of revision. On the other hand, should the application of the theory yield practical principles, it would be a corroboration of the theory, with a consequent strengthening of the theoretical system of the social science. Therefore, while the immediate purpose of applied research is utilitarian, its ultimate result is to refine and build social science theory.

Furthermore, scientists who perform pure research and those who do applied research do not experience the cleavage imputed to them. Every social scientist who plans to earn his keep through applied research knows that he must first be thoroughly trained in fundamental theory. An industrial sociologist is, first and foremost, an expert on human organization as such, and only after that is he an expert on industrial organization. Social scientists who perform applied research belong to the same professional organizations and read and contribute to the same journals as do those

who engage in pure research. In these days of heightened tempo, social scientists move back and forth between the university and the community, one day being preoccupied with pure research and the next day with applied. And in either role they regard themselves as contributing to one and the same

body of knowledge. Therefore, while it is appropriate to distinguish between pure or basic social research and applied social research, it promotes confusion to talk of a pure social science as distinct from an applied social science. A given social science discipline is a whole, and both types of research feed into it.



## What Are the Social Sciences?

EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN

[Whether art or science, social science studies the relationship between man and society. Yet, just as physical science requires specialization in electronics or fission, so social science is in practice *social sciences*. The many facets of man and society—business, government, family, and others—have required special training, techniques, and perspective. In this selection,\* a distinguished American economist attempts to describe and explain the nature and the character of the social sciences.]

Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman (1861–1939) was professor of political economy at Columbia University. He wrote numerous technical works on taxation and finance; however, he is best known as the editor in chief of the fifteen volume *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

From the very beginning of analysis and classification the field of science has been divided between physical nature and the phenomena of mind. The natural sciences have to deal with the phenomena of the universe in which our world forms so tiny a speck. By common consent, although not quite accurately, we contrast with these what are traditionally termed the mental or cultural sciences, those that deal with what takes place in man himself, in the realm of his mental life. We say "not quite accurately" because it is clearly inadmissible to assume that the mind is entirely independent of the body or that the mental processes are not in

themselves subject, in part at least, to the play of natural forces.

Accepting, however, the common distinction between the natural sciences, on the one hand, and the mental or cultural sciences, on the other, it is obvious that the latter fall into two categories. The one deals with man as a separate individual, conceived of as dissociated from his fellow beings. [The discipline of logic, for instance, deals with certain mental processes of the individual as a separate entity. Other sciences treat of man as a member of a group.] In contrast to the separate wants, which can be satisfied by the unaided action of the individual, are wants experienced by the individual which can be satisfied only by associated or group action. These we call the common wants. Common, like separate, wants

\* From the introduction to the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Vol. 1, pp. 3–7, copyright 1937, reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Co.

are experienced by the individual; the difference consists in the appropriate methods of satisfaction. In the one case the satisfaction of the want is obtained by unaided action; in the other by associated action. (The phenomena thus related to group activities are commonly called social phenomena, and the sciences which classify and interpret such activities are the social sciences.) The social sciences may thus be defined as those mental or cultural sciences which deal with the activities of the individual as a member of a group.

Since the common wants of mankind are exceedingly diversified, the group activities designed to satisfy these wants are correspondingly manifold. In the measure that these group activities have been subjected to study, the social sciences have multiplied. They may be said to fall into three classes—the purely social sciences, the semi-social sciences, and the sciences with social implications.

Perhaps the earliest of the social sciences is politics, for the most important of human groups has in general been the state. The state is indeed not the earliest group, nor has it always been the most important. In the millennia which have elapsed since the advent of man, the state was a relatively late comer in the succession of human associations. When scientific discussion arose in Greece, the pre-political groups had dwindled to insignificance or had been absorbed by the all-embracing state. The chief concern of the Greek sages was accordingly politics or political science because it dealt with the *polis*, the highest form of the self-governing commonwealth.

On a somewhat lower plane, in the purview of the Greeks, stood the second of the social sciences, economics. For while politics dealt with the state—the noblest embodiment of human striving—economics had reference to the *oikos*, the household which represented man's property relations. The right ordering of the household—including in one's possessions his wife, his children and his slaves—was indeed important; but the acquisition of wealth, especially in what we should nowadays call business, seemed to the Greeks to stand on a distinctly lower level.

When in the sixteenth century the problem of the acquisition of wealth shifted from that

of individual salvation, as typified by the mediaeval usury doctrine, to national strength and power, the way was prepared for the advent of modern economics. Because of these national prepossessions, de Watteville suggested the term political economy; for it was the national state which was to shape the new system of wealth relations. So strong was this feeling that even Adam Smith, despite his doubts as to the desirability of government interference, could not escape from fastening the term political economy on the discipline which he did so much to develop. It was over a century later before the real social implications of the science were perceived, with a consequence that its leading votaries reverted to the old name given to it by the Greeks and that today we speak of economics, or sometimes of social economics. The political implications are indeed apprehended, but even more than politics itself economics is nowadays recognized as primarily a social science.

The third of the older disciplines that we trace back to the Greeks is history. From the outset history has laid claim to a field co-extensive with human interests. In the work of Herodotus history appears more closely related to the art of literature than to any science, and throughout the centuries history has maintained the union of art with science. In the hands of Thucydides history centered its interest in the state. Its spirit became essentially scientific, and its methods and results represent important contributions to political science. Among the classical and mediaeval successors of Herodotus and Thucydides, while many were essentially annalists or litterateurs seeking dramatic or epic material in past events, the function of history as an inquiry into the genesis and development of political forms and institutions was never entirely forgotten. History has never actually been "past politics" alone; but until comparatively recent times it has served the social sciences mainly through the material it afforded for the interpretation of politics. In the last century history has not only become far more rigorous in its scientific method, but it has extended its scope to the inclusion of the manifold phenomena of human life, individual and mass phenomena as well as those of formal political organization. Thus history has

become an indispensable source of material for the interpretation of all manner of social processes.

The fourth of the older social disciplines is jurisprudence. Even in primitive society certain customs hardened into the rigid coercive relations that we call law. But it was long after the legal systems of relatively advanced states had developed, that law was recognized as an embodiment of justice and that jurisprudence arose. It was primarily the Romans who were led to cultivate this science because of the need of solidifying their world empire. The civil law, like the common law, yielded the chief opportunities that existed in the Middle Ages for the discussion of what were the most important relations of man to man. Next to theology law was the moving force in the creation of the mediæval universities. It was the most significant of the cultural sciences, and its votaries far outnumbered those devoted to politics or history.

Although Rome sought through its *jus gentium* and *jus naturale*, as England later did through its system of equity, to loosen the rigidity of the early system, the accommodation of the old legal forms to the newer social habits was slow. To this extent jurisprudence was conceived as something quite independent of, and unrelated to, the other social disciplines. It is only in very recent times that a change for the better has ensued. More and more have we come to recognize the reciprocal relations of law and economics; more and more has criminal law been influenced by penology; more and more do we hear of the new sociological jurisprudence. What is taking place, in other words, is a recognition of the fact that legal relations are inextricably intertwined with the other phases of human association, and that an adequate legal system must always reflect the myriad forms of social life. Modern jurisprudence, abandoning its early claim to complete independence, has been definitely recognized as one of the social sciences.

Thus the four older disciplines—politics, economics, history and jurisprudence—have outgrown their early separatism and have increasingly realized their interpenetration. Each is gradually recognizing that it is primarily a social science and that this reciprocity enriches

its own domain and deepens its own conclusions.

While the disciplines thus far considered reach back to the beginnings of scientific endeavor, there are others of more recent origin, a result of the modern curiosity as to social relations. The characteristic feature of these newer disciplines is that they arose at a time when a growing recognition of the intertwining of all the human strands in the texture of life was leading to a disappearance of separatism in the older sciences. The newer sciences have thus never presented so hard a crust of tradition to be penetrated.

The first of the newer social sciences is anthropology. A study of early man, historic and prehistoric, became possible only after the rise of some of the natural sciences like geology. The unearthing of primitive artifacts—tools, implements and ornaments—led to the discussion of their uses or social connotations; and the later progress in the study of still existing primitive groups broadened the comprehension of all manner of early customs. Thus anthropology was ready, almost from the outset, to recognize its affiliations with the other social sciences; and while it succeeded in throwing light on early political, economic and legal conditions it received in turn from these sciences many a valuable suggestion.

The second of the newer social sciences is penology. Until the time of Beccaria and Bentham there was no development of such a science because the offender was from the earliest times deemed to be the rightful object of communal vengeance. The commission of a crime was *lèse majesté*—an infraction of the king's peace or of the community's tranquillity. It was only natural for society to revenge itself on the malefactor by putting him out of the way. Criminal law was as barbaric as the conception of vengeance. But when it was recognized that attention must be paid not only to the rights of the group but to the possibilities of the individual, the first step was taken toward a more rational theory of punishment, and the science of penology was ushered in. A much longer step in advance, however, was taken when crime was recognized as at least in part a disease. The final advance was the realization of a large

degree of social responsibility for both crime and disease. Modern penology is coming into intimate relations with economic and social conditions in general. Penology as a social pathology is contributing in full measure to the understanding of a normal social life.

Sociology, the next of the newer sciences, is only three-quarters of a century old, and has scarcely come of age even today. It is the most ambitious of all the social sciences, because in a sense the most comprehensive. As its very name signifies, it is an endeavor to lay bare the foundations of all living together, to elucidate the laws which lie at the basis of social intercourse. Far deeper than the economic or the legal or the political relations are those which govern human association in general. Sociology is the social science *par excellence*. It is also the most difficult of the cultural sciences. If it is not easy correctly to appraise one's self, how much more arduous is it to know one's neighbor or to evaluate one's own reactions to him. It is no wonder that sociology is still far from the definiteness and unity that characterize the older social sciences. Nor is it surprising that broad generalizations lacking adequate verification still hold an important place in sociological theory. Nevertheless sociology remains the most important of human sciences. Only when real progress has been made in the elucidation of its laws, can we hope to attain a comprehension of life itself with its countless facets.

In the formative period in the history of sociology a wide range of social activities were for convenience subsumed under its rubrics,

although not essentially related to its theories. Such, for instance, were the history and technique of charities and corrections, and the whole institutional structure built up to deal with them. What characterizes this entire field is the association of scientific inquiry with social action. The typical procedure is an investigation of a concrete situation as, for example, excessive infant mortality in a given area, followed by recommendations for remedial action, and the actual organization and administration of remedial measures.

For this whole range of activities the term *social work* has come into vogue, a term intended to emphasize the union of inquiry and action. Social work thus conceived holds a position analogous to that of engineering in its modern phases. Like the engineer the social worker starts with a concrete problem, and in his inquiries draws freely upon all the social sciences. So, too, in devising remedial measures he draws upon materials derived not only from the other social sciences but from the natural sciences and the arts as well. As in the engineering field, so in social work recent tendencies point to a vast extension in the future, with multiform specialization. Schools, hospitals, nurseries, housing, employment in factories or in commercial establishments, institutions for the handicapped may serve as examples of the field in which the social worker is applying his professionalized methods of investigation and offering his professional services.

The sciences that have thus far been mentioned are the purely social sciences.

## Part II

# *The Meaning of Social Science*

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### CONCLUSION

Our consideration of the failure of Prohibition revealed the dangers of oversimplified interpretations of man and society. Today, social scientists are agreed that the sale of alcohol is not the cause of alcoholism. So, too, we know that precinct "bosses" do not depend upon stuffed ballot-boxes and that assessing substantial reparations against a defeated nation is a self-defeating effort. Such knowledge is not necessarily common sense. Indeed, common sense is often misleading. Witness, for instance, the seeming motion of the sun and the apparent absence of motion by the earth.

Valid knowledge of man and society necessarily requires the willingness to re-examine one's preconceived ideas. Objectivity must replace personal biases and prejudices. Only then is it possible to begin, fairly and accurately, to explore the social world in which we live. Yet this exploration is no easy task. If an open mind is a prerequisite to understanding, hard work is the basic means of achieving it. Knowledge requires effort, persistent and impelling effort, effort of thought and action.

There are no short cuts to knowledge, but there are ways of eliminating some of the blind alleys. These ways are the established methods of social science. Past experience has taught social scientists how to minimize the effects of personal bias and how to avoid wholly trial-and-error activity. The lessons of long experience have become the rules of research and scholarship. Indeed, the use of certain rules or methods has been considered the very basis of social science.

Art or science, the procedures of social science are not rigid and inflexible. Nor are they intentionally complicated. On the contrary, the social scientist aims to find simplified techniques and interpretations in the most suitable, easiest manner. However, familiarity with the subject to be studied is ever the first step in the process of scientific understanding. To be an expert, therefore, the social scientist must learn all that he can from others, including past and present interpretations, good ideas, and experimental findings. Such knowledge is obtainable from books, professional journals, and personal contact with other social scientists. Acquiring this background of understanding is not only an assurance against wasted activity but also a source of clues and guidance.

When the social scientist possesses comprehensive knowledge of a topic, he may take his own steps toward advancing such knowledge. As we have noted, these steps are not regimented, depending largely on the interests and the abilities of the individual. Some prefer to concentrate on observation, thereby achieving concrete, first-hand familiarity with their subject. Others of more abstract inclination may attempt to formulate general theories aimed at uncovering the underlying and basic forces involved in phenomena. Still others seek to combine abstract knowledge with concrete experience, using hypotheses to test theories against specific instances.

Whatever the interest of the social scientist may be, a variety of procedures are now available to him. Observation can take the form of case history, the intensive study of an individual, an economic exchange, or a political party. Comparative study of many examples is also a possibility, e.g., of marriages ending in divorce, presidential elections, bankruptcies, or rural communities. The techniques of observation include, also, interviews, questionnaires, gathering of reports by businesses and governments, and statistical compilation.

Analysis of information provides an explanation of the connections between phenomena. What effect does technological change have on a group? Do depressions result from overproduction? Do friends and neighbors influence party preferences of voters? Answers to these questions are based upon intensive knowledge. Statistical techniques, such as computation and correlation, help to facilitate our understanding.

Experimental situations guided by workable hypotheses can often be created by social scientists. At times, experiments may actually be conducted in the psychological laboratories. More often, the classroom, the settlement house, or the community is the necessary locale. In one famous series of experiments, a large factory studied the effects of working conditions, pay incentives, and even "coffee breaks" on the production of goods. Such procedures, however, may be costly and complicated. In their place, the unintentional social experiment, as the attempt to prohibit liquor, is often carefully observed by the social scientist.

Theories of supply and demand, of conditioning in human behavior, or of technological influences upon public policy may grow out of observation and experiment, or they may represent "armchair speculation"—the result of scholarly study and profound thought. And all of these procedures can be tested through prediction. For understanding social phenomena enables us to look ahead, to foresee and prepare for the future.

The methods of social science do not provide simple, automatic understanding of man and society. Man is complex, multi-faced, dynamic, and creative. Society, made up of great numbers of such complicated individuals, is even more difficult to explain. As one great physicist has pointed out, it is the basic simplicity of matter that has permitted the great advances of the atomic sciences. How substantially different the task would have been if every grain of sand were composed of a different element. Yet, to some degree, this is true of human society.

Social science has drawn upon the techniques and interpretations of the natural sciences. It has also had to develop new ways of studying the interactions of human beings. We need to learn these methods, and to develop new ones, in our task of coping with the problems of human existence. We need also to become familiar with man and society, to explore the many aspects of their relationship.

What then is the meaning of social science? On the one hand, social science is science, relying not only upon hard work and knowledge, but also upon observation, analysis, experiment, theory, and prediction for systematic understanding. Social science is equally social, shaping these techniques to suit the nature of its subject matter—man and society.

# Book I

## The Study of Man

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### PREFACE

Why study social science? Suppose it is true that men are misguided by their preconceptions and biases—what then? What difference does it make whether society is a jungle or not? Isn't it true that "ignorance is bliss"? So, why worry, everything will take care of itself! Or will our problems, like those of the great Prohibition experiment, become even more serious? The viewpoint of this book is that study and understanding of man and society must *precede* our conclusions. As social scientists, we must be open-minded and objective, interested and hard-working, ready to theorize and equally ready to seek out the facts. Only then are we adequately prepared to arrive at wise and effective decisions. We shall soon see how dangerous are false beliefs and hasty actions.

To study the difficulties encountered by men living together in society, the book begins with a presentation of significant analyses by men who have pondered over the human predicament. These interpretations are to be considered on their merits. They are not to be accepted as conclusive, not even necessarily as true. The purpose of these selections is to examine problems, to determine their significance, to evaluate their impact, and to consider the suggestions concerning causes and solutions.

The selection of "problems" for our study has been based upon their suggestiveness with respect to social science. The chosen topics should lead to questions concerning the nature of man. Is the problem of the H-bomb related to human inability to live together, to race superiority, to dangerous ideas? Are people who have no firm beliefs in anything apt to neglect to vote and to favor strong leaders? What effect will our increasing population have upon our abilities to work together and to think independently?

The complexity of man and society, and the interrelationship of social problems, places barriers in the search for understanding. To help overcome these obstacles, it is necessary to find some way of simplifying the task before us. One technique is to "divide

and conquer." And one obvious dividing point is to separate man from society. In reality, man and society are inseparable, for man cannot exist without society and there is no society without man. Nevertheless, simplification provides the opportunity for improved understanding.

The advantages of beginning our study with an analysis of man must be pointed out. In the first place, man is more concrete than society. The concept of society often seems abstract and remote when compared with the tangible, physical individual. Moreover, we encounter many individuals in the course of our daily activities while our experience is usually limited to one society. The range and diversity of our experiences with other human beings provide us with a testing ground for each new interpretation of man. Last, and most important, we can explore our own minds, feelings, and goals. When we are informed that men are essentially cooperative, authoritarian, or hostile, we can ask, "Does this mean Me?" For these reasons, the study of *man* is a basic aim of the book.

But what do we need to know about man? The study of man's predicaments raises certain questions concerning the backgrounds or origins of man. How did human beings ever get into these situations? Indeed, is man possessed of the devil, created in the image of God, or a descendant of the ape? Was there a golden age of man—now somewhat tarnished? Or is man nearing the millennium, a heaven on earth, a Utopia of peace, prosperity, and equality?

Equality? Are men really equal? The Constitution of the United States tells us that all men are created equal. Yet in World War II, the United States Army, with the approval of the Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court, imprisoned thousands of people without trial because they were Japanese. Throughout the United States, Negroes, Indians, and Mexicans are denied equality of education because their communities believe they are inferior. Well, isn't it true that some people are superior to others—individuals, nations, and races? Human beings do differ in height, weight, sex, brains, and beauty. What is the significance of these differences?

The existence of individual differences has been noted as an explanation of envy and snobbery, race riots and world wars. Certainly, struggles for wealth, power, and status are everywhere apparent. Do these conflicts arise from our physical and mental differences, or is inner hostility a basic human force? Understanding the bases of human conflict helps to clarify the nature of human association. Family arguments occur, yet family life continues. The factory strike is ended by a contract between management and labor. What are the bonds that hold groups together? How is social conflict related to cooperation between man and man?

Individual differences, war and peace are related to the subject of leadership. Some men seem to have great influence over others. The special qualities of a Hitler and an Eisenhower, an Einstein and a Gandhi, deserve our attention. So, too, the characteristics of those who follow need examination. For leaders can lead only when they are accepted by other men. And to understand the ideas that men have about their heroes, we must understand how men think. Does hero worship grow out of the child's respect and love for his father, or is it a result of innate differences in ability? The ways in which our thoughts are formed, as well as the results of ideas, must be explored if we are to understand the nature of man.

When we have achieved some degree of understanding of human differences, of why men engage in war and seek peace, of the reasons for leadership, and the bases for beliefs, we can more readily explore the nature of man and the prospects which man's future may



hold. Is man naturally good or evil, animal or angel, self-seeking or unselfish? Our answers to these questions should permit us to better predict man's fate. Here we may find significant suggestions from the philosopher and the Pope, from Communist and artist, moralist and scientist. Through examination of these studies of man, we can achieve a better understanding of man.

# *The Predicaments of Modern Man*

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## INTRODUCTION

Our study of man begins with an examination of modern predicaments. Of course, problems are not new to man. Famine and war, disease and death, fear and doubt have been the hallmarks of the human lot. The modern world, however, has introduced new dilemmas. If we are to understand man and society, we must consider the nature and the implications of these contemporary problems.

Familiarity with man's predicaments should provide a test of the need for study of man. Is the study of man really necessary, even desirable? After all, we now have penicillin to aid us in our defenses against disease, tractors that have helped create great storehouses of food, and jet airliners to transport us quickly to our destination. Yet, somehow human progress has created new fears—of atomic destruction, of revolution and subversion. We do not know whom to trust and what to believe. Poverty in the midst of plenty and progress accompanied by insecurity; these are strange companions. How have these conditions come about? Is man responsible? What has man done or failed to do? Or, are there forces over which man has little or no control? Thoughtful consideration of the selections included in this section should offer suggestions for answering these questions, as well as opening new avenues for exploration.

## The H-Bomb

BERTRAND RUSSELL

As the world moves into the space age, the marvelous achievements of man seem to have reached their ultimate limits. Yet, a century ago, men believed that science had reached its highest peak. Now, new frontiers are revealed to us. Their prospects, however, are not entirely free of fear and doubt. For man's capacity to explore seems to be linked to an even greater capacity to destroy.

In this selection, an outstanding philosopher-mathematician-scientist asks mankind if uncontrolled prejudices and hostilities are to result in total annihilation. Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell was born into one of England's most eminent families. Expected to make political life his career, he turned to the study of mathematics. Among the best known of the many books he has authored are: *The Scientific Outlook* (1931), *Power: A New Social Analysis* (1938), and *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945).

As you read this selection,\* consider the situation detachedly. Ask yourself if the viewpoint is fair, objective, and accurate. Consider also why man finds himself in this dilemma. Is it because human beings are naturally warlike?

I am writing not as a Briton, not as a European, not as a member of a Western democracy, but as a human being, a member of the species Man, whose continued existence is in doubt. The world is full of conflicts: Jews and Arabs; Indians and Pakistanis; white men and Negroes in Africa; and, overshadowing all minor conflicts, the titanic struggle between Communism and anti-Communism.

Almost everybody who is politically conscious has strong feelings about one or more

of these issues. But I want you, if you can, to set aside such feelings for the moment and consider yourself only as a member of a biological species which has had a remarkable history and whose disappearance none of us can desire. I shall try to say no single word which should appeal to one group rather than to another. All, equally, are in peril, and, if the peril is understood, there is hope that they may collectively avert it. We have to learn to think in a new way. We have to learn to ask ourselves not what steps can be taken to give military victory to whatever group we prefer, for there no longer are such steps. The question we have to ask ourselves is: What steps can be taken to prevent a military contest of

\* From "Man's Duel with the Hydrogen Bomb" by Bertrand Russell. *The Saturday Review*, Vol. 38, April 2, 1955, pp. 11-12 and 41. Reprinted by permission of Public Interest, Inc., and *The Saturday Review*.

which the issue must be disastrous to all sides?

The general public, and even many men in positions of authority, have not realized what would be involved in a war with hydrogen bombs. The general public still thinks in terms of the obliteration of cities. It is understood that the new bombs are more powerful than the old and that, while one atomic bomb could obliterate Hiroshima, one hydrogen bomb could obliterate the largest cities such as London, New York, and Moscow. No doubt in a hydrogen-bomb war great cities would be obliterated. But this is one of the minor disasters that would have to be faced. If everybody in London, New York, and Moscow were exterminated, the world might, in the course of a few centuries, recover from the blow. But we now know, especially since the Bikini test, that hydrogen bombs can gradually spread destruction over a much wider area than had been supposed. It is stated on very good authority that a bomb can now be manufactured which will be 25,000 times as powerful as that which destroyed Hiroshima. Such a bomb, if exploded near the ground or under water, sends radioactive particles into the upper air. They sink gradually and reach the surface of the earth in the form of a deadly dust which infected the Japanese fishermen and their catch of fish although they were outside what American experts believed to be the danger zone.

No one knows how widely such lethal radioactive particles might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with hydrogen bombs is quite likely to put an end to the human race. It is feared that if many hydrogen bombs are used there will be universal death—sudden only for a fortunate minority, but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.

I will give a few instances out of many. Sir John Slessor, who can speak with unrivaled authority from his experiences of air warfare, has said: "A world war in this day and age would be general suicide"; and has gone on to state: "It never has and never will make any sense trying to abolish any particular weapon of war. What we have got to abolish is war." E. D. Adrian, who is the leading English authority on nerve physiology, recently emphasized the same point in his ad-

dress as president of the British Association. He said: "We must face the possibility that repeated atomic explosions will lead to a degree of general radioactivity which no one can tolerate or escape"; and he added: "Unless we are ready to give up some of our old loyalties, we may be forced into a fight which might end the human race." Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert says: "With the advent of the hydrogen bomb, it would appear that the human race has arrived at a point where it must abandon war as a continuation of policy or accept the possibility of total destruction." I could prolong such quotations indefinitely.

Many warnings have been uttered by eminent men of science and by authorities in military strategy. None of them will say that the worst results are certain. What they do say is that these results are possible and no one can be sure that they will not be realized. I have not found that the views of experts on this question depend in any degree upon their politics or prejudices. They depend only, so far as my researches have revealed, upon the extent of the particular expert's knowledge. I have found that the men who know most are most gloomy.

Here, then, is the problem which I present to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race, or shall mankind renounce war? People will not face this alternative because it is so difficult to abolish war. The abolition of war will demand distasteful limitations of national sovereignty. But what perhaps impedes understanding of the situation more than anything else is that the term "mankind" feels vague and abstract. People scarcely realize in imagination that the danger is to themselves and their children and their grandchildren, and not only to a dimly apprehended humanity. And so they hope that perhaps war may be allowed to continue provided modern weapons are prohibited. I am afraid this hope is illusory. Whatever agreements not to use hydrogen bombs had been reached in time of peace, they would no longer be considered binding in time of war, and both sides would set to work to manufacture hydrogen bombs as soon as war broke out, for if one side manufactured the bombs and the other did not, the side

moment and reflect that, if they will allow themselves to survive, there is every reason to expect the triumphs of the future to exceed immeasurably the triumphs of the past. There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall

we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? I appeal as a human being to human beings: remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, nothing lies before you but universal death.

# Progress and Poverty

HENRY GEORGE

The twentieth century has made it difficult to believe unquestioningly in the idea that progress is inevitable. The creation of the H-bomb, following two world wars, has led modern man to doubt that technology is wholly beneficial. During the nineteenth century, humanity was more optimistic and men dreamed of Utopias in which war and want would be eliminated. Yet, even then, some men noted that all was not well with the modern world.

Henry George (1839-1897) is remembered as a distinguished writer, economist and philosopher. His book *Progress and Poverty*, from which the following is excerpted,\* was first published in 1879. Since then, millions of copies have been sold. Does the strange paradox which he described eighty years ago still apply today?

The present century has been marked by a prodigious increase in wealth-producing power. The utilization of steam and electricity, the introduction of improved processes and labor-saving machinery, the greater subdivision and grander scale of production, the wonderful facilitation of exchanges, have multiplied enormously the effectiveness of labor.

At the beginning of this marvelous era it was natural to expect, and it was expected, that labor-saving inventions would lighten the toil and improve the condition of the laborer; that the enormous increase in the power of producing wealth would make real poverty a thing of the past. Could a man of the last cen-

tury—a Franklin or a Priestley—have seen, in a vision of the future, the steamship taking the place of the sailing vessel, the railroad train of the wagon, the reaping machine of the scythe, the threshing machine of the flail; could he have heard the throb of the engines that in obedience to human will, and for the satisfaction of human desire, exert a power greater than that of all the men and all the beasts of burden of the earth combined; could he have seen the forest tree transformed into finished lumber—into doors, sashes, blinds, boxes or barrels, with hardly the touch of a human hand; the great workshops where boots and shoes are turned out by the ease with less labor than the old-fashioned cobbler could have put on a sole; the factories where, under the eye of a girl, cotton becomes cloth faster

\* From *Progress and Poverty*, pp. 3-10, by Henry George, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York, N. Y., 1958.

than hundreds of stalwart weavers could have turned it out with their handlooms; could he have seen steam hammers shaping mammoth shafts and mighty anchors, and delicate machinery making tiny watches; the diamond drill cutting through the heart of the rocks, and coal oil sparing the whale; could he have realized the enormous saving of labor resulting from improved facilities of exchange and communication—sheep killed in Australia eaten fresh in England, and the order given by the London banker in the afternoon executed in San Francisco in the morning of the same day; could he have conceived of the hundred thousand improvements which these only suggest, what would he have inferred as to the social condition of mankind?

It would not have seemed like an inference; further than the vision went it would have seemed as though he saw; and his heart would have leaped and his nerves would have thrilled, as one who from a height beholds just ahead of the thirst-stricken caravan the living gleam of rustling woods and the glint of laughing waters. Plainly, in the sight of the imagination, he would have beheld these new forces elevating society from its very foundations, lifting the very poorest above the possibility of want, exempting the very lowest from anxiety for the material needs of life; he would have seen these slaves of the lamp of knowledge taking on themselves the traditional curse, these muscles of iron and sinews of steel making the poorest laborer's life a holiday, in which every high quality and noble impulse could have scope to grow.

And out of these bounteous material conditions he would have seen arising, as necessary sequences, moral conditions realizing the golden age of which mankind has always dreamed. Youth no longer stunted and starved; age no longer harried by avarice; the child at play with the tiger; the man with the muck-rake drinking in the glory of the stars. Foul things fled, fierce things tame; discord turned to harmony! For how could there be greed where all had enough? How could the vice, the crime, the ignorance, the brutality, that spring from poverty and the fear of poverty, exist where poverty had vanished? Who should crouch where all were freemen; who oppress where all were peers?

More or less vague or clear, these have been the hopes, these the dreams born of the improvements which give this wonderful century its pre-eminence. They have sunk so deeply into the popular mind as radically to change the currents of thought, to recast creeds and displace the most fundamental conceptions. The haunting visions of higher possibilities have not merely gathered splendor and vividness, but their direction has changed—instead of seeing behind the faint tinges of an expiring sunset, all the glory of the daybreak has decked the skies before.

It is true that disappointment has followed disappointment, and that discovery upon discovery, and invention after invention, have neither lessened the toil of those who most need respite, nor brought plenty to the poor. But there have been so many things to which it seemed this failure could be laid, that up to our time the new faith has hardly weakened. We have better appreciated the difficulties to be overcome; but not the less trusted that the tendency of the times was to overcome them.

Now, however, we are coming into collision with facts which there can be no mistaking. From all parts of the civilized world come complaints of industrial depression; of labor condemned to involuntary idleness; of capital massed and wasting; of pecuniary distress among business men; of want and suffering and anxiety among the working classes. All the dull, deadening pain, all the keen, maddening anguish, that to great masses of men are involved in the words "hard times," afflict the world to-day. This state of things, common to communities differing so widely in situation, in political institutions, in fiscal and financial systems, in density of population and in social organization, can hardly be accounted for by local causes. There is distress where large standing armies are maintained, but there is also distress where the standing armies are nominal; there is distress where protective tariffs stupidly and wastefully hamper trade, but there is also distress where trade is nearly free; there is distress where autocratic government yet prevails, but there is also distress where political power is wholly in the hands of the people; in countries where paper is money, and in countries where gold and silver are the only currency. Evidently, beneath all

such things as these, we must infer a common cause.

That there is a common cause, and that it is either what we call material progress or something closely connected with material progress, becomes more than an inference when it is noted that the phenomena we class together and speak of as industrial depression are but intensifications of phenomena which always accompany material progress, and which show themselves more clearly and strongly as material progress goes on. Where the conditions to which material progress everywhere tends are most fully realized—that is to say, where population is densest, wealth greatest, and the machinery of production and exchange most highly developed—we find the deepest poverty, the sharpest struggle for existence, and the most of enforced idleness.

It is to the newer countries—that is, to the countries where material progress is yet in its earlier states—that laborers emigrate in search of higher wages, and capital flows in search of higher interest. It is in the older countries—that is to say, the countries where material progress has reached later stages—that widespread destitution is found in the midst of the greatest abundance. Go into one of the new communities where Anglo-Saxon vigor is just beginning the race of progress; where the machinery of production and exchange is yet rude and inefficient; where the increment of wealth is not yet great enough to enable any class to live in ease and luxury; where the best house is but a cabin of logs or a cloth and paper shanty, and the richest man is forced to daily work—and though you will find an absence of wealth and all its concomitants, you will find no beggars. There is no luxury, but there is no destitution. No one makes an easy living, nor a very good living; but every one can make a living, and no one able and willing to work is oppressed by the fear of want.

But just as such a community realizes the conditions which all civilized communities are striving for, and advances in the scale of material progress—just as closer settlement and a more intimate connection with the rest of the world, and greater utilization of labor-saving machinery, make possible greater economies

in production and exchange, and wealth in consequence increases, not merely in the aggregate, but in proportion to population—so does poverty take a darker aspect. Some get an infinitely better and easier living, but others find it hard to get a living at all. The "tramp" comes with the locomotive, and almshouses and prisons are as surely the marks of "material progress" as are costly dwellings, rich warehouses, and magnificent churches. Upon streets lighted with gas and patrolled by uniformed policemen, beggars wait for the passer-by, and in the shadow of college, and library, and museum, are gathering the more hideous Huns and fiercer Vandals of whom Macaulay prophesied.

This fact—the great fact that poverty and all its concomitants show themselves in communities just as they develop into the conditions toward which material progress tends—proves that the social difficulties existing wherever a certain stage of progress has been reached, do not arise from local circumstances, but are, in some way or another, engendered by progress itself.

And, unpleasant as it may be to admit it, it is at last becoming evident that the enormous increase in productive power which has marked the present century and is still going on with accelerating ratio, has no tendency to extirpate poverty or to lighten the burdens of those compelled to toil. It simply widens the gulf between Dives and Lazarus, and makes the struggle for existence more intense. The march of invention has clothed mankind with powers of which a century ago the boldest imagination could not have dreamed. But in factories where labor-saving machinery has reached its most wonderful development, little children are at work; wherever the new forces are anything like fully utilized, large classes are maintained by charity or live on the verge of recourse to it; amid the greatest accumulations of wealth, men die of starvation, and puny infants suckle dry breasts; while everywhere the greed of gain, the worship of wealth, shows the force of the fear of want. The promised land lies before us like the mirage. The fruits of the tree of knowledge turn as we grasp them to apples of Sodom that crumble at the touch.

It is true that wealth has been greatly



increased, and that the average of comfort, leisure, and refinement has been raised; but these gains are not general. In them the lowest class do not share.<sup>1</sup> I do not mean that the condition of the lowest class has nowhere nor in anything been improved; but that there is nowhere any improvement which can be credited to increased productive power. I mean that the tendency of what we call material progress is in nowise to improve the condition of the lowest class in the essentials of healthy, happy human life. Nay, more, that it is still further to depress the condition of the lowest class. The new forces, elevating in their nature though they be, do not act upon the social fabric from underneath, as was for a long time hoped and believed, but strike it at a point intermediate between top and bottom. It is as though an immense wedge were being forced, not underneath society, but through society. Those who are above the point of separation are elevated, but those who are below are crushed down.

This depressing effect is not generally realized, for it is not apparent where there has long existed a class just able to live. Where the lowest class barely lives, as has been the case for a long time in many parts of Europe, it is impossible for it to get any lower, for the next lowest step is out of existence, and no tendency to further depression can readily show itself. But in the progress of new settlements to the conditions of older communities it may clearly be seen that material progress

does not merely fail to relieve poverty—it actually produces it. In the United States it is clear that squalor and misery, and the vices and crimes that spring from them, everywhere increase as the village grows to the city, and the march of development brings the advantages of the improved methods of production and exchange. It is in the older and richer sections of the Union that pauperism and distress among the working classes are becoming most painfully apparent. If there is less deep poverty in San Francisco than in New York, is it not because San Francisco is yet behind New York in all that both cities are striving for? When San Francisco reaches the point where New York now is, who can doubt that there will also be ragged and barefooted children on her streets?

This association of poverty with progress is the great enigma of our times. It is the central fact from which spring industrial, social, and political difficulties that perplex the world, and with which statesmanship and philanthropy and education grapple in vain. From it come the clouds that overhang the future of the most progressive and self-reliant nations. It is the riddle which the Sphinx of Fate puts to our civilization, and which not to answer is to be destroyed. So long as all the increased wealth which modern progress brings goes but to build up great fortunes, to increase luxury and make sharper the contrast between the House of Have and the House of Want, progress is not real and cannot be permanent. The reaction must come. The tower leans from its foundations, and every new story but hastens the final catastrophe. To educate men who must be condemned to poverty, is but to make them resolute; to base on a state of most glaring social inequality political institutions under which men are theoretically equal, is to stand a pyramid on its apex.

<sup>1</sup> It is true that the poorest may now in certain ways enjoy what the richest a century ago could not have commanded, but this does not show improvement of condition so long as the ability to obtain the necessities of life is not increased. The beggar in a great city may enjoy many things from which the backwoods farmer is debarred, but that does not prove the condition of the city beggar better than that of the independent farmer.

## Bigness

### Government

### Is Too Big

HERBERT HOOVER

As engineer, consultant, and ex-president, Herbert Hoover (1874- ) has spent much of his lifetime in public service. On the basis of these varied experiences, he is well qualified to discuss the role of government in modern society. The major predicament which concerns him here is the growing scope, services, and power of the federal government. Why is this happening? What effects will it have? The reading below \* is part of an interview with Mr. Hoover presenting his views on this subject.

Q. As you look over the work your Commission has done, Mr. Hoover, how would you describe the main purpose? Was it to save money for the taxpayer through more effective use of appropriations?

A. In the Commission's work, the large majority favored the philosophic foundation under which we would operate. It's very simple—that the whole social-economic system of this country is based on private enterprise, properly regulated to prevent unfair competition and to prevent monopolies; that the Government should provide those services which the people cannot do for themselves. And with that test we examined all the agencies as to whether they were violating those principles. That part of our work was not so much a matter of savings as strengthening our vital structure of individual, State and local government rights.

\* Reprinted from *U. S. News & World Report*, Vol. 39, Aug. 5, 1955, pp. 48-51. Copyright 1955 United States News Publishing Corporation

Q. And you found many instances in which the Federal Government—

A. About 3,000 cases of the Government being in business enterprises in direct competition with the citizens.

Q. Would it be a catastrophe if the Government ceased to be in those businesses?

A. I think the functions could be performed better by private initiative.

Q. Do those 3,000 cases include the public power facilities?

A. They would. I might say, however, that we made no recommendations that they should be sold, because it's impractical, and, in any event, we didn't approach the problem from that point of view.

Q. Do you find that Government tends to encroach more and more if given the chance?

A. To answer that I'll give you a little background. Most of these business enterprises in the Government were born of emergency and war. When they came out of their immediate task and had it done, they ought to have

quit, but they were equipped with a large bureaucracy, in love with an empire, and they had behind them a pressure group, in every case, of business people or some pressure group who were benefiting by it.

Therefore, there has been consistent opposition to their dissolution. With the instincts of a vegetable they keep spreading and growing. They sometimes make an appearance of earning a profit. But they are exempt from taxation, most of them pay no interest to the Federal Government on capital invested. They pay no amortization of the capital advanced to them.

Q. They don't pay any rent, either, do they?

A. And usually no rent. And they don't pay any of the fringe benefits that come to the Government employees.

And they don't pay for the top supervision. If you apply such tests to these businesses, you will find they are all losing money, and, beyond that, if that particular function were carried on by private enterprise, then they would have to pay taxes to the Government.

It becomes difficult to calculate the saving. But it would amount to considerable.

There is a certain longevity in these things that I told you about. There is one of them that lasted for over 30 years—after the first World War—and lost money nearly every year.

Q. What was that one?

A. Mississippi Barge Lines.

Q. Finally that was sold?

A. Yes. I suppose the Government got a few per cent of what it had invested and lost.

Q. What else has been your objective—the efficiency of administration?

A. Well, we were trying to strengthen the philosophical foundations of our country; we were trying to bring about a reduction of expenses; we made no recommendation that would in the slightest degree injure the security of the American people, and we did nothing that would in any way disturb the justifiable social services to the country. What we were looking for was waste. We were not looking for revolution.

Q. Have you found enthusiasm in Congress for your recommendations for savings?

A. I couldn't say one way or the other. With

the philosophical foundation I told you about a minute ago, I imagine that all the "left-wingers" in the Congress are opposed to everything that we suggested.

Q. Aside from all the waste procedures and the competitive enterprises, do you find that the Government is attempting to engage in too much social-welfare activity and trying to do too much for people?

A. No, I wouldn't make any broad statement like that. I've been in favor of old-age pensions and Social Security. I've been in favor of developing all the water resources in the country. I've had reservations about the way they did the latter, but I don't belong to the group that opposes all Government activity in the public interest.

Q. Do you think there is a dividing line?

A. Yes, and the dividing line is one of practical statesmanship and the Government limiting itself to undertakings which the people cannot do for themselves.

Q. We've had for a number of years a trend toward expansion of social services by Government. Should that continue to expand?

A. I really wouldn't like to answer that because I haven't examined it. Our examinations have been directed to what is, and not what is proposed.

Q. Do you think the Government is too big today?

A. Oh, I think the Federal Government is immensely too big. It has undertaken functions which ought to be left to the States and the people.

Q. You think that it's too many functions there, or that the Congress has loaded upon them too many burdens—which?

A. I don't think that Congress has loaded it on them. I think the States and pressure groups have come here and got them out of the Congress.

Q. What are some examples of functions that should be left to the States?

A. In the history of this country, up to about 1920—1910, perhaps—the States and local communities did practically all of their own flood control and navigation work—all of the flood control, certainly. And now the Federal Government has been loaded with the whole works. That is a typical example of the States coming here and loading it off on

the Federal Government. Any amount of flood control is local to the State. It's not interstate. Where it is interstate, it ought to be supported by the Federal Government.

Q. Have they done the same thing with the indigent people, the poor?

A. I would not say that what we were concerned with was their wasteful administration. There's a great deal of duplication in administration of the social field between the States and the Federal Government. Many States have old-age relief systems and the Federal Government has one, and organizations duplicate at many points.

Q. You have been in the Government 35 or 40 years. What has impressed you most about the Government? Has it been a constant expansion?

A. The major expansion of this Government has taken place in the 20 years before the present Administration. It multiplied 14 times its size. Its civil employes increased from about 600,000 or less up to about 2.4 million. The armed forces have increased from about 300,000 or 350,000 to 3.5 million. Some of those expansions are absolutely necessary. Our defense today requires the present strength. I wouldn't denounce all expansion.

Q. The State governments have increased at the same time—

A. Yes, but not in the same ratio.

Q. Now, in a broad-gauged way, how far have you come toward accomplishing the objectives of your commission?

A. We have only just completed our recommendations. The Congress in setting up this Commission was guided by the success of the first Commission and the number of uncompleted tasks that it left behind. That Commission succeeded in about 70 per cent of its recommendations, but it took six years. In the first Commission we were practically inhibited from discussion of policies. This time the Congress wanted a study of the executive departments both as to functions and policies.

Q. About their functions, was your aim to find out what these agencies are doing, or whether they are doing what they are supposed to do?

A. Both. When we speak of functional examination, we mean, for instance, group study

of all the agencies engaged in medical care or all the agencies engaged in lending, guarantees, loans or insurance. In the latter case we gave the country a summation of the national direct or indirect transactions.

Q. And what did you find in that particular inquiry?

A. We found that the Government has direct and indirect and moral liability for about 240 billion dollars. That does not include the public debt, nor the Social Security.

Q. Does that include mortgages?

A. The Government has a mass of securities for these loans, guarantees, etc., except perhaps the loans to foreign governments.

Q. What assets would you say it had available to offset that?

A. Well, there is a great mass of assets, and there are some reserves set up, whether or not in time of a catastrophe or time of a depression you could collect on all those assets is open to question.

Q. Do you think that the size of the Government can be reduced?

A. We made a lot of suggestions about that. I don't know to what extent our recommendations would affect the number of employes. I am confident that it would decrease them. We didn't express it in those terms.

We have secured an estimate from each of our task forces of the savings that they believe could be made if their recommendations were carried out. The different task forces estimated about 8.5 billion dollars. That, however, is subject to a good deal of discount, because a good many of them overlap with each other.

The Budget and Accounting Task Force—which, by the way, makes one of the most revolutionary proposals in government accounting and budgeting—said that if their recommendations were carried out there would be about 4 billion dollars of saving. That included having a stronger management in the Bureau of the Budget to carry out the recommendations of the task forces.

The only statement on which I am willing to pledge myself is the statement in our final report, that, after all deductions are made for overlap or other reasons, there is still enough possible savings left to balance the budget and

make a very substantial reduction in taxes. As a matter of fact, the budget would only require about 3.5 billion dollars, and a couple of billion in tax reductions would be well received. That is certainly far within the limit of the savings that are recommended in these reports.

Q. Would action by Congress be necessary to effect those savings?

A. In these recommendations there are about 160 legislative recommendations of which a good many would be necessary to make these savings. That doesn't require 160 separate bills, because many of them relate to the same agency. The drafting of legislation in the Commission may be of interest. The law setting up the Commission required that we draft legislation which would give expression to the recommendations of the Commission.

We set up a drafting unit under the retired head of the Senate Drafting Committee, with more men from those experienced groups. They will shortly complete drafting all such legislation. The Commission, of course, could not go over those drafts sentence by sentence. Therefore we furnish them to the committees and Congressmen who are interested merely as an aid from the Commission with the statement that they carry no responsibility.

Those bills are being introduced rapidly, as many Congressmen and Senators have applied for the drafts. I think something over 30 or 40 have already been introduced and sent to committees. Congress is giving serious consideration to the one on surplus property.

Q. Would the functions of the Government be reduced sharply?

A. We are paring something out of many different functions—for instance, the Government enterprises in competition with private industry. I think there are 24 departments or agencies engaged in this field with about 3,000 competitive enterprises. We didn't have time to examine more than 1,000 exhaustively, but our recommendations would curtail about 1,000. Thus these recommendations would curtail the activities of many different agencies. I should think in that the Government could recover somewhere about 15 billions of invested capital. It would reduce the number of Government employees. Naturally, private enterprise would need to employ more people.

Q. What are some of the large assets involved? Are they in the lending activities of Government mostly?

A. Our reports give such estimates. The recovery of capital would come most largely from the defense, lending and guaranteeing agencies. There are many sources for such recovery. For instance, the Government sets up a corporation and starts it off in business by subscribing its capital. That corporation turns around and invests part of that capital in Government securities. Thus the Government is paying interest on its own money, which amounts to a hidden subsidy to that agency.

There is about 500 millions of such money lying around. We said very emphatically that they ought to hand those securities back to the Treasury, diminish the national debt by that amount.

## The Concentration of Economic Power

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Bigness is the concern of another former President of the United States. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Governor of the State of New York, and the only president to serve four terms, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) was also experienced and qualified to discuss economic power. Taking office after four years of serious economic distress throughout America and the world, he became greatly concerned with the growth of monopoly and its effects on a democracy.

This selection is from the President's address to the Congress on April 29, 1938.\* What effect does the concentration of economic power have on competition? Why did concentration take place? Has the trend been halted today, a quarter century later?

To the Congress of the United States:

Unhappy events abroad have retaught us two simple truths about the liberty of a democratic people.

The first truth is that the liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself. That, in its essence, is fascism—ownership of government by an individual, by a group, or by any other controlling private power.

The second truth is that the liberty of a democracy is not safe, if its business system does not provide employment and produce and distribute goods in such a way as to sustain an acceptable standard of living.

Both lessons hit home.

Among us today a concentration of private power without equal in history is growing.

This concentration is seriously impairing the economic effectiveness of private enterprise as a way of providing employment for labor and capital and as a way of assuring a more equitable distribution of income and earnings among the people of the Nation as a whole.

### THE GROWING CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER

Statistics of the Bureau of Internal Revenue reveal the following amazing figures for 1935:

*Ownership of corporate assets:* Of all corporations reporting from every part of the Nation, one-tenth of 1 percent of them owned 52 percent of the assets of all of them.

\* Senate Documents 173, 75 Congress 3 Sess.

And to clinch the point: Of all corporations reporting, less than 5 percent of them owned 87 percent of all the assets of all of them.

*Income and profits of corporations:* Of all the corporations reporting from every part of the country, one-tenth of 1 percent of them earned 50 percent of the net income of all of them.

And to clinch the point: Of all the manufacturing corporations reporting less than 4 percent of them earned 84 percent of all the net profits of all of them.

The statistical history of modern times proves that in times of depression concentration of business speeds up. Bigger business then has larger opportunity to grow still bigger at the expense of smaller competitors who are weakened by financial adversity.

The danger of this centralization in a handful of huge corporations is not reduced or eliminated, as is sometimes urged, by the wide public distribution of their securities. The mere number of security holders gives little clue to the size of their individual holdings or to their actual ability to have a voice in the management. In fact, the concentration of stock ownership of corporations in the hands of a tiny minority of the population matches the concentration of corporate assets.

The year 1929 was a banner year for distribution of stock ownership.

But in that year three-tenths of 1 percent of our population received 78 percent of the dividends reported by individuals. This has roughly the same effect as if, out of every 300 persons in our population, one person received 78 cents out of every dollar of corporate dividends, while the other 299 persons divided up the other 22 cents between them.

The effect of this concentration is reflected in the distribution of national income.

A recent study by the National Resources Committee shows that in 1935-36:

Forty-seven percent of all American families and single individuals living alone had incomes of less than \$1,000 for the year; and at the other end of the ladder a little less than 1½ percent of the Nation's families received incomes which in dollars and cents reached the same total as the incomes of the 47 percent at the bottom.

Furthermore, to drive the point home, the

Bureau of Internal Revenue reports that estate-tax returns in 1936 show that:

Thirty-three percent of the property which was passed in inheritance was found in only 4 percent of all the reporting estates. (And the figures of concentration would be far more impressive, if we included all the smaller estates which, under the law, do not have to report.)

We believe in a way of living in which political democracy and free private enterprise for profit should serve and protect each other—to insure a maximum of human liberty, not for a few, but for all.

It has been well said that, "The freest government, if it could exist, would not be long acceptable if the tendency of the laws were to create a rapid accumulation of property in few hands and to render the great mass of the population dependent and penniless."

Today many Americans ask the uneasy question: Is the vociferation that our liberties are in danger justified by the facts?

Today's answer on the part of average men and women in every part of the country is far more accurate than it would have been in 1929—for the very simple reason that during the past 9 years we have been doing a lot of common-sense thinking. Their answer is that if there is that danger, it comes from that concentrated private economic power which is struggling so hard to master our democratic government. It will not come, as some (by no means all) of the possessors of that private power would make the people believe—from our democratic government itself.

## FINANCIAL CONTROL OVER INDUSTRY

Even these statistics I have cited do not measure the actual degree of concentration of control over American industry.

Close financial control, through interlocking spheres of influence over channels of investment and through the use of financial devices like holding companies and strategic minority interests, creates close control of the business policies of enterprises which masquerade as independent units.

That heavy hand of integrated financial and

management control lies upon large and strategic areas of American industry. The small businessman is unfortunately being driven into a less and less independent position in American life. You and I must admit that.

Private enterprise is ceasing to be free enterprise and is becoming a cluster of private collectivisms; masking itself as a system of free enterprise after the American model, it is in fact becoming a concealed cartel system after the European model.

We all want efficient industrial growth and the advantages of mass production. No one suggests that we return to the hand loom or hand forge. A series of processes involved in turning out a given manufactured product may well require one or more huge mass-production plants. Modern efficiency may call for this. But modern efficient mass production is not furthered by a central control which destroys competition among industrial plants each capable of efficient mass production while operating as separate units. Industrial efficiency does not have to mean industrial empire building.

And industrial empire building, unfortunately, has evolved into banker control of industry. We oppose that.

Such control does not offer safety for the investing public. Investment judgment requires the disinterested appraisal of other people's management. It becomes blurred and distorted if it is combined with the conflicting duty of controlling the management it is supposed to judge.

Interlocking financial controls have taken from American business much of its traditional virility, independence, adaptability and daring—without compensating advantages. They have not given the stability they promised.

Business enterprise needs new vitality and the flexibility that comes from the diversified efforts, independent judgments, and vibrant energies of thousands upon thousands of independent businessmen.

The individual must be encouraged to exercise his own judgment and to venture his own small savings, not in stock gambling but in new enterprise investment. Men will dare to compete against men but not against giants.

## THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION AND ITS EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT

In output per man or machine, we are the most efficient industrial nation on earth.

In the matter of complete mutual employment of capital and labor we are among the least efficient.

Our difficulties of employing labor and capital are not new. We have had them since good free land gave out in the West at the turn of the century. They were old before we undertook changes in our tax policy or in our labor and social legislation. They were caused not by this legislation but by the same forces which caused the legislation. The problem of bringing idle men and idle money together will not be solved by abandoning the forward steps we have taken to adjust the burdens of taxation more fairly and to attain social justice and security.

If you believe with me in private initiative, you must acknowledge the right of well-managed small business to expect to make reasonable profits. You must admit that the destruction of this opportunity follows concentration of control of any given industry into a small number of dominating corporations.

One of the primary causes of our present difficulties lies in the disappearance of price competition in many industrial fields, particularly in basic manufacture where concentrated economic power is most evident—and where rigid prices and fluctuating payrolls are general.

Managed industrial prices mean fewer jobs. It is no accident that in industries, like cement and steel, where prices have remained firm in the face of a falling demand, payrolls have shrunk as much as 40 and 50 percent in recent months. Nor is it mere chance that in most competitive industries where prices adjust themselves quickly to falling demand, payrolls and employment have been far better maintained. By prices we mean, of course, the prices of the finished articles and not the wages paid to workers.

When prices are privately managed at levels above those which would be determined by free competition, everybody pays.

The contractor pays more for materials; the



homebuilder pays more for his house; the tenant pays more rent; and the worker pays in lost work.

Even the Government itself is unable, in a large range of materials, to obtain competitive bids. It is repeatedly confronted with bids identical to the last cent.

Our housing shortage is a perfect example of how ability to control prices interferes with the ability of private enterprise to fill the needs of the community and private employment for capital and labor.

On the other hand, we have some lines of business, large and small, which are genuinely competitive. Often these competitive industries must buy their basic products from monopolistic industry, thus losing, and causing the public to lose, a large part of the benefit of their own competitive policy. Furthermore, in times of recession, the practices of monopolistic industries make it difficult for business or agriculture, which is competitive and which does not curtail production below normal needs, to find a market for its goods even at reduced prices. For at such times a large number of customers of agriculture and competitive industry are being thrown out of work by those noncompetitive industries which choose to hold their prices rather than to move their goods and to employ their workers.

If private enterprise left to its own devices becomes half-regimented and half-competitive, half-slave and half-free, as it is today, it obviously cannot adjust itself to meet the needs and the demands of the country.

Most complaints for violations of the anti-trust laws are made by businessmen against other businessmen. Even the most monopolistic businessman disapproves of all monopolies but his own. We may smile at this as being just an example of human nature, but we cannot laugh away the fact that the combined effect of the monopolistic controls which each business group imposes for its own benefit, inevitably destroys the buying power of the Nation as a whole.

### COMPETITION DOES NOT MEAN EXPLOITATION

Competition, of course, like all other good things, can be carried to excess. Competition

should not extend to fields where it has demonstrably bad social and economic consequences. The exploitation of child labor, the chiseling of workers' wages, the stretching of workers' hours, are not necessary, fair, or proper methods of competition. I have consistently urged a Federal wages-and-hours bill to take the minimum decencies of life for the working man and woman out of the field of competition.

It is, of course, necessary to operate the competitive system of free enterprise intelligently. In gauging the market for their wares, businessmen, like farmers, should be given all possible information by government and by their own associations so that they may act with knowledge, and not on impulse. Serious problems of temporary over-production can and should be avoided by disseminating information that will discourage the production of more goods than the current markets can possibly absorb or the accumulation of dangerously large inventories for which there is no obvious need.

It is, of course, necessary to encourage rises in the level of those competitive prices, such as agricultural prices, which must rise to put our price structure into more workable balance and make the debt burden more tolerable. Many such competitive prices are now too low.

It may at times be necessary to give special treatment to chronically sick industries which have deteriorated too far for natural revival, especially those which have a public or quasi-public character.

But generally over the field of industry and finance we must review and strengthen competition if we wish to preserve and make workable our traditional system of free private enterprise.

The justification of private profit is private risk. We cannot safely make America safe for the businessman who does not want to take the burdens and risks of being a businessman.

### THE CHOICE BEFORE US

Examination of methods of conducting and controlling private enterprise which keep it from furnishing jobs or income or opportunity for one-third of the population is long overdue

on the part of those who sincerely want to preserve the system of private enterprise for profit.

No people, least of all a democratic people, will be content to go without work or to accept some standard of living which obviously and woefully falls short of their capacity to produce. No people, least of all a people with our traditions of personal liberty, will endure the slow erosion of opportunity for the common man, the oppressive sense of helplessness under the domination of a few, which are over-shadowing our whole economic life.

A discerning magazine of business has editorially pointed out that big-business collectivism in industry compels an ultimate collectivism in government.

The power of a few to manage the economic life of the Nation must be diffused among the many or be transferred to the

public and its democratically responsible government. If prices are to be managed and administered, if the Nation's business is to be allotted by plan and not by competition, that power should not be vested in any private group or cartel, however benevolent its professions profess to be.

Those people, in and out of the halls of government, who encourage the growing restriction of competition either by active efforts or by passive resistance to sincere attempts to change the trend, are shouldering a terrific responsibility. Consciously or unconsciously they are working for centralized business and finance or the other alternative—a growing concentration of public power in the Government to cope with such concentration of private power.

The enforcement of free competition is the least regulation business can expect.

## Civilization and Materialism

ALBERT SCHWEITZER

Living and working as a missionary surgeon in French Equatorial Africa, Albert Schweitzer (1875- ) is known throughout the mid-twentieth century world as one of its great religious leaders. This leadership has come about through the example of his work and the ideas in his writings. Uninterested in "conveniences," Schweitzer has led an active, helpful, and satisfying life.

In the present selection,\* this Nobel Peace prize winner asks us what human civilization really means. Are our material achievements adapted to man's real needs and nature? Will moral and spiritual decay destroy the very fabric of our society? What *do* men strive for, and why?

### OUR CIVILIZATION IS GOING THROUGH A SEVERE CRISIS

Most people think that the crisis is due to the war,<sup>1</sup> but they are wrong. The war, with everything connected with it, is only a phenomenon of the condition of uncivilization in which we find ourselves. Even in States which took no part in the war, and on which the war had no direct influence, civilization is shaken, only the fact is not so clearly evident in them as in those which were hard hit by the consequences of its peculiarly cruel spiritual and material happenings.

Now, is there any real, live thought going

on among us about this collapse of civilization, and about possible ways of working our way up out of it? Scarcely any! Clever men stumble about in seven-league boots in the history of civilization and try to make us understand that civilization is some kind of natural growth which blossoms in definite peoples at definite times and then of necessity withers, so that new peoples with new civilizations must keep replacing those which are worn out. When they are called upon, indeed, to complete their theory by telling us what peoples are destined to be our heirs, they are somewhat embarrassed. There are, in fact, no peoples to be seen whom one could imagine to be capable of even a portion of such a task. All the peoples of the earth have been in large measure under the influence both of our civilization and of our lack of it, so that

\* From *The Philosophy of Civilization*, pp. 85-89, by Albert Schweitzer, copyright 1949, reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Co.

<sup>1</sup> I.e., the war of 1914-18.

they more or less share our fate. Among none of them are to be found thoughts which can lead to any considerable original movement of civilization.

Let us put on one side ingenious theories and interesting surveys of the history of civilization, and busy ourselves in a practical way with the problem of our own endangered civilization. What is the nature of this degeneration in our civilization, and why has it come about?

To begin with, there is one elementary fact which is quite obvious. The disastrous feature of our civilization is that it is far more developed materially than spiritually. Its balance is disturbed. Through the discoveries which now place the forces of Nature at our disposal in such an unprecedented way, the relations to each other of individuals, of social groups, and of States have undergone a revolutionary change. Our knowledge and our power have been enriched and increased to an extent that no one would have thought possible. We have thereby been enabled to make the conditions of human existence incomparably more favorable in numerous respects, but in our enthusiasm over our progress in knowledge and power we have arrived at a defective conception of civilization itself. We value too highly its material achievements, and no longer keep in mind as vividly as is necessary the importance of the spiritual element in life. Now come the facts to summon us to reflect. They tell us in terribly harsh language, that a civilization which develops only on its material side, and not in corresponding measure in the sphere of the spirit, is like a ship with defective steering gear which gets out of control at a constantly accelerating pace, and thereby heads for catastrophe.

The essential nature of civilization does not lie in its material achievements, but in the fact that individuals keep in mind the ideals of the perfecting of man, and the improvement of the social and political conditions of peoples, and of mankind as a whole, and that their habit of thought is determined in living and constant fashion by such ideals. Only when individuals work in this way as spiritual forces brought to bear on themselves and on society is the possibility given of solving the problems which have been produced by the

facts of life, and of attaining to a general progress which is valuable in every respect. Whether there is rather more or rather less of material achievement to record is not what is decisive for civilization. Its fate depends on whether or not thought keeps control over facts. The issue of a voyage does not depend on whether the vessel's speed is a little faster or a little slower, but on whether it follows the right course, and its steering gear keeps in good condition.

Revolutions in the relations of life between individuals, society, and peoples, as they follow in the train of our great material achievements, if they are to show real progress in the sense of valuable civilization, make higher demands on the habit of thought of civilized people, just as the increased speed of a ship presupposes greater reliability in rudder and steering gear. Advances in knowledge and power work out their effects on us almost as if they were natural occurrences. It is not within our power so to direct them that in every respect they influence favorably the relations in which we live, but they produce for individuals, for society, and for nations, difficult and still more difficult problems, and bring with them dangers which it is quite impossible to estimate in advance. Paradoxical as it may seem, our progress in knowledge and power makes true civilization not easier but more difficult. Judging by the events of our own and the two preceding generations, one might even say that we are almost entitled to doubt whether in view of the way in which these material achievements have been showered upon us, true civilization is still possible.

The most widespread danger which material achievements bring with them for civilization consists in the fact that through the revolutions in the conditions of life men become in greater numbers unfree, instead of free. The type of man who once cultivated his own bit of land becomes a worker who tends a machine in a factory; manual workers and independent tradespeople become employees. They lose the elementary freedom of the man who lives in his own house and finds himself in immediate connection with Mother Earth. Further, they no longer have the extensive and unbroken consciousness of responsibility of those who live by their own independent

labor. The conditions of their existence are therefore unnatural. They no longer carry on the struggle for existence in comparatively normal relations in which each one can by his own ability make good his position whether against Nature or against the competition of his fellows, but they see themselves compelled to combine together and create a force which can extort better living conditions. They acquire thereby the mentality of unfree men, in which ideals of civilization can no longer be contemplated with the needful clarity, but become distorted to correspond with the surrounding atmosphere of struggle.

To a certain extent we have all of us, under modern conditions, become unfree men. In every rank of life we have from decade to decade, if not from year to year, to carry on a harder struggle for existence. Overwork, physical or mental or both, is our lot. We can no longer find time to collect and order our thoughts. Our spiritual dependence increases at the same rate as our material dependence. In every direction we are the victims of conditions of dependence which in former times were never known in such universality and such strength. Economic, social, and political organizations, which are steadily becoming more and more complete, are getting us more and more into their power. The State with its increasingly rigid organization holds us under a control which is growing more and more decisive and inclusive. In every respect, therefore, our individual existence is depreciated. It is becoming ever more difficult to be a personality.

Thus it is that the progress of our external civilization brings with it the result that individuals, in spite of all the advantages they get, are thereby in many respects injured both materially and spiritually in their capacity for civilization.

It is our progress in material civilization, too, which intensifies in so disastrous a way our social and political problems. Modern social

problems involve us in a class struggle which shakes and shatters economic and national relations. If we go down to rock-bottom, it was machinery and world commerce which brought about the world war, and the inventions which put into our hands such mighty power of destruction made the war of such a devastating character that conquered and conquerors alike are ruined for a period of which no one can see the end. It was also our technical achievements which put us in a position to kill at such a distance, and to annihilate men in such masses, that we sank so low as to push aside any last impulse to humanity, and were mere blind wills which made use of perfected lethal weapons of such destructive capacity that we were unable to maintain the distinction between combatants and non-combatants.

Material achievements, then, are not civilization, but become civilization only so far as the mental habit of civilized peoples is capable of allowing them to aim at the perfecting of the individual and the community. Fooled, however, by our advances in knowledge and power, we did not reflect on the danger to which we were exposing ourselves by the diminished value we put on the spiritual elements of civilization. We surrendered completely to a naive satisfaction at our magnificent material achievements, and went astray into an incredibly superficial conception of civilization. We believed in a progress which was a matter of course, because contained in the facts themselves. Instead of harbouring in our thought ideals approved by reason, and undertaking to mould reality into accordance with them, we were deluded by a vain conception of reality, and wanted to live with lowered ideals borrowed from it. By taking this course we lost all control over the facts.

Accordingly, just when it was necessary that the spiritual element in civilization should be present in unparalleled strength, we allowed it to waste away.

# Escape From Freedom

ERICH FROMM

The subject of the reading is the attractiveness of totalitarianism—fascism, communism, nazism—to modern society. At the beginning of the twentieth century freedom and democracy seemed to be inevitable. Yet, today, Asia and Africa, South America and the Middle East, show signs of increased authoritarianism. Will democracy win out? Why should men choose dictators over self-rule?

Erich Fromm (1900– ), a trained psychoanalyst interested in social science, in this selection \* explores man's urge toward conformity and obedience. Based on his own experience with, and knowledge of, the rise of Adolf Hitler to power in Germany, Fromm explores the conditions which foster totalitarianism. What are these forces?

... I have tried to show that certain factors in the modern industrial system in general and in its monopolistic phase in particular make for the development of a personality which feels powerless and alone, anxious and insecure. I have discussed the specific conditions in Germany which make part of her population fertile soil for an ideology and political practice that appeal to what I have described as the authoritarian character.

But what about ourselves? Is our own democracy threatened only by Fascism beyond the Atlantic or by the "fifth column" in our own ranks? If that were the case, the situation would be serious but not critical. But although foreign and internal threats of Fascism must

be taken seriously, there is no greater mistake and no graver danger than not to see that in our own society we are faced with the same phenomenon that is fertile soil for the rise of Fascism anywhere: 'the insignificance and powerlessness of the individual.'

This statement challenges the conventional belief that by freeing the individual from all external restraints modern democracy has achieved true individualism. We are proud that we are not subject to any external authority, that we are free to express our thoughts and feelings, and we take it for granted that this freedom almost automatically guarantees our individuality. *The right to express our thoughts, however, means something only if we are able to have thoughts of our own.* freedom from external authority is a lasting gain only if the inner psychological conditions are such that we are able to establish our own

\* From *Escape from Freedom*, pp. 240-43, 246-48, 251-56, by Erich Fromm. Copyright 1943 by Erich Fromm, reprinted by permission of Rinehart & Company, Inc., New York, Publishers.

individuality. Have we achieved that aim, or are we at least approaching it? . . . In discussing the two aspects of freedom for modern man, we have pointed out the economic conditions that make for increasing isolation and powerlessness of the individual in our era; in discussing the psychological results we have shown that this powerlessness leads either to the kind of escape that we find in the authoritarian character, or else to a compulsive conforming in the process of which the isolated individual becomes an automaton, loses his self, and yet at the same time consciously conceives of himself as free and subject only to himself.

It is important to consider how our culture fosters this tendency to conform, even though there is space for only a few outstanding examples. The suppression of spontaneous feelings, and thereby of the development of genuine individuality, starts very early, as a matter of fact with the earliest training of a child. This is not to say that training must inevitably lead to suppression of spontaneity if the real aim of education is to further the inner independence and individuality of the child, its growth and integrity. The restrictions which such a kind of education may have to impose upon the growing child are only transitory measures that really support the process of growth and expansion. In our culture, however, education too often results in the elimination of spontaneity and in the substitution of original psychic acts by superimposed feelings, thoughts, and wishes. (By original I do not mean, let me repeat, that an idea has not been thought before by someone else, but that it originates in the individual, that it is the result of his own activity and in this sense is his thought.) To choose one illustration somewhat arbitrarily, one of the earliest suppressions of feelings concerns hostility and dislike. To start with, most children have a certain measure of hostility and rebelliousness as a result of their conflicts with a surrounding world that tends to block their expansiveness and to which, as the weaker opponent, they usually have to yield. It is one of the essential aims of the educational process to eliminate this antagonistic reaction. The methods are different; they vary from threats and punishments, which frighten the child, to the subtler methods of bribery or "explanations," which

confuse the child and make him give up his hostility. The child starts with giving up the expression of his feeling and eventually gives up the very feeling itself. Together with that, he is taught to suppress the awareness of hostility and insincerity in others; sometimes this is not entirely easy, since children have a capacity for noticing such negative qualities in others without being so easily deceived by words as adults usually are. They still dislike somebody "for no good reason"—except the very good one that they feel the hostility, or insincerity, radiating from that person. This reaction is soon discouraged; it does not take long for the child to reach the "maturity" of the average adult and to lose the sense of discrimination between a decent person and a scoundrel, as long as the latter has not committed some flagrant act.

On the other hand, early in his education, the child is taught to have feelings that are not at all "his": particularly is he taught to like people, to be uncritically friendly to them, and to smile. What education may not have accomplished is usually done by social pressure in later life. If you do not smile you are judged lacking in a "pleasing personality"—and you need to have a pleasing personality if you want to sell your services, whether as a waitress, a salesman, or a physician. Only those at the bottom of the social pyramid, who sell nothing but their physical labor, and those at the very top do not need to be particularly "pleasant." Friendliness, cheerfulness, and everything that a smile is supposed to express, become automatic responses which one turns on and off like an electric switch.<sup>1</sup>

The same distortion happens to original thinking as happens to feelings and emotions. From the very start of education original

<sup>1</sup> As one telling illustration of the commercialization of friendliness, I should like to cite Fortune's report on "The Howard Johnson Restaurants." (Fortune, Sept., 1940, p. 96.) Johnson employs a force of "shoppers" who go from restaurant to restaurant to watch for lapses. "Since everything is cooked on the premises according to standard recipes and measurements issued by the home office, the inspector knows how large a portion of steak he should receive and how the vegetable should taste. He also knows how long it should take for the dinner to be served and he knows the exact degree of friendliness that should be shown by the hostess and the waitress."

behavior of an actor or a person hypnotized. When the general plot of the play is handed out, each actor can act vigorously the role he is assigned and even make up his lines and certain details of the action by himself. Yet he is only playing a role that has been handed over to him.

The particular difficulty in recognizing to what extent our wishes—and our thoughts and feelings as well—are not really our own but put into us from the outside, is closely linked up with the problem of authority and freedom. In the course of modern history the authority of the Church has been replaced by that of the State, that of the State by that of conscience, and in our era, the latter has been replaced by the anonymous authority of common sense and public opinion as instruments of conformity. Because we have freed ourselves of the older overt forms of authority, we do not see that we have become the prey of a new kind of authority. We have become automatons who live under the illusion of being self-willing individuals. This illusion helps the individual to remain unaware of his insecurity, but this is all the help such an illusion can give. Basically the self of the individual is weakened, so that he feels powerless and extremely insecure. He lives in a world to which he has lost genuine relatedness and in which everybody and everything has become instrumentalized, where he has become a part of the machine that his hands have built. He thinks, feels, and wills what he believes he is supposed to think, feel, and will; in this very process he loses his self upon which all genuine security of a free individual must be built.

The loss of the self has increased the necessity to conform, for it results in a profound doubt of one's own identity. If I am nothing but what I believe I am supposed to be—who am "I"? We have seen how the doubt about one's own self started with the breakdown of the medieval order in which the individual had had an unquestionable place in a fixed order. The identity of the individual has been a major problem of modern philosophy since Descartes. Today we take for granted that we are we. Yet the doubt about ourselves still exists, or has even grown. In his plays Pirandello has given expression to this feeling of

modern man. He starts with the question: Who am I? What proof have I for my own identity other than the continuation of my physical self? His answer is not like Descartes'—the affirmation of the individual self—but its denial: I have no identity, there is no self excepting the one which is the reflex of what others expect me to be: I am "as you desire me."

This loss of identity then makes it still more imperative to conform; it means that one can be sure of oneself only if one lives up to the expectations of others. If we do not live up to this picture we not only risk disapproval and increased isolation, but we risk losing the identity of our personality, which means jeopardizing sanity.

By conforming with the expectations of others, by not being different, these doubts about one's own identity are silenced and a certain security is gained. However, the price paid is high. Giving up spontaneity and individuality results in a thwarting of life. Psychologically the automaton, while being alive biologically, is dead emotionally and mentally. While he goes through the motions of living his life runs through his hands like sand. Behind a front of satisfaction and optimism modern man is deeply unhappy; as a matter of fact, he is on the verge of desperation. He desperately clings to the notion of individuality; he wants to be "different," and he has no greater recommendation of anything than that "It is different." We are informed of the individual name of the railroad clerk we buy our tickets from; handbags, playing cards, and portable radios are "personalized," by having the initials of the owner put on them. All this indicates the hunger for "difference" and yet these are almost the last vestiges of individuality that are left. Modern man is starved for life. But since, being an automaton, he cannot experience life in the sense of spontaneous activity he takes as surrogate any kind of excitement and thrill: the thrill of drinking, of sports, of vicariously living the excitement of fictitious persons on the screen.

What then is the meaning of freedom for modern man?

He has become free from the external bonds that would prevent him from doing and thinking as he sees fit. He would be free to



act according to his own will, if he knew what he wanted, thought, and felt. But he does not know. He conforms to anonymous authorities and adopts a self which is not his. The more he does this, the more powerless he feels, the more is he forced to conform. In spite of a veneer of optimism and initiative, modern man is overcome by a profound feeling of powerlessness which makes him gaze toward approaching catastrophes as though he were paralyzed.

Looked at superficially, people appear to function well enough in economic and social life; yet it would be dangerous to overlook the deep-seated unhappiness behind that comforting veneer. If life loses its meaning

because it is not lived, man becomes desperate. People do not die quietly from physical starvation; they do not die quietly from psychic starvation either. If we look only at the economic needs as far as the "normal" person is concerned, if we do not see the unconscious suffering of the average automatized person, then we fail to see the danger that threatens our culture from its human basis: the readiness to accept any ideology and any leader, if only he promises excitement and offers a political structure and symbols which allegedly give meaning and order to an individual's life. The despair of the human automaton is fertile soil for the political purposes of Fascism.

## The Moral Challenge of Communism

BARBARA WARD

Of all the problems that beset modern man in the middle of the twentieth century, none seems as crucial as the world-wide struggle between the United States and Soviet Russia. This conflict has included "cold war" and international intrigue, police action and subversion, threats of missile destructiveness and offers of peace. More important perhaps than all of these is the struggle for the minds of men. In Asia, South America, Africa, Italy, and France, the ideologies of communism and capitalism, democracy and totalitarianism meet in this market place of ideas—man's mind.

Barbara Ward (1914— ), now Lady Jackson, is an economist, lecturer, and writer. In this selection,\* she asks us to re-examine our visions, our dreams, and our promises. She asks us to consider also the hopes and the prospects of the rest of the world.

Reluctantly yet wholeheartedly, the Western world has accepted the challenge of Soviet military power. The hammering of plowshares into swords echoes round the Atlantic. In the Far East the weapons have been tested in battle. Rearmament has the first claim on national resources, the perfecting of defensive alliances upon diplomacy.

Yet the Western world must avoid the mistake of answering this decade's problem with the answer that would possibly have been adequate in the thirties. A show of strength might have checked the rise of Nazism. Hitler had not twenty years of established power behind him. He was not the prophet of a

world-wide creed. A few groups of quislings were ready, when his victory looked certain, to open the gates to him, but he had no fanatical mass support within the ranks of Europe's workers, no blind devotees in foreign schools and universities, no organized followers among the youth of other nations. The challenge from Nazism and the challenge from Communism have only this in common—that they have both used force and have therefore required the readiness to use force against them. But the challenge from Communism is far graver and far more various. One need look no further than the last twelve months to realize the extent to which in Communism moral weapons are as formidable as those of military power.

\* From "The Moral Challenge of Communism" by Barbara Ward, *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 188, Dec. 1951, pp. 37-41. Reprinted by permission.

General elections were held last summer<sup>1</sup> in France and Italy, both recipients of Marshall Aid, both signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. In Italy, the Communist-controlled vote was actually higher than in the decisive election of 1948. In France, the decline in support for Communism was negligible. Once again the Party received the mandate of more than a quarter of the voters. Nobody has made any secret about the reasons for this discouraging result. The benefits that flowed from American assistance had largely failed to reach the consciousness of the mass of the working class. General de Gaulle might jeer at their Communist leaders as "separatists," but the workers, unhappily, did feel deeply separated from the successes and interests of the rest of the nation. The Marshall Plan as a moral venture had passed them by.

If one moves to the other end of the globe, there is the same evidence that Communism has consciously gained or maintained strength through the supposed moral failings of the Western side. Wherever Communist guerrillas are active in the Far East—in Malaya, in the Philippines, in Indo-China—they fight with the same slogans—an end to imperialism and exploitation, the achievement of national independence and peace, the division of the land, the raising of the workers. Nor is it altogether untrue to suggest that this double talk—for who cares less than the Communist about the peasant and his independence?—has been most effective where local grievances and abuses have been most gross.

Or take the propaganda war back to Europe—to last summer's Berlin Youth Festival. Not all the two million young people who marched and shouted had come there under compulsion. Faith and vision—honest in many of those young minds—led them to reserve for the Soviet delegates their loudest cheers and to accept uncritically the Communist slogans of "fighting for peace." And all the time one must remember that the Festival was only a small part of the worldwide Soviet "peace" campaign which has to a certain extent been made easier by the Western powers' belated acceptance of the Soviet's military challenge.

<sup>1</sup> Ed. note: The year was 1951. In the decade since then, how effectively have the Western powers met the challenge of communism?

The Marshall Plan may not have penetrated as it should to every group and class, but as a gesture and an achievement it was beyond Soviet criticism. The Communist endeavored—rather feebly—to dismiss it as an American attempt to secure European markets; in other words, as an interested and not as a moral gesture. But the effort was a failure. It is in the last year when the need for rearmament has been frankly accepted in the West that the Soviets have put all their energy into the war of propaganda, to convict the West of warmongering, to denounce it as imperialist and aggressive, to exploit in millions of simple minds the desire for peace and revulsion from war which are among the deepest moral instincts of contemporary society. We must recognize that during the epoch of the Marshall Plan, the Communists in Europe were at a loss for a moral weapon. Now, in the period of rearmament, it is the moral issue which they are making the center of their campaign.

.....  
The possibility that we face not a violent explosion of war but the long-drawn-out struggle of will and pressure we call Containment makes this question of the West's moral purposes if anything more crucial. It is Stalin's belief that he has greater staying power than the West and that history in the long run is on his side. Are we, in our tremendous effort to build adequate forces now, thinking equally carefully about the "long run"? Have we a picture of our policies once the necessary measure of rearmament is achieved? Even at a practical level, the problem raises formidable difficulties. How, for instance, is the vastly extended industrial equipment of the Western allies, particularly of the United States, to be kept occupied and an ominous decline in economic activity avoided? Even if this is not a problem for today, it is one for the day after tomorrow. Are we really over our Micawberism? Are we, while Stalin and his men are sustained by their long vision of history, simply waiting for something to turn up?

There should surely be no misunderstanding on this point. Moral policies, farsighted and imaginative plans for joint action, will not produce themselves any more than guns

will produce themselves. We shall have no more vision than we set out to acquire and no more moral appeal than we seek with all our power to achieve. It is not the purpose of this article to suggest blueprints for a Western revival of its old vision and moral energy. But it is the whole reason and purpose of these pages to plead for a recognition of the primacy of the problem and for the attempt to give Western man's deeper needs and capabilities the same recognition as his immediate necessity of military security. Free men, working together, have a very promising hope of securing their ends—even the intangible end of moral revival. But they cannot hope to succeed if they fail to recognize the problem and to devote to it a sufficient part of their thought and energy. At present, the longer vision and purpose of the West may perhaps be point fifty-six on the Allied agenda—if it appears at all. The Kremlin does not make that mistake. The irony of it is that only a moment's reflection will show how much has already been done in the West to sketch in the framework of a new and inspiring picture of free society. What is apparently lacking is the determination and sustained purpose to carry the sketch on to the completed masterpiece.

Acceptance of the idea of the economic system as an instrument, not a master, of the community has gained ground. The maintenance of steady employment is—in the English-speaking countries—an accepted goal. The essentially moral belief that the more prosperous members of the world community should be prepared to give a part of their wealth to raise living standards elsewhere is edging out the old imperialism and could, incidentally, play its part in maintaining high Western employment once the pressure of rearmament is over. If the principle were accepted as a normal, not an exceptional, measure in Western life, it would make possible a far more sustained and effective attack on the problems of structural maladjustment which exist in some economies. To give only one example, a concentrated effort over twenty or thirty years could create balance in the Italian economy by increased investment, expanded land reclamation and reform, and an international emigration policy. The Marshall

Plan has been the prototype of such possibilities. The Colombo Plan is the outline of another. What is lacking is the general acceptance in the West of the procedure as a normal part of economic practice.

Another promising field which is full of growing points but still lacks general recognition and definition is the drawing of the worker into the community of the business enterprise. That there is here a deep desire for human responsibility—incidentally flouted completely in the Soviet managerial system—can be proved by the strength of syndicalism, by such moves as the demand of the Ruhr workers for joint representation in heavy industry, or the anxiety of British workers for closer participation in the management of nationalized industries. The United States has here, as in many other fields, quietly taken the lead and proved that productivity and industrial peace are immensely enhanced by creating in the worker a sense of joint responsibility. It is, for instance, in America, not Europe, that profit sharing is advancing as a method. What is lacking is the projection of this new trend into the consciousness of Western life and its general acceptance as a mark of responsible economic citizenship. The ECA has started a revolutionary move in Europe by making a condition of its loans to private industry that better attention be given by local management to productivity, profit sharing, and worker participation—a procedure desperately needed in France, where the workers' share in the national income has actually fallen since the war. Land reform was part of General MacArthur's work in Japan and similar moves have been made in Korea. These could be the beginnings of an efficient and humane program which counters Communism at the most vulnerable point—the workbench and the peasant holding.

Behind the ECA program is a sense of missionary activity. One could enormously extend the field. If the West is to accept for decades to come economic responsibility for the rest of the free world, it needs to match that economic aid by active help and example in the administrative and political field. It is here that the moral impact of the West in terms of complete integrity, keen sympathy, and wise judgment could be repeated again

and again with each expert sent out, each administrator on loan, each official and businessman whose affairs take him to other lands.

American businessmen could in particular realize that many of their so-called colleagues in Asia—and even, alas, in Europe—are still very near the Marxist caricature of the amoral capitalist uniquely concerned with gain. The revolution in American managerial outlook—which is in many ways a moral revolution—is one of which businessmen themselves can be the most effective advocates. The importance of this advocacy, particularly in powerful industrial communities such as Germany and Japan, need hardly be underlined. Both these nations will, incidentally, be seeking private capital. It is a vital interest of the West to see that conditions are laid down to regulate not only its economic but its social use as well.

Yet any missionary effort of this sort on the part of Western nations depends in fact upon the quality of their own national life. When the Bell Report was published on the results of American economic aid to the Philippines and waste and corruption were singled out for censure, an angry Philippine editor retorted that his countrymen had learned graft from the Americans, only they were not yet quite as adept. Coming on the eve of the Kefauver investigations, such an outburst throws light upon an aspect of local corruption and immorality which is often overlooked—that a Frank Costello in America or a Sydney Stanley in Britain plays his part in the worldwide battle of faiths. The inquiries made front-page news in Europe, not least in the Communist press.

In short, behind the plans and the projects which, in the interests of a sustained and successful resistance to Communism, have yet to be made in the West lies the question of the moral strength of the people to uphold them. It is the question of aims which the community as a whole sets itself—*arete*, the Greek ideal of excellence; sainthood, the crown of Christian virtue; or the good time, the television set, the full barns, and "tomorrow we die." It was in a time such as ours, when ordered society was threatened with

defeat by dark external forces, that St. Augustine wrote his tremendous vision of man's earthly destiny, the building of the city of God. There he laid down that "a nation is an association of reasonable beings united in a peaceful sharing of the things they cherish; therefore to determine the quality of a nation, you must consider what those things are." How would the West today survive such a scrutiny?

The answer lies with ourselves. Each citizen can in his different sphere reaffirm the ideal of freedom and moral responsibility that underlies Western civilization. The official can guard his integrity, the legislator his wisdom and generosity, the businessman his sense of responsibility and community with those who work with him. The artist can, in the words of Lionel Trilling, give himself to "the great work of our time," which is "the restoration and reconstitution of the will"—in other words, of the sense of freedom. The statesman can transcend national boundaries and give to the world such high examples of selfless humility as that of a General Marshall. The citizen can work for good and responsible government. Parents can demand that the great ideals of the West's humane and Christian society should mold the minds of their children, and that the trend towards purely technical training be reversed. Everyone can preserve in his heart a deposit of hope and faith which no nameless totalitarian horrors can waste away.

To believe that such a moral revival is possible is not to flout history or experience. Solon rescued Greece from a confusion of rancor and division. Christian faith carried mankind onward from the wreck of Rome. The Reformation challenged the Church to universal reform. Wesley and the Evangelicals transformed the England of the Whig families and Hogarth's Gin Lane into the great age of Victorian piety. Today we have been allowed to see in Soviet Russia the society that must emerge once morality and freedom are sloughed off. We have been led to the brink of the precipice. But we still have the chance to draw back. This is the real test of survival. Shall we return to the springs of our deepest strength in time?

to regulate our society and our lives for us. In every case, however, men take active roles—though some are more active than others.

While it is true that men's actions are responsible for mankind's achievements, it is also true that some actions bring troubles in their wake. How can we guide our footsteps, avoid pitfalls, and prevent social disasters? Act we must. Even inactivity is an action which allows others to make the decisions for us. Let us therefore consider how we may choose our future.

If progress is not inevitable, an understanding of man's too-frequent inhumanity to men becomes an urgent necessity. Social science can here aid us in revealing the nature of social things as they are and in suggesting the social shape of things to come. In many ways, science has become a universal language, spoken and learned throughout the world. To aid man in the difficult task of living with others, social science too is being studied and developed.

The risks of human existence have multiplied. Is science, the creator of guided missile and misguided automobile, the villain in the human drama? Why does mankind expend its resources in inhumane undertakings? The scientist asks that we be cautious in placing blame, the social scientist suggests that explanation follow careful study, rather than omit it.

The study of man's predicaments has provided an opportunity to explore their causes and their solutions. How easy it is to arrive at solutions! How unfortunate that others do not agree with us! Differences of opinion are based upon differences in our assumptions. I explain war by human aggressiveness. You insist it results from the desire for power. But he says it is greed and selfishness. Perhaps these very assumptions need to be reconsidered.

Let us begin our study of man with questions rather than answers. What is the nature of man; whence does he come and where is he going? How do men differ from each other? Why do men struggle with each other—for existence, for mastery, and for the sake of struggle itself? Why do men also live at peace and in harmony with one another? What thoughts cross men's minds and why? Such questions are easier asked than accurately answered.

The answers to our questions about man are varied. As social scientists, we must study such answers carefully and objectively. And we must ask if the "answers" themselves meet the standards of social science. Are they simply theory or based on observation? Upon what grounds are the theories based? What evidence is offered as proof of observation? We need also to watch for unstated assumptions and unwarranted conclusions. Above all, we need to read thoroughly and think deeply. In so doing, we can more readily arrive at the answers to our questions about our subject, ourselves and others—MAN.

# How Men Differ

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## INTRODUCTION

All human beings are classified by biologists as members of the mammalian species, *homo sapiens*. Among the characteristics of a species are common ancestry, ability of all members to interbreed, and essential physical similarity. The human race is *one* species. Every man is very much like every other man. Witness the facility with which a doctor can operate on or prescribe medication for any human being after studying the anatomy and physiology of only one group of men.

Yet there are many and striking differences among men. These differences have become the cause or occasion for many social institutions and social conflicts. In this part we will read about these differences and about some of the conclusions men have drawn because of them. We begin by studying the origins of man, as these are perceived by the evolutionist. Have differing origins been the basis of differences in color, creed, and nationality? Are all peoples approximately equal in intelligence, health, strength, and other characteristics, or is one race superior to the others?

Men differ also because of location. What effects has climate had on the behavior of people? Are southerners more indolent than northerners? Is not the Eskimo significantly what he is because of his location? Is geography more important in producing human differences than race?

Mankind, like much of the animal kingdom, is divided into two sexes. What effect have sex differences had on human behavior? Many social institutions are built around sex. In our own society women are given household tasks, cooking, cleaning and care of children, while men more generally assume work outside the home. Is this because each sex is biologically best suited to the work assigned it, or is it simply a matter of convention?

Apart from differences in minds which result from age and education, psychologists have isolated differences in native or original mental ability. Some people seem naturally more intelligent than others. What is the nature of these differences? Commonly we refer

to these differences in native intelligence as differences in I.Q. (intelligence quotient). How is it that some people have high I.Q.'s while others appear subnormal?

Whatever be our race, our country, and our biological characteristics, each one of us is unique in terms of the unduplicated individual experience of our separate lives. True, we live in a world shaped by the community that surrounds us and our minds and attitudes are greatly affected by these social influences, but we are also unique. Our individual experiences make each one of us different. How much are our personalities the result of these unique experiences; how much the product of social influence?

Men differ in physical appearance, in geographic location, in sex, in age, in mental talents, in cultural influences, and in individual experiences. As you explore the readings in this part, evaluate if you can the effect each of these factors has had on your own personality and recognize the many dimensions in which men differ from one another.



# The Origins of Man

RALPH LINTON

Where did man come from? Every age, every people have asked this question and proposed an answer. There is the account of man's origin in Genesis, the first book of the Bible, where it is told that God made man and the universe. There is the Greek explanation of the origin of the earth and of man in the turbulent activity and intrigue of the Gods on Mount Olympus. Hindu, Buddhist, and primitive—all have thought about the origins of man.

The scientific explanation of origins is presented in the selection that follows.\* The author, Ralph Linton (1893-1953), an outstanding anthropologist, presents the evolutionist's point of view. Does this view conflict with religion? Does this view mean that men are merely animals? Can we conclude, then, that all of us are the same—apes not angels?

Man's origin is still unknown. That the human body was evolved from some lower form of life is no longer doubted by any one who is familiar with the evidence. Structurally man has so much in common with the other mammals, especially those of the primate order, that no other theory seems tenable. That the human mind was similarly evolved from animal mentality is less clearly demonstrable, but there can be no doubt that the human brain and nervous system, its instruments, were so evolved. The problems of the existence and origin of the human soul do not fall within the scope of this book. However,

granting the existence of the soul, there is no basic inconsistency between this and a belief in the evolution of man's body. Divine grace was certainly capable of awarding man a soul at any stage in his physical development.

The recently revived conflict between religion and science on the question of evolution seems to be based on misconceptions on both sides. A belief in evolution and in the existence of a Creative Intelligence are in no way incompatible. The study of evolution is merely a study of the mechanics of creation with a recognition of the continuity of the creative process. The evolutionist can determine the steps by which new forms of life have come into being, but he remains ignorant of the force responsible for these changes and for their direction. He can prove that life, whose

\* From *The Study of Man*, pp. 7-21, by Ralph Linton, Copyright, 1936, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc. Reprinted by permission of Appleton-Century Crofts, Inc.

source itself is unknown, has assumed more and more complex forms with the passage of time, but he cannot tell us why it has done so. He cannot even forecast, with any degree of accuracy, what forms evolving life will assume. His researches to date make the existence of a Creative Intelligence more rather than less probable. If religion condemns the study of evolution it must also, in common logic, condemn all other studies of the nature of the world in which we live and all attempts to understand it. The Old Testament statements on the nature of the universe are quite as definite as its statements on the origin of man, both being somewhat vague and conflicting, yet the Church no longer condemns men for believing that the world is round or that it moves about the sun. Neither does it condemn them for studying the behavior of bacteria and using the knowledge thus gained to combat disease, or for those studies of materials which have made possible the suspension bridge and skyscraper. It is to be hoped that the enemies of evolutionary studies will sometime realize that there is no conflict between the recorded teachings of Christ, on which they claim to base their creeds, and the attempt to understand nature. Christ came to show men how to live in the world, not to tell them what the universe was like. His message is as vital to the inhabitants of a spherical earth as of a flat one, to a race which evolved from some lower form of life as to one created instantaneously from the slime of the earth.

Most readers will already be familiar with the principles of evolution and the proofs that it has taken place. We will only concern ourselves with the place of man in zoological classifications, his probable line of descent, and the time at which he appeared on earth. The structure of the human body at once places man as a vertebrate, as a mammal, and lastly as a member of a particular order of mammals, the primates. This order includes not only man but also all the apes and monkeys. Some of these, such as the South American monkeys, are very different from man in their structure, while others, like the anthropoid apes, are very much like him. The important point is that in every element of his structure man is more like one or another

of these sub-human forms than certain of these forms are like each other. By every anatomical test all the primates, from the marmoset to the chimpanzee, are his more or less remote cousins.

Man's closest relatives among the primates are the big tailless apes called anthropoids. There are four genera of these: the chimpanzee, gorilla, orangutan, and gibbon. Of these the chimpanzee and gorilla are the most manlike. Chimpanzees are now fairly common in zoological collections and will be familiar to most readers. No one who has watched them will question their similarity to man, even though he may not be enthusiastic about admitting the resemblance. Actually, this resemblance is even closer than appears on the surface. Their structure parallels that of man bone for bone and organ for organ. Even their brains, although proportionately much smaller in size, are surprisingly manlike. Their senses of sight, hearing, smell, etc., seem to be almost exactly like those of men while their mental processes in so far as these can be tested, seem to be nearly identical with those of human children three to four years old. The resemblance does not even end here. Recent years have seen the development of extremely delicate tests for distinguishing between the blood of animals of different genera and even species. These tests are unable to distinguish between the blood of an anthropoid and that of a man, although they can distinguish between the blood of either and that of a monkey.

Unless all scientific techniques are at fault, the anthropoids are not only our relatives but our rather close relatives. However, they are not our ancestors. With the possible exception of the gibbon, which seems to be a primitive form, it is unlikely that any of the genera of anthropoids are older than man himself. They are not living fossils but the end products of divergent lines of evolution. While man has specialized and developed along certain lines, the apes have gone on developing along others. Men and apes no doubt have a common ancestor somewhere in the remote past, but this ancestor is long since extinct.

Since fossil evidence for man's ancestry is fragmentary and unsatisfactory, we can only try to deduce the form from which he evolved

by studying what he is. Most of the living primates are tree-dwellers, and there can be little doubt that our own ancestors were so at one time. The structure of the human arm and shoulder bears mute witness to a long-lost habit of swinging from branch to branch. So do the flexible human hand and the five toes of the human foot, once a grasping organ. Even the adaptation of our bodies to a vertical posture probably goes back to the days when our ancestors hung by their arms much more than they stood on their legs. It seems almost certain that, somewhere in our line of ancestry, there was an arboreal form not very different from some of the existing Old World monkeys. He did not swing by his tail, since only the New World monkeys developed that refinement, but we may be sure that he was educated in the higher branches.

There can be little doubt that both man and the anthropoids evolved from the same small tree-dwelling form, but the point at which the developing human line split off from the anthropoid line is still vigorously disputed. Certain writers date the separation from the beginnings of the primate order. The main inspiration for this theory seems to be a desire to place a large and comfortable distance between man and his sub-human relatives. Actually, the structural and especially the blood similarities between man and anthropoids are so close that it is hard to conceive of them as results of independent parallel evolution. It seems much more likely that the human and anthropoid lines have been the same for most of their length. Before we take up the questions of where they separated it will be necessary to inject a little geology.

Geologists divide the past of the earth into eras and then subdivide the eras into periods. Each of the eras is characterized by the dominance of certain forms of life. At the beginning of the last or Cenozoic era mammals came to the fore. They had existed in the preceding era but had been of very minor importance. The Cenozoic era is subdivided into the Eocene, Oligocene, Miocene, Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Recent periods, in the last of which we live. The primate order emerged in the Eocene, and by the beginning of the Oligocene it had already differentiated into several families. A fossil ape from the

Lower Oligocene, *Propliopithecus*, has characteristics which suggest that it may be the ancestor of both man and the anthropoids. It was a small, tree-dwelling form. We do not know what was happening to *Propliopithecus*' descendants during the Upper Oligocene and Lower Miocene, but we have an extensive series of fossils from the Middle Miocene. These prove that by this time anthropoids were numerous, in fact much more numerous than they are to-day, and that they had already developed the large size which is still one of their outstanding characteristics.

All the earliest primates which are known to us and most of the existing species are little animals. The members of the order began as tree-dwellers, and light weight is a distinct advantage in arboreal life. Any adult who has tried to follow a boy to the end of a limb will understand why. However, the ancestral anthropoid-human stock evidently developed a tendency toward gigantism. This evolutionary trend seems to culminate in the modern gorilla, adult males of which genus may weigh 600 pounds. Such huge beasts are quite unsuited to arboreal life. Even an animal of one-third the weight has difficulty in finding branches strong enough to support it. As the members of the ancestral stock grew larger they must have spent more and more of their time on the ground and developed increasing structural adaptations to traveling on the ground. Their legs became longer, with more rigid attachment at the hip joint, and the foot, released from its task of grasping branches, drew together and adapted itself to the new task of supporting the weight of the body. This evolutionary trend can also be observed in the gorilla. The mountain gorilla, which reaches the largest size and is most completely ground-living, has a more manlike foot than any other sub human primate.

It seems highly probable that the first of our manlike ancestors came down out of the trees because he had gotten too heavy for arboreal life. Changing food habits may have been a contributory factor. Although the remote ancestors of the primates seem to have been insect-eaters, most of the primates are vegetarians. None of them is above sucking eggs or devouring an occasional small bird or lizard, but they live mainly on fruits, young

shoots, and other growing things. Man is the only really carnivorous primate, yet his large size makes him poorly adapted to chasing agile prey through the branches. If we assume that his ancestors acquired their taste for meat at a time when they had already grown fairly large and were dividing their time between the trees and the ground, there would have been an extra stimulus to ground living. The hunting there was better for big animals.

The Miocene was evidently a time of great evolutionary activity among the anthropoids, and even the small group of fossils which have survived from this period show a number of starts in the human direction. Although none of the known species seem to be in our direct line of ancestry, certain of them are more human in particular respects than any living anthropoid. Apparently nature was experimenting with the human idea at this period, and there probably were a great number of genera and species which were more apelike than any known humans but more manlike than any existing apes. It seems probable that the split between the anthropoid and hominoid, i.e., human, lines of evolution occurred at this period and that the direct ancestor of man was a large Miocene anthropoid with tendencies toward terrestrial life and a carnivorous diet.

Although it is disappointing that we have so little fossil evidence of man's ancestry, it is not surprising. All the living species of anthropoids have a rather small geographic range, and the same may very well have held for our remote ancestors. It is quite possible that no search for fossils has so far been made in the territory in which they lived. Both the anthropoids and the human groups which live by simple food-gathering form sparse populations even in the regions which they occupy, so it seems probable that our ancestors were rare animals even in their home territory. Moreover, the chances of their skeletons being preserved were slight. Fossilization requires special conditions. The remains must be protected from predatory animals and the effects of weather and at the same time impregnated with mineral matter. Even our Miocene ancestors were probably intelligent enough to avoid bogs and quicksands, to wait for rivers in flood to go down, and to keep out of wet caves.

At the same time they probably were not advanced enough to bury their dead. The chances of their remains being fossilized were therefore slight, and the chances of such fossils being found are still smaller. To deliberately set out to find man's ancestors is a much harder task than the proverbial hunt for a needle in a haystack. Most of the pre-human and early human fossils known to us have been found by accident and owe their preservation to the chance of some one interested in such material being on the spot when the find was made. Outside Europe there are very few persons with such interests, and until the last century there have been none at all in Africa and southern Asia, the most promising hunting grounds for our ancestors.

The only Miocene fossil belonging to the hominoid stock which has so far come to light is the Java man, *Pithecanthropus erectus*. This fossil was actually found in deposits of Upper Pliocene date but Sir Arthur Keith, the greatest authority on these matters, thinks that it may be a late Miocene type which had survived into the next geological period. The remains consist of a thigh-bone, a skull-cap, and a few teeth. The thigh-bone is intermediate in its characteristics between men and anthropoids but leans somewhat to the human side. Its form indicates that the species had already assumed fully erect posture and hence was probably ground-dwelling. The skull-cap is long and narrow, with massive bony ridges over the eyes and a very low vault. The brain capacity was apparently about 900 cubic centimeters, larger than that of any known ape but smaller than that of the smallest normal man. Aside from its capacity the skull is so apelike that certain investigators have concluded that it is that of a gigantic gibbon. The teeth are, however, on the human side, and their wear indicates that the species chewed with a rotary bite, like modern man. This would have been impossible if the canines had projected beyond the line of the other teeth, as they do in apes. This fossil certainly lies in the line of evolution of the hominoid stock, although it may not be directly ancestral to our own species.

With this single questionable exception there is a complete break in the fossil record from the middle Miocene to the close of the

Pliocene. From the late Pliocene or early Pleistocene we have two more manlike fossils, but both of these seem to lie further from our own line of ancestry than does Java man. The more remote of the two is the Taungs species, based on a single skull from Northern Rhodesia in Africa. This skull is, unfortunately, that of an infant, and some of its manlike characteristics may be due to this fact. The skulls of young anthropoids are, in general, more manlike than those of adults of the same species. The Taungs fossil is that of an anthropoid somewhat similar to a modern chimpanzee except for its very large brain capacity. The deposit in which it was found had apparently been laid down in a small cave which had later been completely filled with limestone. Although this deposit contained no implements, it contained many animal bones, including the skulls of a number of baboons of an extinct species. Several of these skulls show a peculiar type of depressed fracture which looks as though they had been killed with a club. Although it cannot be proved, it seems quite possible that the Taungs species was a big-brained ape of carnivorous habits and that it had advanced to the point of living in caves and using weapons of some sort in hunting. The fossil history of South Africa is still too imperfectly known for us to be able to date these finds with accuracy, but they are probably early or middle Pleistocene. By this time more manlike forms were certainly present in Africa.

The most puzzling of the semi-human fossils is that known as Piltdown man or Eoanthropus.<sup>1</sup> It was found in Sussex, England, and apparently belongs to the close of the Pliocene. A few very crude stone tools were obtained from the same deposit. The remains consist of most of a skull and a half-jaw. Unfortunately, the fragments of the skull do not join the two sides of the braincase, and this has led to lively disputes as to the size of the brain. The most probable estimate puts this at 1,400 cubic centimeters, well within the range of variation in normal members of our own species. At the same time the structure

<sup>1</sup> Ed. note: New carbon dating techniques have solved the puzzle. The fragments of the skull are now known to have differing origins and the "find" is now considered to be a fraud.

of the brain, as revealed by the contours of the inside of the skull, seems to have been considerably simpler and more apelike than that of any living race. Externally the skull is thoroughly human. Even the bony ridges over the eyes, which are heavily developed in Pithecanthropus and the earliest human fossils, fall within the range of variation for modern man. The startling features of this species are the jaw and teeth. The jaw is very much like that of a young chimpanzee and is so out of harmony with the skull that the first investigators doubted whether the two belonged together. The teeth are also intermediate in their form between anthropoid and human, and the canines project in anthropoid fashion. Apparently we have here a form which had almost reached the level of modern man in its brain and upper face while retaining a large number of ape characteristics in its lower face.

Although only one of the three species just discussed can conceivably be ancestral to our own, they may indicate the evolutionary trends which were at work from the Miocene on. All of them are disharmonic in certain respects, suggesting that each of the evolving semi-human species was progressive in certain respects and conservative in others. All of them show an increase in brain size considerably beyond the level of the present anthropoids. Eoanthropus and Pithecanthropus had attained completely erect posture and were probably constant ground-dwellers, while for the Taungs species the evidence on this point is not negative but lacking. Moreover, the presence of these forms in regions as far apart as Java, England, and South Africa indicates that by the beginning of the Pliocene Nature's experiments in the human direction had already spread over the major part of the Old World.

It may be well to mention here that there are no indications that any of these semi-human forms ever reached America or that any starts in the human direction were made on this continent. The American primates became separated from their Old World relatives at a very early time and followed their own divergent lines of evolution. These did not lead toward either large size or big and complex brains. When man finally appeared in America he was a fully evolved form and al-

ready familiar with the use of tools and fire. Apparently he entered the new continent from northeastern Asia in not very remote times.

From the first third of the Pleistocene we have still another semi-human species but one which is much nearer to our own genus than any of those hitherto described. This is the Peking man, found near the city of that name in China. At the time of this writing fragments of a number of individuals have been found, but the study of the remains is still under way and final conclusions have not been published. Apparently this species is related to Java man but shows a marked advance in the human direction. The skull retains the heavy brow ridges but has a much higher vault and considerably larger brain capacity. The jaw is much more apelike than that of modern man, but the teeth are rather on the human side. The canines were short, as in man. A peculiar feature is the great enlargement of the pulp cavities in the teeth. This characteristic is lacking in both modern men and anthropoids but is found in two extinct human species, Heidelberg and Neanderthal. A single foot-bone seems to indicate that the foot structure of this species was markedly different from that of modern man. That this species was already human in some of its habits is proved by the presence of crude stone implements in association with the remains. We will discuss its possible relations to our own genus later, when we have described some of the ancient species of true men.

The oldest fossil assigned to our own genus is the Heidelberg jaw, found in a sand-pit near the village of Mauer in Germany. It was recovered from undisturbed deposits nearly eighty feet below the surface and is certainly of early Pleistocene date. The jaw is extraordinarily massive and lacks a chin, but its form is essentially human and the teeth are thoroughly so. They differ from those of modern man only in the feature of an enlarged pulp cavity. No other remains of this species have been found, and until we know more about it it may be wise to reserve judgment on its exact generic position. Although it is classed with Genus *Homo*, we must not forget that if *Eoanthropus* could combine an apelike jaw with a human skull some other species may have

combined a manlike jaw with an apelike skull.

The earliest unquestionably human remains are those of Neanderthal man, a race or species which seems to have occupied most of Europe during the middle and later part of the Pleistocene. Many individuals of this group have been found, and this is the earliest point in human history at which we stand on really firm ground with complete skeletons on which to base our conclusions. Although Neanderthal was more apelike than any living race, there can be no doubt that he was a fully developed man. He was a short, stocky individual, barrel-chested and strongly muscled. Both his arms and legs were short, and the proportions of the upper and lower bones in each were, curiously enough, less anthropoid than those of our own species. He seems to have been unable to straighten his knees completely and must have had a rather slow and shambling gait. His head was tilted back, due to a high attachment of the neck muscles on the skull, so that he must have shown a single unbroken curve from the crown of his head to the small of his back. His head was large, with a very heavy face, broad and probably flat nose, and a massive chinless jaw. The eyes were protected by projecting brow ridges even heavier than those of a modern Australian black. His forehead was low and his skull long and rather flat on top, with the bulk of its capacity toward the rear. His brain was, proportionately to his size, quite as large as that of modern men, but it was organized somewhat differently and he was probably distinctly inferior in mental ability. He differed from modern man most markedly in his tooth structure, which showed a constant development of large pulp cavities and a tendency toward plug-rooted molars instead of fang-rooted ones of modern type. He seems to have known the use of tools and fire from the earliest period in which we find him and before his extinction had evolved a considerable series of specialized tools. In fact he was little inferior in this respect to our own ancestors at the time that they replaced him on the European continent.

There is one other species of our genus which deserves only a passing mention. This is Rhodesian man, based upon a single skull found in Rhodesia in Africa. This skull is very

and temperate regions of the Old World. If even the semi-human forms were able to do this, there is no reason to suppose that our own ancestors, who were more intelligent and better equipped to cope with a variety of environments, could not have followed their example. It is one of the tenets of evolution that the struggle for existence is always sharpest between closely related species which utilize much the same natural resources of any region. In their spread our own ancestors probably "mopped up" all the other human or semi-human species which had survived to come into competition with them.

The last campaign in this long war for world sovereignty seems to have been fought in Europe. Here the Pleistocene was an age of ice with alternate glacial advances and retreats. *Homo sapiens* was a tropical or at most temperate species, hairless and susceptible to cold. Neanderthal, on the other hand, seems to have been a sub-arctic species. He was able to live in Europe under conditions as severe as those which confront the modern Eskimo and with a vastly less adequate equipment. We know that he has left no tools suitable for sewing skins together, and it is doubtful whether he had clothing at all. Perhaps he had retained the furry coat of his anthropoid ancestors. It was only when the ice moved north for the last time that our ancestors entered the continent and began to contest Neanderthal's supremacy. These first immigrants were of fully modern type and their descendants are still present in the European population. They seem to have carried on a war of extermination with the Neanderthal species, and there are no indications that they ever interbred with them. This is so much at variance with the usual practices of wife-stealing and race mixture that it suggests the presence of some great difference between the two groups. It is hardly conceivable that the physical differences of the two species made breeding impossible. It is more likely that there was some superficial characteristic of Neanderthal, perhaps a furry coat, which placed him completely outside the human family. Whatever the reason, Neanderthal was wiped out without leaving a trace and our own species emerged as the sole representatives of the *Hominidae*.

It was toward the close of the Pleistocene also that members of our own species reached the American continent. Whether they came by the bleak Bering Strait route or by some now sunken bridge farther to the south is still uncertain. However, we know that man was only one of a series of Asiatic mammals which penetrated to America at this time and at least one of these, the bison, has never been an arctic form. In the new continent men found a rich although somewhat archaic fauna and no anthropoid or hominoid forms which might challenge their supremacy. They increased rapidly and spread widely, but they lost time in pioneering and did not begin to lay the foundations of civilization until some 3,000 or 4,000 years after their Old World relatives had taken the first steps in the same direction.

Anyone who writes on the origin of man must make a liberal use of "probably" and "perhaps." There are long gaps in the record, and some of these may never be filled. At the same time, evidence is accumulating so rapidly that any book on the subject becomes antiquated within five years. In the light of our present knowledge the history of our species can be summarized as follows: Our most remote primate ancestor was some small tree dwelling form ancestral to men and apes alike. For a long time the human and ape lines of evolution were the same, the individuals becoming steadily larger and also developing disproportionately large brains. During the Miocene period some of the members of this line became too large to live in trees and began to adapt themselves to existence on the ground. One or more species of these big ground-dwellers developed carnivorous habits and branched off from the ancestral stem, increasing the size of its brain and adopting completely erect posture. This was the beginning of the hominoid stem, which put forth many branches during the late Miocene and Pliocene. One of these branches reached the human level, probably during the later half of the Pliocene, and gave rise to a number of species one of which finally evolved into modern man. This species spread far and wide, exterminated its competitors, and began in turn to differentiate into various races, species in the making.

## The Idea of Race

### Aryans and Jews

ADOLPH HITLER

No individual name in the modern world is more indissolubly linked to racism than Adolf Hitler (1889-1945). In *Mein Kampf*, written while he was imprisoned in 1923 following an unsuccessful revolt, Hitler described his struggles, his philosophy, and his future. A basic feature of his thought was the belief in the racial superiority of the "Aryan" race. To him, the most undestorable race were the Jews. His conviction led him to order the extermination of nearly sixteen million people—Jews, Poles, Russians, and others.

The idea of race is thus an influential one. Yet, curiously, the idea is of modern making. In reading the selection that follows,\* consider the viewpoint of this "expert." Does the presentation accord with your ideas of Jews? Are not some groups of people more mercenary, more ambitious, and more advanced than others? Is racial superiority the basis of these differences?

The mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew. In hardly any people in the world is the instinct of self-preservation developed more strongly than in the so-called "chosen." Of this, the mere fact of survival of this race may be considered the best proof. Where is the people which in the last two thousand years has been exposed to so slight

changes of inner disposition, character, etc., as the Jewish people? What people, finally, has gone through greater upheavals than this one—and nevertheless issued from the mightiest catastrophes of mankind unchanged? What an infinitely tough will to live and preserve the species speaks from these facts!

The mental qualities of the Jew have been schooled in the course of many centuries. Today he passes as "smart," and this in a certain sense he has been at all times. But his intelligence is not the result of his own develop-

\* From *Mein Kampf* by Adolph Hitler, trans. Ralph Manheim, pp. 300, 302-3, 305, 325. Copyright 1943, reprinted by permission of the Houghton Mifflin Co.



## The Idea of Race

### Americans

### Betrayed

MORTON GRODZINS

Does "concentration camp" sound undemocratic—unlikely in the United States? Well, then, does "relocation center" seem to be an improvement? Relocation centers were the places in which over a hundred thousand Americans were held in 1942 without evidence and without charges. Morton Grodzins (1917– ), a political scientist, describes the "evacuation" of those Pacific Coast Americans of Japanese ancestry in his book *Americans Betrayed*, from which this reading is taken.\*

What part did the idea of race play in the relocation? In times of stress, can we expect racial loyalties to supercede citizenship and friendship? Can we trust the Japanese today? These questions are not merely academic. Half of the world's population is Asiatic. We need to know if they can be trusted, if they will trust us.

The evacuation of Japanese Americans from the Pacific Coast in the spring and summer of 1942 was an act without precedent in American history. It was the first time that the United States government condemned a large group of people to barbed-wire inclosures. It was the first event in which danger to the nation's welfare was determined by group characteristics rather than by individual guilt. It was the first program in which race alone determined whether an American would remain free or become incarcerated.

Why did the evacuation take place? How did the national government determine that evacuation was necessary?

\* Reprinted from *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 1-2, 13-14, 19-21, 84-87, 372-74, by Morton Grodzins, by permission of The University of Chicago Press.

The single purpose of the following pages is to answer these questions. But the answers have more than a historical significance. The decision in favor of evacuation affected in the short run only a tiny minority of the nation's population; in the long run, it affects the whole people. The process of government is a continuing process; what it produced for Japanese Americans it can also produce for other Americans. The decision to evacuate was made in the face of emergency; but the Supreme Court has imbedded the principle of evacuation into the nation's constitutional system.

The evacuation, in short, is less important as a crisis program than as a permanent legacy of governmental action taken against the members of a minority group. It is less important

as a historical incident than as a legal precedent. It is less important as a policy of government than as a demonstration of the policy-making process. It is less important for what it did to Japanese Americans than for what it might do to all Americans.

One hundred and ten thousand Americans of Japanese ancestry were evacuated. Aliens and citizens, children and adults, males and females, were moved on short notice from their lifetime homes to concentration centers. No charges were ever filed against these persons, and no guilt was ever attributed to them. The test was ancestry, applied with the greatest rigidity. Evacuation swept into guarded camps, orphans, foster-children in white homes, Japanese married to Caucasians, the offspring of such marriages, persons who were unaware of their Japanese ancestry, and American citizens "with as little as one-sixteenth Japanese blood."<sup>1</sup> Evacuation was not carried out by lawless vigilantes or by excited local officials. The program was instituted and executed by military forces of the United States with a full mandate of power from both the executive and the legislative branches of the national government.

The controversy over the merits of absolute exclusion and of the various restrictive acts aimed at resident Japanese before the mass evacuation of 1942 has no place in this book. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the terms in which restrictive measures were argued had in many cases little relation to facts or logic. Errors were made on both sides, but the larger misconceptions were probably broadcast by the exclusionists and their supporters. The various fanciful estimates of the rapidity of the reproduction rate of resident Japanese are but one case in point. There is an abundance of further examples. A treatise of the early part of the century by a California official declared that as the result of the immigration to the United States of discharged Japanese soldiers "it would be easy to marshal an army of 50,000 Japanese veterans at any

point in California in forty-eight hours."<sup>2</sup> At the time this statement was made the total Japanese population of California (according to the census of 1910) was less than 42,000. The segregation of oriental students in San Francisco in 1906 was urged on the grounds that Japanese were "crowding" white students, but an official inquiry later revealed that exactly ninety-three persons in seventy-two schools were involved.<sup>3</sup> In 1913 Senator Phelan complained that a white farmer could not "compete for his daily bread against this wifeless, childless yellow man,"<sup>4</sup> but in 1920 Governor Stephens of California asserted that the Japanese were "proving crushing competitors to our white rural population" because they employed "their wives and their very children in the arduous toil of the soil."

Groups, both friendly and unfriendly toward American Japanese, were activated by the war with Japan. On the one hand, church, social service, and civil liberties organizations were conscious of the tendency to identify Japanese in America with the Japanese enemy. They took steps to advise American Japanese of their sympathy, to curb acts of prejudice, and to provide assistance to those thrown out of work by distrustful employers. The first weeks of the war encouraged these friendly groups. Acts of public hostility were infrequent and minor in character; the Department of Justice pursued a liberal policy, arresting large numbers of individuals considered of potential danger but taking a firm stand in opposition to repressive acts against the Japanese as a group; President Roosevelt, Governor Olson of California, and several congressmen paid tribute to the loyalty of the nation's minorities and pleaded that fairness be shown them. As a later chapter shows, the

<sup>1</sup> W. Almont Gates, "Oriental Immigration on the Pacific Coast," address before the National Conference of Charities and Correction, Buffalo, 1909, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> V. H. Metcalf (Secretary of Commerce and Labor and Secretary of Navy in cabinet of Theodore Roosevelt), *Japanese in the City of San Francisco*, Sen. Doc. No. 147, 59th Congress, 2d Session, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1906.

<sup>3</sup> James D. Phelan, "The Japanese Question from a Californian Viewpoint," *Independent*, June 24, 1913, p. 1440.

<sup>4</sup> Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, *Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast*, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1913, p. 145.

friends of American Japanese were disarmed by the near-universal tolerance thus accorded the Japanese group in the first weeks of the war. The rapid buildup of demands for mass evacuation found them unprepared, and the significant protests over the mass treatment of Japanese were made only after evacuation became public policy.

On the other hand, many traditionally anti-Japanese individuals and organizations realized that the war with Japan presented a natural opportunity to further their long-term aims. At the first meeting of the California Joint Immigration Committee after Pearl Harbor, the executive secretary remarked: "I know that the Committee has received more active and more general support in the last month than it has received in the last thirty years of its existence, and what we want, we ought to get now." A member added: "It strikes me that we could get a lot of good educational material . . . if it was handled right. This is our time to get things done that we have been trying to get done for a quarter of a century."<sup>5</sup>

The same insight into the timeliness of spreading the war with Japan into an attack upon Japanese Americans was demonstrated time and time again. Three additional examples, chosen at random, follow.

An officer of the Western Growers Protective Association wrote Congressman John Z. Anderson regarding a bill introduced by the latter which the agricultural leader thought would "make it possible to ship all these Japanese, whether of foreign or American birth, back to Japan."

I feel that now is the time to do this and to do it right. If we wait until after the war is over the "sob sisters" are going to hold sway again and we will never be able to get such a Resolution through Congress and the various State Legislatures.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> California Joint Immigration Committee, meeting of February 7, 1942, "Minutes," p. 6. The first speaker was H. J. McClatchy; the second, Charles M. Goethe.

<sup>6</sup> F. W. McNabb to Anderson, May 19, 1942. (All names used to identify authors of unpublished letters to public officials are fictitious. Fictitious names of individuals are printed in italics.) Actually Mr. Anderson's measure (H. J. Res. 305, 77th Congress, 2d Session) provided that persons born of parents

A leading official of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association explained to Congressman Anderson his views on the same measure:

If it were not for the "white-skinned Japs" in this country there wouldn't be any Japanese question. What can you suggest that I do and thousands of Californians be led to do, that may make it possible to get rid of all Japs, sending them back to Japan either before or after the war is won. I am convinced that if it is not done or at least the action completed before the war is over, it will be impossible to get rid of them. . . . The Japanese cannot be assimilated as the white race [and] we must do everything we can to stop them now as we have a golden opportunity now and may never have it again.<sup>7</sup>

A resident of Los Angeles wrote Attorney General Francis Biddle in regard to the necessity of evacuation:

No Jap should be permitted to remain in America. Whether born here or not, they are Japs at heart and always will be. . . . Whole districts in Los Angeles, both residential and business, are 100% Jap and no such opportunity as now exists may ever again be presented to us, in all our future history, to ship them back to Japan. . . .<sup>8</sup>

Mr. Dies's Special Committee on Un-American Activities had for more than three years "exposed" numerous allegedly disloyal persons within the United States. Through the summer before war began Congressman Dies released press statements threatening exposure of Japanese espionage and anti-American propaganda.<sup>9</sup> On January 15 he addressed the House at length on the "fifth column" in America, emphasizing Communist and Nazi dangers, and declaring that the country was "still not on the alert against these foes that are within our borders."<sup>10</sup> On January 28 Mr. Dies declared that "a fear of displeasing for-

ineligible for citizenship by naturalization should not become citizens by birth in the United States.

<sup>7</sup> O. L. Scott to Anderson, May 12, 1942.

<sup>8</sup> J. R. Carter to Biddle, December 13, 1941.

<sup>9</sup> See *Los Angeles Examiner*, July 6, 1941; *July 23, 1941*; August 1, 1941.

<sup>10</sup> *Congressional Record*, January 15, 1942, pp. 407-10.

in concentration camps at once" and went a step further to argue that persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States "are not citizens of the United States and never can be."<sup>14</sup> Five days later the Mississippi congressman introduced a bill that authorized and directed the Secretary of War "to take into custody certain persons who are citizens or subjects of, or owe allegiance to, any nation with which the United States is at war." This measure was identical in all important aspects to one that had been previously introduced in the upper house by Senator Tom Stewart on February 19. Both bills were drawn up specifically to insure the incarceration of American citizens of Japanese ancestry.<sup>15</sup>

The bill was never discussed in the House, Congressman Rankin being willing to let the initiative rest with his colleague in the upper chamber. Senator Stewart used the measure as a springboard for a more important attack on the citizenship status of American Japanese. Like the Mississippi congressman, he based his contentions on the dissenting opinion in the case of Wong Kim Ark which he read to the Senate on February 26. He argued: "A Jap born on our soil is a subject of Japan under Japanese law; therefore, he owes allegiance to Japan, and, so owing allegiance to Japan, certainly he is not 'subject to the jurisdiction' of the United States under a proper construction and in the light of modern beliefs."

Senator Stewart thought it "absurd" that "those whose parents could not themselves become naturalized should become citizens by the mere accident of birth on American soil." The Japanese were among Americans' worst enemies.

They are cowardly and immoral. They are different from Americans in every conceivable way, and no Japanese . . . should have a right to claim American citizenship . . .

A Jap is a Jap anywhere you find him, and his taking the oath of allegiance to this country would not help, even if he should be permitted to do so. They do not believe in God and have

no respect for an oath. They have been plotting for years against the Americas and their democracies.<sup>16</sup>

Evacuation was a radical departure from traditional American ways and a disturbing model for the future. Yet full consideration of the merits of evacuation in terms of the national welfare was frustrated at each plane of the policy-making process. Regional considerations, emotional half-truths, and racial prejudice colored the public discussion and the original military decision in favor of evacuation. Neither at this point nor at any subsequent point in the entire history of evacuation policy-making did the necessity of evacuation receive full, impartial discussion. At no time in the entire process of decision-making was evacuation as a measure of national defense balanced against the facts available with respect to resident Japanese, against alternative methods of control, or against the implications for democracy in the incarceration of a racial group. The negation of political rationality marked each step in the process by which evacuation became public policy.

Americans in the past decade have held up to scorn the crudities of the Fascist regimes. Yet the history of the evacuation policy could be an episode from the totalitarian handbook. The resident Japanese minority became the scapegoat of military defeat at Hawaii. Racial prejudices, economic cupidity, and political fortune-hunting became intertwined with patriotic endeavor. In the face of exact knowledge to the contrary, military officials propounded the theory that race determined allegiance. Civil administrators and the national legislature were content to rubber-stamp the military fiat.

Americans in concentration centers at home provided a bitter irony at a time that Americans were fighting for the Four Freedoms abroad. Ideological issues were presented with bleak clarity in World War II. On the one hand, the nation's principal European enemy found energy in a doctrine of racial superiority, and the nation's Asiatic enemy propagandized its cause in terms of the colored

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* (Appendix), February 23, 1942, pp. A768-69. Mr. Rankin based his legal argument that Japanese born in America were not citizens on the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fuller in *United States v. Wong Kim Ark*, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).

<sup>15</sup> S. 2293, 77th Congress, 2d Session.

<sup>16</sup> *Congressional Record*, February 26, 1942, pp. 1682-83.

racess struggling against their white oppressors. On the other hand, the United States took leadership from a President who affirmed "Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry"; the strength of the country was conditioned by the unity of its diverse nationalities; millions of Chinese stood foremost among the nation's allies. The lines were clear cut, and the Japanese minority on the West Coast presented the United States with a magnificent opportunity to confound her enemies on both sides, to lend encouragement to her allies, and to build strength out of the diversity of her minority groups. No opportunity was more completely thwarted. The policy adopted was an affirmation of enemy principles.

The American Civil Liberties Union has

called the Japanese evacuation "the worst single wholesale violation of civil rights of American citizens in our history." Later judgment will probably not lower that estimate, though it has already been tempered in historical perspective as abrogated rights have been restored and most Japanese in America have returned with full status to normal life.

Japanese Americans were the immediate victims of the evacuation. But larger consequences are carried by the American peoples as a whole. Their legacy is the lasting one of precedent and constitutional sanctity for a policy of mass incarceration under military auspices. This is the most important result of the process by which the evacuation decision was made. That process betrayed all Americans.

## The Idea of Race

### Race Differences

RUTH BENEDICT AND GENE WELTFISH

Beliefs about race are important. We have seen how race prejudice is related to concentration camps and relocation centers. The pictures in men's minds determine their actions. But how accurate are the pictures of race superiority and inferiority? For one answer to this question we turn to the work of two anthropologists, Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish. Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) was particularly distinguished in her field, perhaps best known for *Patterns of Culture* (1934) and *Race: Science and Politics* (1940).

How does the interpretation presented in this selection \* fit into your ideas?

#### WHAT ABOUT INTELLIGENCE?

The most careful investigations of intelligence have been made in America among Negroes and whites. The scientist realizes that every time he measures intelligence in any man, black or white, his results show the intelligence that man was born with plus what happened to him since he was born. The scientist has a lot of proof of this. For instance, in the First World War, intelligence tests were given to the American Expeditionary Forces; they showed that Negroes made a lower score on intelligence tests than whites. But the tests also showed that Northerners, black and white, had higher scores than Southerners, black and white. Everyone knows that Southerners are inborn equals of Northerners, but in 1917 many southern states' per capita expenditures for schools were only fractions of

those in northern states, and housing and diet and income were far below average too. Since the vast majority of Negroes lived in the South, their score on the intelligence test was a score they got not only as Negroes, but as Americans who had grown up under poor conditions in the South. Scientists therefore compared the scores of Southern whites and Northern Negroes.

#### Median Scores on A.E.F. Intelligence Tests

##### SOUTHERN WHITES:

Mississippi	41.25
Kentucky	41.50
Arkansas	41.55

##### NORTHERN NEGROES:

New York	45.02
Illinois	47.35
Ohio	49.50

\* From *The Races of Mankind* by Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish, Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 85 (1946), pp. 17-24. Reprinted by permission

Negroes with better luck after they were born got higher scores than whites with less

luck. The white race did badly where economic conditions were bad and schooling was not provided, and Negroes living under better conditions surpassed them. *The differences did not arise because people were from the North or the South, or because they were black or white, but because of differences in income, education, cultural advantages, and other opportunities.*

Scientists then studied gifted children. They found that children with top scores turn up among Negroes, Mexicans, and Orientals. Then they went to European countries to study the intelligence of children in homelands from which our immigrants come. Children from some of these countries got poor scores in America, but in their homeland children got good scores. Evidently the poor scores here were due to being uprooted, speaking a foreign language, and living in tenements; the children were not unintelligent by heredity.

### CHARACTER NOT INBORN

The second superiority which a man claims when he says, "I was born a member of a superior race," is that his race has better character. The Nazis boasted of their racial soul. But when they wanted to make a whole new generation into Nazis they didn't trust to "racial soul"; they made certain kinds of teaching compulsory in the schools, they broke up homes where the parents were anti-Nazi, they required boys to join certain Nazi youth organizations. By these means they got the kind of national character they wanted. But it was a planned and deliberately trained character, not an inborn "racial soul." In just the same way the Japanese have bred a generation of ruthless fighters. Fifty years ago Europeans who lived in Japan used to describe them as "butterflies flitting from flower to flower," incapable of "the stern drives" of Western civilization. Since 1900 the "butterflies" have fought six times overseas, and they are desperate and ruthless fighters. In a generation the butterflies have become game cocks. But their race has not changed. The same blood still flows in their veins. But spiritually they are more like the Germans than they are like their racial brothers, the peace-loving Chinese. It can go the other way, too. In 1520 the

ancient Mexicans were like the Germans. They talked like Nazis, thought like them, in many ways felt like them. They too, believed war to be man's highest mission. They, too, trained their children for it, placing their boys in great state schools where they learned little else but the glories of battle and the rituals of their caste. They, too, believed themselves invincible, and against small, defenseless villages, they were. But they were defeated in battle by the Spaniards with the help of the peoples whom the Aztecs had oppressed; their leaders were killed, their temples destroyed, their wealth pillaged, and their power broken. The Mexican peasant, who still speaks the Aztec language and in whose veins still runs the blood of Aztec conquerors, no longer dreams of glorious death in battle and eternal life in an Indian Valhalla. He no longer goes on the warpath, no longer provokes war with peaceful villages. He is a humble peon, wishing only to be left in peace to cultivate his little field, go to church, dance, sing, and make love. These simple things endure.

Americans deny that the Nazis have produced a national character superior to that of Goethe's and Schiller's day, and that the ruthless Japanese of today are finer human beings than in those generations when they preferred to write poetry and paint pictures. Race prejudice is, after all, a determination to keep a people down, and it misuses the label "inferior" to justify unfairness and injustice. Race prejudice makes people ruthless; it invites violence. It is the opposite of "good character" as it is defined in the Christian religion—or in the Confucian religion, or in the Buddhist religion, or the Hindu religion, for that matter.

### CIVILIZATION NOT CAUSED BY RACE

History proves that progress in civilization is not the monopoly of one race or subrace. When our white forbears in Europe were rude stone-age primitives, the civilizations of the Babylonians and the Egyptians had already flourished and been eclipsed. There were great Negro states in Africa when Europe was a sparsely settled forest. Negroes made iron tools and wove fine cloth for their

clothing when fair-skinned Europeans wore skins and knew nothing of iron.

When Europe was just emerging from the Middle Ages, Marco Polo visited China and found there a great civilization, the like of which he had never imagined. Europe was a frontier country in those days compared with China.

Since the beginning of history an unusual collection of fortunate circumstances have been present among one race, sometimes among another. Up to now, every great center of civilization has had its day and has given place to others. The proud rulers of yesterday become the simple peasants of another era. The crude people who once threatened the great cities become later the kings and emperors in the same country. The peoples change, but the old arts of life are, for the most part, not permanently lost. They pass into the common heritage of mankind.

Inventions pass, too, from one continent to another when people trade with each other. This has happened since the dawn of history. About 5,000 years ago, when Europe was on the frontiers of the civilized world, Asiatics came to trade in Europe and North Africa in great caravans. They followed the main rivers—the Nile into North Africa, the Danube into Europe, and the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers out of Asia. People from all over came in contact with one another and compared notes on what they knew. In this way they pooled their knowledge, and out of this combined knowledge came the great inventions of civilization—massive building and the arts of metallurgy, chemistry, writing, medicine, and mathematics; transportation on wheels. The idea of printing and the use of movable type are *old Chinese inventions*, and our power engines depend upon a knowledge of explosives that the Chinese worked out with fire-crackers.

When Columbus discovered America, corn, "Irish" potatoes, tobacco, and "Boston" beans were unknown in Europe. They had been developed by American Indians. Within ten years corn was being planted in Central Asia

and in the interior of Africa, and African tribes today think that corn was given them by their own gods "in the beginning."

All races have made their contributions to human knowledge. Those who have lived at the crossroads of the world have invented most; those who have lived isolated on islands or at the tip ends of continents have been content to earn their livelihoods by old traditional methods. There was, for them, no "necessity" to be "the mother of invention" after they had devised a way to live on the land.

Peoples who came into contact with strangers, however, gave what arts of life they had and took what the strangers had. These contributions to civilization accumulated over the centuries and on this accumulation new discoveries are based. We are all the gainers.

The United States is the greatest crossroads of the world in all history. People have come here from every race and nation, and almost every race in the world is represented among our citizens. They have brought with them their ways of cooking food, so that our "American" diet is indebted to a dozen peoples. Our turkey, corn, and cranberries come from the Indians. Our salads we borrowed from the French and Italians. Increasingly in recent years we have enriched our tables with soups from Russia, vegetables from Italy, appetizers from the Scandinavian countries, seafoods from the Mediterranean lands, chili and tortillas from Mexico, and so on almost endlessly. At the same time, everywhere we have gone in the world, we have popularized ice cream, beefsteak, breakfast cereals, corn on the cob, and other foods that are called "American."

Industry in the United States has taken the hand-skills of our immigrants and made machines to do the work; without their skills we should not have known how. Our music, our buildings have developed from patterns brought to our shores or learned from every quarter of the world. Our country would be poorer in every phase of its culture if different cultures had not come together here, sharing and learning the special contributions each had to offer.



## Race or Place

ELLSWORTH HUNTINGTON

It should not be surprising to find a geographer contending that climate is more important than racial differences. Ellsworth Huntington (1876-1947) spent a lifetime in the study of geography. His personal expeditions, his many books and honors, reflect his serious interest in the effects of climate upon mankind.

*Civilization and Climate* is the source of the following interpretation.\* How do you suppose the author would explain the rise of civilization in the Nile valley, in England and Japan, in your present community? Will the "adverse climates" of Egypt and India, Central Africa and Southeast Asia, prevent their peoples from achieving world power and prominence?

So far as inheritance is concerned, the white Southerners, according to the generally accepted principles of biology, must be essentially as well off as the white men of the North. New England has probably had a certain advantage from the strong fiber of her early settlers, but that section is excluded from our comparison because it has so few colored farmers. In New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the states farther west, the white farmers in 1900 were of highly mixed origin, and there is little reason to think that they inherit any greater capacity than do the white men of the South. Hence, we infer that the difference shown by the census is largely a matter of climate. It has arisen partly by indi-

rect means such as slavery and disease, partly by direct means such as the disinclination to physical exertion. This demands emphasis, for we are told that the South needs nothing but a fair opportunity, plenty of capital, and abundant roads, railroads, and factories, or else it needs only education, a new respect of one race for the other, cooperation between the two for the sake of the common good, and a deeper application of the principles of Christ. All these things are sadly needed, but it is doubtful whether they can work their full effect unless supplemented by a new knowledge of how to neutralize the climatic influences which seem to underlie so many southern problems. In the climate of the South a part of the white population becomes a prey to malaria, the hookworm, and other debilitating ailments. People cease to be careful about

\* From *Civilization and Climate*, pp. 22-23 and 33-34, by Ellsworth Huntington, copyright 1915, reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

food and sanitation. Even those who are in good health do not feel the eager zest for work which is so notable in the parts of the world where the climatic stimulus is at a maximum. Thus one thing joins with another to cause a part of the people to fall far below the level of their race, and to become "Poor Whites," or "Crackers." These increase in number as one passes from a more to a less favorable climate. It is their run-down, unkempt farms which bring the average of the southern whites so dangerously near the level of the negroes. The best farms of the South vie with those of the North. They show what could be done if all the inhabitants could be instilled with the energy and wisdom of the best.

Aside from North America the only large area where Teutons and negroes come into direct contact as permanent inhabitants is South Africa. There they meet on practically equal terms. The English and the Boers began to settle in South Africa in large numbers only in the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1911 the South African Republic contained about 1.3 million Europeans, 4 million natives, and 600,000 from other regions. A large proportion of the white men were not born there, and hence the new conditions have not had time to produce their full effect. The natives consist largely of the Bantu stock of negroes. The majority are Zulus, but the most capable appear to be the Basutos, an allied race who have preserved a large measure of independence in the safe refuge of the Drakenberg mountains. Both the Zulus and the Basutos came from the North a few generations ago. Some preceded the white man and some have come since his arrival. In any case they are comparatively newcomers. Their arrival, and still more that of the Europeans, has practically exterminated the former inhabitants, Hottentots and Bushmen.

The colored people are most numerous in the north and east of the Republic, that is, in Rhodesia and Natal. The white men are most abundant in the south and in the central plateau, that is, in Cape Colony, Orange River Colony, and Transvaal. With ever increasing force, however, the blacks are pushing into the white man's country. They are brought as laborers for the mines; they are wanted for the farms; they are in demand as servants; and

they are themselves taking up farms and successfully cultivating them. They are doing more than this, however, for they are actually ousting the Europeans. In 1902 the English and the Boers finished a bitter war. Ten years later their enmity had almost vanished in the common fear of the negro. Aside from the disturbances due to the European War of 1914, the great political question of the day is the black man. One party advocates segregation, with a white man's South Africa in the highlands from Transvaal southward, and a black man's South Africa in Natal and Rhodesia. No black man, they say, should be allowed to live permanently outside his own country, although he might go elsewhere to work temporarily. The other party holds that such measures are too radical, but it also recognizes the gravity of the situation.

The problem presents itself under an economic guise. The colored men have a lower standard of living than the whites. Hence they work more cheaply. They furnish so abundant a supply of labor that white laborers have no chance. Thus a large number of the Europeans—even a tenth according to ardent believers in the future of South Africa—are "poor whites." They are a shiftless set, living from hand to mouth, proud of their race, yet less efficient than the blacks. The problem of preventing them from becoming an immediate charge upon the community is serious. They lack the push and energy which characterize the rest of the white population. According to Stevens, in his book *White and Black*, 5 per cent of the white population in certain regions have fallen so low that they would rather resort to crime than work in competition with the black man. The most sinister fact is that these "poor whites" appear to have been largely born in the country. The newcomers are on the whole more energetic. They find employment, and if they have difficulty in one place, move on to another. The poor whites lack the initiative to do this. If they fall into difficulties, they tend to lie down and give up. They need higher wages than the blacks in order to maintain their traditional standard of living. They are not efficient enough to get higher wages. If they had the restless energy which characterizes the children and grandchildren of emigrants from

Europe in Canada, for example, they would scarcely fall into such straits.

Since the problem is economic, the South Africans are striving to apply economic remedies. This is wise, but success is doubtful unless other factors are also considered. Back of the economic facts, and in many ways conditioning them, lies the climate. South Africa is supposed to have a climate admirably adapted to Europeans. I shared the common opinion until I began to gather statistics of the effect of climate upon efficiency. These, as will be shown later, indicate that although the South African climate is pleasant, it lacks the stimulating qualities which are so important in Europe and North America. This lack of stimulus increases rapidly as one goes from south to north. Here, then, is the situation that confronts us: In South Africa the white men settled first in the regions most favorable from a climatic point of view and then pushed northward into worse conditions. Even the best parts of South Africa cannot approach England and Holland in the excellence of their climate. Hence, the white settlers are everywhere at a disadvantage. On the other hand, the Bantu negroes have come into South Africa from the north, where the climate is far less favorable than in their new homes. Thus the two races face each other under conditions which lessen the white man's energy, while they stimulate the black man. The whites are still far ahead, and will doubtless continue to be so indefinitely. Nevertheless, the weaker ones are being weeded out and prepared for destruction. What the final result will be, no man can say. It depends upon whether we can discover a means of preventing the deterioration which now seems to attack a portion of the population when people move from a good climate to a worse.

A more striking case than that of South Africa is found in the Bahama Islands. At the time of the American Revolution a considerable number of Loyalists were so faithful to England that they sacrificed their all in order to escape from the new flag with its stars and stripes. Leaving their homes in Georgia and other southern states they sought the British territory of the Bahamas. Other colonists came from Great Britain. Now, after from three to five generations, the new environment has had

more opportunity than in South Africa to produce its full effect. Nowhere else, indeed, in all the world have people of the English race lived as genuine colonists for several generations in so tropical a climate. What has been the result? There can be but one answer. It has been disastrous. Compare the Bahamas with Canada. The same sort of people went to both places. Today the descendants of the Loyalists in Canada are one of the strongest elements in causing that country to be conspicuously well governed and law-abiding, and the descendants of other colonists, both British and French, vie with them in this matter. In the Bahamas the descendants of the same type of people show today a larger proportion of poor whites than can probably be found in any other Anglo-Saxon community. Although no figures are available, my own observations lead to the conclusion that the average white farmer is scarcely ahead of the average negro.

Whatever the exact figures may be, there can be no question that in the Bahamas the two races tend to approach the same level. This seems to indicate a marked retrogression of the white race in regions which are climatically unsuitable. Let me hasten to say that many of the more intelligent Bahamans do not differ from the corresponding portions of the Anglo-Saxon race elsewhere. At home they feel themselves handicapped, but when the young people go away to the northern United States or England, they frequently show marked ability. Their inheritance is still good.

.....  
The farmers of the northern and southern states, the race problem of South Africa, and the backwardness of the Bahamas, all seem to point to the same conclusion. When the white man migrates to climates less stimulating than those of his original home, he appears to lose in both physical and mental energy. This leads to carelessness in matters of sanitation and food, and thus gives greater scope to the diseases which under any circumstances would find an easy prey in the weakened bodies. The combination of mental inertia and physical weakness makes it difficult to overcome the difficulties arising from isolation, from natural disaster, or from the presence of an inferior race, and this in turn leads to

ignorance, prejudice, and idleness. Thus there arises a vicious circle which keeps on incessantly. From its revolving edge a part of the community is thrown off as poor whites, whose number increases in proportion to the enervating effect of the climate and the consequent speed with which the circle revolves. That climate is the original force which sets the wheel in motion seems to me evident, be-

cause it is only in adverse climates that we find the "cracker" type of "poor white trash" developing in appreciable numbers. If white men lived a thousand years in Egypt it seems probable that a large proportion of them would degenerate to this type. Whether they would still retain an inheritance of mentality sufficient to keep them ahead of a similar body of negroes can scarcely be determined.

## Male and Female

MARGARET MEAD

In *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, Margaret Mead described some unusual (to Americans) personality patterns. Among the Arapesh, both men and women were unaggressive and cooperative. The Mundugumor men and women were also similar, but both sexes were aggressive, individualistic, and violent. The Tchambuli men were graceful, artistic, and "catty," while their women were resourceful and "manly." How do these "varieties" compare with male-female differences in the United States?

In this selection \* Dr. Mead develops her analysis of sex differences. Some other books by the same author which you may want to read are *Coming of Age in Samoa* (1928) and *Growing Up in New Guinea* (1930).

The knowledge that the personalities of the two sexes are socially produced is congenial to every programme that looks forward towards a planned order of society. It is a two-edged sword that can be used to hew a more flexible, more varied society than the human race has ever built, or merely to cut a narrow path down which one sex or both sexes will be forced to march, regimented, looking neither to the right nor to the left. It makes possible a Fascist programme of education in which women are forced back into a mould that modern Europe had fatuously believed to be broken forever. It makes possible a Communist programme in which the two sexes are treated as nearly alike as their different physiological

functions permit. Because it is social conditioning that is determinative, it has been possible for America, without conscious plan but none the less surely, partially to reverse the European tradition of male dominance, and to breed a generation of women who model their lives on the pattern of their schoolteachers and their aggressive, directive mothers. Their brothers stumble about in a vain attempt to preserve the myth of male dominance in a society in which the girls have come to consider dominance their natural right. As one fourteen-year-old girl said in commenting on the meaning of the term "tomboy," "Yes, it's true that it used to mean a girl who tried to act like a boy, dress like a boy, and things like that. But that belonged to the hoop-skirt era. Nowadays all girls have to do is act exactly like boys, quite quietly." The tradition in this country has been changing so rapidly that the term "sissy," which ten years ago

\* From "Sex and Temperament" in *From the South Seas*, pp. 310-313 and 318-322, by Margaret Mead, copyright 1928, 1930, 1935, 1939 by Margaret Mead, by permission of William Morrow and Company, Inc.

meant a boy who showed personality traits regarded as feminine, can now be applied with scathing emphasis by one girl to another, or can be defined by a small girl as "the kind of boy who always wears a baseball glove and goes about shouting, 'Put her there! Put her there!' and when you throw him a soft one he can't catch it." These penetrating comments are sharply indicative of a trend that lacks the concerted planning behind Fascist or Communist programmes, but which has nevertheless gained in acceleration in the last three decades. Plans that regiment women as home-makers, or which cease to differentiate the training of the two sexes, have at least the virtue of being clear and unambiguous. The present development in this country has all the insidious ambiguity of the situation that we found illustrated among the Tchambuli head-hunters, where the man is still defined as the head of the house, although the woman is trained to a greater celerity and sureness in taking that position. The result is an increasing number of American men who feel they must shout in order to maintain their vulnerable positions, and an increasing number of American women who clutch unhappily at a dominance that their society has granted them—but without giving them a charter of rules and regulations by which they can achieve it without damage to themselves, their husbands, and their children.

There are at least three courses open to a society that has realized the extent to which male and female personality are socially produced. Two of these courses have been tried before, over and over again, at different times in the long, irregular, repetitious history of the race. The first is to standardize the personality of men and women as clearly contrasting, complementary, and antithetical, and to make every institution in the society congruent with this standardization. If the society declared that woman's sole function was motherhood and teaching and care of young children, it could so arrange matters that every woman who was not physiologically debarred should become a mother and be supported in the exercise of this function. It could abolish the discrepancy between the doctrine that women's place is the home and the number of homes that were offered to them. It could abolish the

discrepancy between training women for marriage and then forcing them to become the spinster supports of their parents.

Such a system would be wasteful of the gifts of many women who could exercise other functions far better than their ability to bear children in an already overpopulated world. It would be wasteful of the gifts of many men who could exercise their special personality gifts far better in the home than in the market-place. It would be wasteful, but it would be clear. It could attempt to guarantee to each individual the role for which society insisted upon training him or her, and such a system would penalize only those individuals who, in spite of all the training, did not display the approved personalities. There are millions of persons who would gladly return to such a standardized method of treating the relationship between the sexes, and we must bear in mind the possibility that the greater opportunities open in the twentieth century to women may be quite withdrawn, and that we may return to a strict regimentation of women.

The waste, if this occurs, will be not only of many women, but also of as many men, because regimentation of one sex carries with it, to greater or less degree, the regimentation of the other also. Every parental behest that defines a way of sitting, a response to a rebuke or a threat, a game, or an attempt to draw or sing or dance or paint, as feminine, is moulding the personality of each little girl's brother as well as moulding the personality of the sister. There can be no society which insists that women follow one special personality-pattern, defined as feminine, which does not do violence also to the individuality of many men.

Alternatively, society can take the course that has become especially associated with the plans of most radical groups: admit that men and women are capable of being moulded to a single pattern as easily as to a diverse one, and cease to make any distinction in the approved personality of both sexes. Girls can be trained exactly as boys are trained, taught the same code, the same forms of expression, the same occupations. This course might seem to be the logic which follows from the conviction that the potentialities which different socie-

ties label as either masculine or feminine are really potentialities of some members of each sex, and not sex-linked at all. If this is accepted, is it not reasonable to abandon the kind of artificial standardizations of sex-differences that have been so long characteristic of European society, and admit that they are social fictions for which we have no longer any use? In the world today, contraceptives make it possible for women not to bear children against their will. The most conspicuous actual difference between the sexes, the difference in strength, is progressively less significant. Just as the difference in height between males is no longer a realistic issue, now that lawsuits have been substituted for hand-to-hand encounters, so the difference in strength between men and women is no longer worth elaboration in cultural institutions.

Let us suppose that, instead of the classification laid down on the "natural" bases of sex and race, a society had classified personality on the basis of eye-colour. It had decreed that all blue-eyed people were gentle, submissive, and responsive to the needs of others, and all brown-eyed people were arrogant, dominating, self-centred, and purposive. In this case two complementary social themes would be woven together—the culture, in its art, its religion, its formal personal relations, would have two threads instead of one. There would be blue-eyed men, and blue-eyed women, which would mean that there were gentle, "maternal" women, and gentle, "maternal" men. A blue-eyed man might marry a woman who had been bred to the same personality as himself, or a brown-eyed woman who had been bred to the contrasting personality. One of the strong tendencies that makes for homosexuality, the tendency to love the similar rather than the antithetical person, would be eliminated. Hostility between the two sexes as groups would be minimized, since the individual interests of members of each sex could be woven together in different ways, and marriages of similarity and friendships of contrast need carry no necessary handicap of possible psycho-sexual maladjustment. The individual would still suffer a mutilation of his temperamental preferences, for it would be the unrelated fact of eye-colour that would determine

the attitudes which he was educated to show. Every blue-eyed person would be forced into submissiveness and declared maladjusted if he or she showed any traits that it had been decreed were only appropriate to the brown-eyed. The greatest social loss, however, in the classification of personality on the basis of sex would not be present in this society which based its classification on eye-colour. Human relations, and especially those which involve sex, would not be artificially distorted.

But such a course, the substitution of eye-colour for sex as a basis upon which to educate children into groups showing contrasting personalities, while it would be a definite advance upon a classification by sex, remains a parody of all the attempts that society has made through history to define an individual's role in terms of sex, or colour, or date of birth, or shape of head.

However, the only solution of the problem does not lie between an acceptance of standardization of sex differences with the resulting cost in individual happiness and adjustment, and the abolition of these differences with the consequent loss in social values. A civilization might take its cues not from such categories as age or sex, race or hereditary position in a family line, but instead of specializing personality along such simple lines recognize, train, and make a place for many and divergent temperamental endowments. It might build upon the different potentialities that it now attempts to extirpate artificially in some children and create artificially in others.

Historically the lessening of rigidity in the classification of the sexes has come about at different times, either by the creation of a new artificial category, or by the recognition of real individual differences. Sometimes the idea of social position has transcended sex-categories. In a society that recognizes gradations in wealth or rank, women of rank or women of wealth have been permitted an arrogance which was denied to both sexes among the lowly or the poor. Such a shift as this has been, it is true, a step towards the emancipation of women, but it has never been a step towards the greater freedom of the individual. A few women have shared the upper-class personality, but to balance this a great many men as well as women have been condemned

to a personality characterized by subservience and fear. Such shifts as these mean only the substitution of one arbitrary standard for another. A society is equally unrealistic whether it insists that only men can be brave, or that only individuals of rank can be brave.

To break down one line of division, that between the sexes, and substitute another, that between classes, is no real advance. It merely shifts the irrelevancy to a different point. And meanwhile, individuals born in the upper classes are shaped inexorably to one type of personality, to an arrogance that is again uncongenial to at least some of them, while the arrogant among the poor fret and fume beneath their training for submissiveness. At one end of the scale is the mild, unaggressive young son of wealthy parents who is forced to lead, at the other the aggressive, enterprising child of the slums who is condemned to a place in the ranks. If our aim is greater expression for each individual temperament, rather than any partisan interest in one sex or its fate, we must see these historical developments which have aided in freeing some women as nevertheless a kind of development that also involved major social losses.

The second way in which categories of sex-differences have become less rigid is through a recognition of genuine individual gifts as they occurred in either sex. Here a real distinction has been substituted for an artificial one, and the gains are tremendous for society and for the individual. Where writing is accepted as a profession that may be pursued by either sex with perfect suitability, individuals who have the ability to write need not be debarred from it by their sex, nor need they, if they do write, doubt their essential masculinity or femininity. An occupation that has no basis in sex-determined gifts can now recruit its ranks from twice as many potential artists. And it is here that we can find a ground plan for building a society that would substitute real differences for arbitrary ones. We must recognize that beneath the superficial classifications of sex and race the same potentialities exist, recurring generation after

generation, only to perish because society has no place for them. Just as society now permits the practice of an art to members of either sex, so it might also permit the development of many contrasting temperamental gifts in each sex. It might abandon its various attempts to make boys fight and to make girls remain passive, or to make all children fight, and instead shape our educational institutions to develop to the full the boy who shows a capacity for maternal behaviour, the girl who shows an opposite capacity that is stimulated by fighting against obstacles. No skill, no special aptitude, no vividness of imagination or precision of thinking would go unrecognized because the child who possessed it was of one sex rather than the other. No child would be relentlessly shaped to one pattern of behaviour, but instead there should be many patterns, in a world that had learned to allow to each individual the pattern which was most congenial to his gifts.

Such a civilization would not sacrifice the gains of thousands of years during which society has built up standards of diversity. The social gains would be conserved, and each child would be encouraged on the basis of his actual temperament. Where we now have patterns of behaviour for women and patterns of behaviour for men, we would then have patterns of behaviour that expressed the interests of individuals with many kinds of endowment. There would be ethical codes and social symbolisms, an art and a way of life, congenial to each endowment.

Historically our own culture has relied for the creation of rich and contrasting values upon many artificial distinctions, the most striking of which is sex. It will not be by the mere abolition of these distinctions that society will develop patterns in which individual gifts are given place instead of being forced into an ill-fitting mould. If we are to achieve a richer culture, rich in contrasting values, we must recognize the whole gamut of human potentialities, and so weave a less arbitrary social fabric, one in which each diverse human gift will find a fitting place.



## Ability

## Hereditary

## Genius

FRANCIS GALTON

Differences in individual abilities are surely obvious to the student. With seemingly little effort, some persons receive A's in their courses while others struggle and fail. Are these differences inherited? If so, why should the ungifted be permitted to enroll in the colleges and universities? Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911) was himself the son of a successful banker, a first cousin of Charles Darwin. The founder of the science of eugenics, and a student of statistics in biology, Galton was greatly concerned with the quality of the human race.

*Hereditary Genius*, from which this reading is taken, was published in 1869. Does his evidence rule out the influences of family environment?

I have no patience with the hypothesis occasionally expressed, and often implied, especially in tales written to teach children to be good, that babies are born pretty much alike, and that the sole agencies in creating differences between boy and boy, and man and man, are steady application and moral effort. It is in the most unqualified manner that I object to pretensions of natural equality. The experiences of the nursery, the school, the University, and of professional careers, are a chain of proofs to the contrary. I acknowledge freely the great power of education and social influences in developing the active powers of the mind, just as I acknowledge the effect of use

in developing the muscles of a blacksmith's arm, and no further. Let the blacksmith labour as he will, he will find there are certain feats beyond his power that are well within the strength of a man of herculean make, even although the latter may have led a sedentary life. Some years ago, the Highlanders held a grand gathering in Holland Park, where they challenged all England to compete with them in their games of strength. The challenge was accepted, and the well-trained men of the hills were beaten in the foot-race by a youth who was stated to be a pure Cockney, the clerk of a London banker.

Everybody who has trained himself to

physical exercises discovers the extent of his muscular powers to a nicety. When he begins to walk, to row, to use the dumb bells, or to run, he finds to his great delight that his thews strengthen, and his endurance of fatigue increases day after day. So long as he is a novice, he perhaps flatters himself there is hardly an assignable limit to the education of his muscles; but the daily gain is soon discovered to diminish, and at last it vanishes altogether. His maximum performance becomes a rigidly determinate quantity. He learns to an inch, how high or how far he can jump, when he has attained the highest state of training. He learns to half a pound, the force he can exert on the dynamometer, by compressing it. He can strike a blow against the machine used to measure impact, and drive its index to a certain graduation, but no further. So it is in running, in rowing, in walking, and in every other form of physical exertion. There is a definite limit to the muscular powers of every man, which he cannot by any education or exertion overpass.

This is precisely analogous to the experience that every student has had of the working of his mental powers. The eager boy, when he first goes to school and confronts intellectual difficulties, is astonished at his progress. He glories in his newly-developed mental grip and growing capacity for application, and, it may be, fondly believes it to be within his reach to become one of the heroes who have left their mark upon the history of the world. The years go by; he competes in the examinations of school and college, over and over again with his fellows, and soon finds his place among them. He knows he can beat such and such of his competitors; that there are some with whom he runs on equal terms, and others whose intellectual feats he cannot even approach. Probably his vanity still continues to tempt him, by whispering in a new strain. It tells him that classics, mathematics, and other subjects taught in universities, are mere scholastic specialities, and no test of the more valuable intellectual powers. It reminds him of numerous instances of persons who had been unsuccessful in the competitions of youth, but who had shown powers in after-life that made them the foremost men of their age. Accordingly, with newly furbished hopes,

and with all the ambition of twenty-two years of age, he leaves his University and enters a larger field of competition. The same kind of experience awaits him here that he has already gone through. Opportunities occur—they occur to every man—and he finds himself incapable of grasping them. He tries, and is tried in many things. In a few years more, unless he is incurably blinded by self-conceit, he learns precisely of what performances he is capable, and what other enterprises lie beyond his compass. When he reaches mature life, he is confident only within certain limits, and knows, or ought to know, himself just as he is probably judged of by the world, with all his unmistakable weakness and all his undeniable strength. He is no longer tormented into hopeless efforts by the fallacious promptings of overweening vanity, but he limits his undertakings to matters below the level of his reach, and finds true moral repose in an honest conviction that he is engaged in as much good work as his nature has rendered him capable of performing.

The Judges of England, since the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, form a group peculiarly well adapted to afford a general outline of the extent and limitations of heredity in respect to genius. A judgeship is a guarantee of its possessor being gifted with exceptional ability; the Judges are sufficiently numerous and prolific to form an adequate basis for statistical inductions, and they are the subjects of several excellent biographical treatises. It is therefore well to begin our inquiries with a discussion of their relationships. We shall quickly arrive at definite results, which subsequent chapters, treating of more illustrious men, and in other careers, will check and amplify.

It is necessary that I should first say something in support of my assertion, that the office of a judge is really a sufficient guarantee that its possessor is exceptionally gifted. In other countries it may be different to what it is with us, but we all know that in England, the Bench is never spoken of without reverence for the intellectual power of its occupiers. A seat on the Bench is a great prize, to be won by the best men. No doubt there are hindrances, external to those of nature, against

a man getting on at the Bar and rising to a judgeship. The attorneys may not give him briefs when he is a young barrister; and even if he becomes a successful barrister, his political party may be out of office for a long period, at a time when he was otherwise ripe for advancement. I cannot, however, believe that either of these are serious obstacles in the long run. Sterling ability is sure to make itself felt, and to lead to practice; while as to politics, the changes of party are sufficiently frequent to give a fair chance to almost every generation. For every man who is a judge, there may possibly be two other lawyers of the same standing, equally fitted for the post, but it is hard to believe there can be a larger number.

If not always the foremost, the Judges are therefore among the foremost, of a vast body of legal men. The Census speaks of upwards of 3,000 barristers, advocates, and special pleaders; and it must be recollected that these do not consist of 3,000 men taken at hap-hazard, but a large part of them are already selected and I speak of those among them who are of humble parentage, but have brilliant natural gifts—who attracted notice as boys, or, it may be, even as children, and were therefore sent to a good school. There they won exhibitions and fitted themselves for college, where they supported themselves by obtaining scholarships. Then came fellowships, and so they ultimately found their way to the Bar. Many of these have risen to the Bench. The parentage of the Lord Chancellors justifies my statement. There have been thirty of them within the period included in my inquiries. Of these, Lord Hardwicke was the son of a small attorney at Dover, in narrow circumstances; Lord Eldon (whose brother was the great Admiralty Judge, Lord Stowell) was son of a "coal fitter"; Lord Truro was son of a sheriff's officer; and Lord St. Leonards (like Lord Tenterden, the Chief Justice of Common Pleas) was son of a barber. Others were sons of clergymen of scanty means. Others have begun life in alien professions, yet, notwithstanding their false start, have easily recovered lost ground in after life. Lord Erskine was first in the navy and then in the army, before he became a barrister. Lord Chelmsford was originally a midshipman. Now a large number of men with antecedents as unfavour-

able to success as these, and yet successful men, are always to be found at the Bar, and therefore I say the barristers are themselves a selected body; and the fact of every judge having been taken from the foremost rank of 3,000 of them, is proof that his exceptional ability is of an enormously higher order than if the 3,000 barristers had been conscripts, drawn by lot from the general mass of their countrymen: I therefore need not trouble myself with quoting passages from biographies, to prove that each of the Judges whose name I have occasion to mention, is a highly gifted man. It is precisely in order to avoid the necessity of this tedious work, that I have selected the Judges for my first chapter.

In speaking of the English Judges, I have adopted the well-known *Lives of the Judges*, by Foss, as my guide. It was published in 1865, so I have adopted that date as the limit of my inquiries. I have considered those only as falling under the definition of "judges" whom he included as such. They are the Judges of the Courts of Chancery and Common Law, and the Master of the Rolls, but not the Judges of the Admiralty nor of the Court of Canterbury. By the latter limitation, I lose the advantage of counting Lord Stowell (brother of the Lord Chancellor Eldon), the remarkable family of the Lushingtons, that of Sir R. Phillimore, and some others. Through the limitation as regards time, I lose, by ending with the year 1865, the recently-created judges, such as Judge Selwyn, brother of the Bishop of Lichfield, and also of the Professor of Divinity at Cambridge. But I believe, from cursory inquiries, that the relations of these latter judges, speaking generally, have not so large a share of eminence as we shall find among those of the judges in my list. This might have been expected, for it is notorious that the standard of ability in a modern judge is not so high as it used to be. The number of exceptionally gifted men being the same, it is impossible to supply the new demand for heads of great schools and for numerous other careers, now thrown open to able youths, without seriously limiting the field whence alone good judges may be selected. By beginning at the Restoration, which I took for my commencement, because there was frequent jobbery in earlier days, I lose a Lord Keeper (of

Although the average educational performance at the beginning of the experiment fell within the first grade, by the completion of the three-year program it had reached approximately fifth grade level. Moreover, 79 subjects transferred to the regular elementary school either to qualify for immediate graduation from the eighth grade or to complete the elementary school course in regular classes. During the five-year follow-up period, a large number continued their education in technical, business, or avocational courses, and 27 of the original group had graduated from high school by the termination of the study. Data on subsequent occupational history, socio-economic status, community activities, and the like during the

follow-up showed the group to have made a very satisfactory adjustment.

As a control group, Schmidt employed 68 children, also enrolled in special classes for the intellectually deficient but not participating in the experimental program. The control group was approximately equated with an experimental sub-group of 64 cases in initial IQ, educational achievement, and chronological age. The mean gain of this experimental sub-group was 23.8 IQ points, while the control group lost an average of 3.6 points during the same period. Marked differences in educational progress and in subsequent vocational and social adjustment were likewise found between these two groups.

## *The Individual and His History*

JOHN BENNETT AND MELVIN TUMIN

In this selection,\* a sociologist and an anthropologist summarize the individualizing influences which form each unique personality. The precise influences vary from person to person, but all are affected in one way or another. Can you think of one of your personal characteristics which is a result of some unique social relationship—with a parent, friend, or teacher? In what ways—aims, attitudes, beliefs—do you differ from those you know? Why? How does your interpretation of this analysis compare with that of Hitler? Of Huntington?

That humans are different from one another is a commonplace observation. No two faces are ever completely the same; no two individuals eat the same foods, feel exactly the same physiological needs, or live by the same routine. Fingerprints are always different and voices vary in timbre and pitch. These differences can be great or insignificant, but they are always present in some degree.

We can study these differences in various ways. Some of them relate to heredity and involve the fact that no two individuals—with the single exception of identical twins who have come from a single egg—have exactly the same assortment of genes. Some differences relate to the varying environments within which the genetic potentialities develop. Other differences relate to behavior or activity of the

organism and at least in man have an important socio-cultural dimension.

1) GENETIC INHERITANCE. To begin with heredity, we know that the egg cell produced by the mother and the sperm cell produced by the father each have exactly half the number of chromosomes or gene-bearing bodies that are present in the body cells of the parents. When the egg and sperm unite, each with its twenty-four chromosomes, the cells of the growing individual once more have the full number, forty-eight. This stock of forty-eight of course is not the same as those of either parent, but a mixture of half of each parent. Thus, out of a total of ninety-six chromosomes present in both parents a child can have no more than forty-eight. Each child then is a new combination of chromosomes; each child is genetically somewhat different from its parents and every other child. Identical twins excepted, no two children of the same parents ever receive the same assortment of genes.

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(We might also recall mutation—the chemical change that produces a change in a gene.) Heredity, then, is really an ever changing, ever asserting process and not the fixed destiny we so often consider it.

2) **UTERINE ENVIRONMENT.** The basis for human differences, however, is not merely a matter of gene assortment. There exist other ways in which the sex cells, the embryo, and the fetus can be influenced so as to produce differences. It is known that the biochemical constitution of the egg and germ cells can influence the form of the embryo in ways having nothing to do with the actual genes involved. The environment of the uterus can also effect changes in the growing embryo and modify the way in which genetic potentialities work out. Before unification of the egg and sperm, the environment of the passages leading to the uterus from the ovary can affect the outcome. These various influences affect various parts of the cells and ultimately the growing tissues and organs. While the biochemical and physiological make-up of the cells and bodily organs mentioned above is relatively constant, some variation within and between individuals always occurs, and these variations (perhaps related to diet, emotional states, etc.) ultimately have their effects on the infant individual. Our parents then can influence us in ways other than by contributing some of their genes to us.

3) **NATAL AND EARLY POSTNATAL FACTORS.** After birth a number of important difference-producing factors appear. The mother's or formula milk—the only food given to the infant during the first stages of postuterine life—is very important in setting the pace for future developmental paths. This milk can vary in composition and thus can have influences of a generalized character. Another factor of much importance is the type of handling and general stimulation given to the infant at the time of and after birth. Hectic, disturbed birth and early environments appear to establish certain general behavioral trends in infants different from those set up by calm, gentle births and environments, although research on these problems is just beginning.

The important point to keep in mind is that the differences produced by the conditions mentioned above need not show up im-

mediately or appear in obvious ways. They may be hidden in the germ cells before sexual union, in the growing embryo, or at any time in the postnatal period. They can therefore be very difficult to discover. This difficulty is made even more severe by the fact that the effects do not usually appear as simple, observable conditions, but as complex circumstances often affecting many cells, glands, different organs, and various physiological processes. We get into still further difficulties when we recall that all of these prenatal and postnatal factors leading toward difference are profoundly modifiable in nearly all cases by the later environments of childhood and adulthood.

The possible interrelationships of these various factors are vast. We have genes assorting and changing; cellular constitution varying; internal environments changing; postnatal conditions varying; and early training always differing from individual to individual. With this constant flux and the constant alteration of proportions of factors and conditions it can be seen that no two individuals can ever be entirely the same. Even identical twins, who have as nearly identical cellular and internal environments as possible, can nevertheless be treated differently at and after birth, for behavioral differences always appear to some degree. These differences are not always explainable entirely by obvious "environmental" factors.

Eugenicists and others often advocate that environment be controlled and standardized so that we can predict the outcome of sexual union and breed scientifically for a "better race." These arguments fail to take into account the vast possibilities for individual differences and the difficulty or inability to control these potentialities even if they were all completely understood.

4) **UNIQUE SOCIAL RELATIONS.** Another source of individuality is to be found in the unique interactional experiences of an individual. In this regard we might begin by recalling the essential characteristics of human behavior discussed earlier. We noted that humans are distinguished from other mammalian species by their marked ability to develop and retain symbolic conceptions of things, other people, and relationships. This

ability results in language—a stored-up set of symbolic utterances or verbal behavior necessary for the expression of ideas and emotional states, and for permitting complex interactions to take place between individuals. This process of interaction, as we have seen, typically results among other things in the continual formation and change of new conceptions and relationships. Hence behavior patterns are continually changing and readapting.

The interactions between individuals then are potentially different in every instance. We often remark, for example, "I am really getting to know him now," or "She is completely different from what I first thought"—and behavior in the relationship between the two individuals concerned changes accordingly. As behavior changes so do the characteristics by which we "know" and identify individuals. These characteristics may change drastically or very little; some may not change at all. But sufficient change occurs to result in a more or less unique set of behavior patterns for each and every individual. These behavior patterns change as the individual changes, expands, or contracts his interactions with others.

The specific process of socialization, or the acquirement by the young individual of behavior patterns which fit him for social life, is basically a process of the development and change of behavior through interaction with others. No two individuals, by virtue of the complexity of human social life and culture, and by virtue of the depth and range of symbolic meaning for behavior, ever pass through exactly the same socialization experience. These differences result in different individuals and various degrees of difference between individuals.

In later childhood the maturing organism learns ways of behaving which are encouraged, tabooed, or regarded with indifference by his group. This learning can be of various types. It can be smooth and effortless, as it is in many nonliterate folk cultures where the child is slowly inducted into the patterns and beliefs of his society. Or it can be very stringent and abrupt ("spare the rod and spoil the child") as it tends to be in other nonliterate societies and in some sectors of our own society. Finally, in any society the learning process will vary by family unit and by

individual. The way in which this learning takes place will have much influence on the "personality" or individuality of the children. Children taught smoothly and "unconsciously" will probably have personalities which are characterized in part by a lack of conflict and anxiety, because the traumatic experiences of having knowledge and manners "pounded into them" will be lacking. Conflict and anxiety can of course arise in such individuals from other circumstances, but at least when they do we know they are probably not derived from learning experiences.

The kind of learning and training given individuals will also have important consequences for the biologic development of the organism. Eating habits for example differ significantly from group to group and from individual to individual. Suppose a group (anything from a single family to a whole society) sanctions very strongly the eating of meat and considerable pressure is exerted on individuals to consume large quantities of meat in order to retain prestige. We know that individual physiological needs respecting the food products found in meat are not uniform. Some people require much protein, others relatively little; some need a lot of fat, others very little. In some people meat products are productive of physiological disturbances. These variations may in part be due to genetic differences, in part to differences in maturation, growth, and training, or as a result of all of these factors. It is apparent then that the social insistence on meat-eating may affect some individuals adversely and this will have an important effect upon their biology; others will be at an advantage if their meat-product needs happen to be high. In such a situation there is a complex interrelationship between genetic, biologic, and socio-cultural factors which works out differently for different individuals.

## SUMMARY

It is obvious to everyone that individuals differ and that in actual fact each individual is to greater or lesser degree a unique organism. The reasons for this uniqueness or indi-

viduality lie in the process of individual growth from the germ cells through adulthood and the relationships of this growth process with social and natural environments. Thus, no individual can have exactly the same genes; biochemical factors other than genetic ones can produce differences in the germ cells and the growing individual; conditions of birth and treatment immediately after birth can have important differential effects; training and learning during childhood and adulthood, with their potentialities for infinite variability of interpersonal interaction and cultural-pattern differences by group, all have their role to play in the production of individual differences. This entire involved process of maturation-socialization takes place within a human organism with its characteristic forms of be-

havior which permit such complex patterns of interaction and change to appear.

If we look at the process in this manner it no longer becomes necessary to make sharp distinctions between "heredity" and "environment," or "nature" and "nurture." Instead we have an organism developing in an environment; every phase of that organism's growth is an instance of genetic potentialities unfolding, being encouraged, discouraged, inhibited, or modified by "environmental" factors. Individuality is as much a product of genetically determined glandular situations as it is a matter of interaction with others in a social environment. In some cases one may be more important than the other, but without either one the individual would be dead or inhuman.



## Cultural Differences

CLYDE KLUCKHOHN

What is meant by "cultural differences"? What is meant by culture? How does culture explain individual differences? Similarities? These questions are answered in the following presentation.\* The author is a former president of the American Anthropological Society and the co-author of *The Navaho* (1946), *How the Soviet System Works* (1956), and other books.

Can you list ten personal characteristics which you hold in common with most other Americans?

Why do the Chinese dislike milk and milk products? Why would the Japanese die willingly in a Banzai charge that seemed senseless to Americans? Why do some nations trace descent through the father, others through the mother, still others through both parents? Not because different peoples have different instincts, not because they were destined by God or Fate to different habits, not because the weather is different in China and Japan and the United States. Sometimes shrewd common sense has an answer that is close to that of the anthropologist: "because they were brought up that way." By "culture" anthropology means the total life way of a people, the social legacy the individual acquires from his group. Or culture can be re-

garded as that part of the environment that is the creation of man.

This technical term has a wider meaning than the "culture" of history and literature. A humble cooking pot is as much a cultural product as is a Beethoven sonata. In ordinary speech a man of culture is a man who can speak languages other than his own, who is familiar with history, literature, philosophy, or the fine arts. In some cliques that definition is still narrower. The cultured person is one who can talk about James Joyce, Scarlatti, and Picasso. To the anthropologist, however, to be human is to be cultured. There is culture in general, and then there are the specific cultures such as Russian, American, British, Hottentot, Inca. The general abstract notion serves to remind us that we cannot explain acts solely in terms of the biological properties of the people concerned, their individual past

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bed with an adult brother represent equally nonrational responses, culturally standardized unreason.

All this does not mean that there is no such thing as raw human nature. The very fact that certain of the same institutions are found in all known societies indicates that at bottom all human beings are very much alike. The files of the Cross-Cultural Survey at Yale University are organized according to categories such as "marriage ceremonies," "life crisis rites," "incest taboos." At least seventy-five of these categories are represented in every single one of the hundreds of cultures analyzed. This is hardly surprising. The members of all human groups have about the same biological equipment. All men undergo the same poignant life experiences such as birth, helplessness, illness, old age, and death. The biological potentialities of the species are the blocks with which cultures are built. Some patterns of every culture crystallize around focuses provided by the inevitables of biology: the difference between the sexes, the presence of persons of different ages, the varying physical strength and skill of individuals. The facts of nature also limit culture forms. No culture provides patterns for jumping over trees or for eating iron ore.

There is thus no "either-or" between nature and that special form of nurture called culture. Culture determinism is as one-sided as biological determinism. The two factors are interdependent. Culture arises out of human nature, and its forms are restricted both by man's biology and by natural laws. It is equally true that culture channels biological processes—vomiting, weeping, fainting, sneezing, the daily habits of food intake and waste elimination. When a man eats, he is reacting to an internal "drive," namely, hunger contractions consequent upon the lowering of blood sugar, but his precise reaction to these internal stimuli cannot be predicted by physiological knowledge alone. Whether a healthy adult feels hungry twice, three times, or four times a day and the hours at which this feeling recurs is a question of culture. *What* he eats is of course limited by availability, but is also partly regulated by culture. It is a biological fact that some types of berries are poisonous; it is a cultural fact that, a few generations ago, most

Americans considered tomatoes to be poisonous and refused to eat them. Such selective, discriminative use of the environment is characteristically cultural. In a still more general sense, too, the process of eating is channeled by culture. Whether a man eats to live, lives to eat, or merely eats and lives is only in part an individual matter, for there are also cultural trends. Emotions are physiological events. Certain situations will evoke fear in people from any culture. But sensations of pleasure, anger, and lust may be stimulated by cultural cues that would leave unmoved someone who has been reared in a different social tradition.

Except in the case of newborn babies and of individuals born with clear-cut structural or functional abnormalities we can observe innate endowments only as modified by cultural training. In a hospital in New Mexico where Zuni Indian, Navaho Indian, and white American babies are born, it is possible to classify the newly arrived infants as unusually active, average, and quiet. Some babies from each "racial" group will fall into each category, though a higher proportion of the white babies will fall into the unusually active class. But if a Navaho baby, a Zuni baby, and a white baby—all classified as unusually active at birth—are again observed at the age of two years, the Zuni baby will no longer seem given to quick and restless activity—as compared with the white child—though he may seem so as compared with the other Zunis of the same age. The Navaho child is likely to fall in between as contrasted with the Zuni and the white, though he will probably still seem more active than the average Navaho youngster.

It was remarked by many observers in the Japanese relocation centers that Japanese who were born and brought up in this country, especially those who were reared apart from any large colony of Japanese, resemble in behavior their white neighbors much more closely than they do their own parents who were educated in Japan.

I have said "culture channels biological processes." It is more accurate to say "the biological functioning of individuals is modified if they have been trained in certain ways and not in others." Culture is not a disem-

bodied force. It is created and transmitted by people. However, culture, like well-known concepts of the physical sciences, is a convenient abstraction. One never sees gravity. One sees bodies falling in regular ways. One never sees an electromagnetic field. Yet certain happenings that can be seen may be given a neat abstract formulation by assuming that the electromagnetic field exists. Similarly, one never sees culture as such. What is seen are regularities in the behavior or artifacts of a group that has adhered to a common tradition. The regularities in style and technique of ancient Inca tapestries or stone axes from Melanesian islands are due to the existence of mental blueprints for the group.

Culture is a way of thinking, feeling, believing. It is the group's knowledge stored up (in memories of men; in books and objects) for future use. We study the products of this "mental" activity: the overt behavior, the speech and gestures and activities of people, and the tangible results of these things such as tools, houses, cornfields, and what not. It has been customary in lists of "culture traits" to include such things as watches or lawbooks. This is a convenient way of thinking about them, but in the solution of any important problem we must remember that they, in themselves, are nothing but metals, paper, and ink. What is important is that some men know how to make them, others set a value on them, are unhappy without them, direct their activities in relation to them, or disregard them.

It is only a helpful shorthand when we say "The cultural patterns of the Zulu were resistant to Christianization." In the directly observable world of course, it was individual Zulus who resisted. Nevertheless, if we do not forget that we are speaking at a high level of abstraction, it is justifiable to speak of culture as a cause. One may compare the practice of saying "syphilis caused the extinction of the native population of the island." Was it "syphilis" or "syphilis germs" or "human beings who were carriers of syphilis"?

"Culture," then, is "a theory." But if a theory is not contradicted by any relevant fact and if it helps us to understand a mass of otherwise chaotic facts, it is useful. Darwin's contribution was much less the accumulation

of new knowledge than the creation of a theory which put in order data already known. An accumulation of facts, however large, is no more a science than a pile of bricks is a house. Anthropology's demonstration that the most weird set of customs has a consistency and an order is comparable to modern psychiatry's showing that there is meaning and purpose in the apparently incoherent talk of the insane. In fact, the inability of the older psychologies and philosophies to account for the strange behavior of madmen and heathens was the principal factor that forced psychiatry and anthropology to develop theories of the unconscious and of culture.

Since culture is an abstraction, it is important not to confuse culture with society. A "society" refers to a group of people who interact more with each other than they do with other individuals—who cooperate with each other for the attainment of certain ends. You can see and indeed count the individuals who make up a society. A "culture" refers to the distinctive ways of life of such a group of people. Not all social events are culturally patterned. New types of circumstances arise for which no cultural solutions have as yet been devised.

A culture constitutes a storehouse of the pooled learning of the group. A rabbit starts life with some innate responses. He can learn from his own experience and perhaps from observing other rabbits. A human infant is born with fewer instincts and greater plasticity. His main task is to learn the answers that persons he will never see, persons long dead, have worked out. Once he has learned the formulas supplied by the culture of his group, most of his behavior becomes almost as automatic and unthinking as if it were instinctive. There is a tremendous amount of intelligence behind the making of a radio, but not much is required to learn to turn it on.

The members of all human societies face some of the same unavoidable dilemmas, posed by biology and other facts of the human situation. This is why the basic categories of all cultures are so similar. Human culture without language is unthinkable. No culture fails to provide for aesthetic expression and aesthetic delight. Every culture supplies standardized orientations toward the deeper

problems, such as death. Every culture is designed to perpetuate the group and its solidarity, to meet the demands of individuals for an orderly way of life and for satisfaction of biological needs.

However, the variation on these basic themes are numberless. Some languages are built up out of twenty basic sounds, others out of forty. Nose plugs were considered beautiful by the predynastic Egyptians but are not by the modern French. Puberty is a biological fact. But one culture ignores it, another prescribes informal instructions about sex but no ceremony, a third has impressive rites for girls only, a fourth for boys and girls. In this culture, the first menstruation is welcomed as a happy, natural event; in that culture the atmosphere is full of dread and supernatural threat. Each culture dissects nature according to its own system of categories. The Navaho Indians apply the same word to the color of a robin's egg and to that of grass. A psychologist once assumed that this meant a difference in the sense organs, that Navahos didn't have the physiological equipment to distinguish "green" from "blue." However, when he showed them objects of the two colors and asked them if they were exactly the same colors, they looked at him with astonishment. His dream of discovering a new type of color blindness was shattered.

Every culture must deal with the sexual instinct. Some, however, seek to deny all sexual expression before marriage, whereas a Polynesian adolescent who was not promiscuous would be distinctly abnormal. Some cultures enforce lifelong monogamy, others, like our own, tolerate serial monogamy; in still other cultures, two or more women may be joined to one man or several men to a single woman. Homosexuality has been a permitted pattern in the Greco-Roman world, in parts of Islam, and in various primitive tribes. Large portions of the population of Tibet, and of Christendom at some places and periods, have practiced completely celibacy. To us marriage is first and foremost an arrangement between two individuals. In many more societies marriage is merely one facet of a complicated set of reciprocities, economic and otherwise, between two families or two clans.

The essence of the cultural process is selectivity. The selection is only exceptionally conscious and rational. Cultures are like Topsy. They just grew. Once, however, a way of handling a situation becomes institutionalized, there is ordinarily great resistance to change or deviation. When we speak of "our sacred beliefs," we mean of course that they are beyond criticism and that the person who suggests modification or abandonment must be punished. No person is emotionally indifferent to his culture. Certain cultural premises may become totally out of accord with a new factual situation. Leaders may recognize this and reject the old ways in theory. Yet their emotional loyalty continues in the face of reason because of the intimate conditionings of early childhood.

A culture is learned by individuals as the result of belonging to some particular group, and it constitutes that part of learned behavior which is shared with others. It is our social legacy, as contrasted with our organic heredity. It is one of the important factors which permits us to live together in an organized society, giving us ready-made solutions to our problems, helping us to predict the behavior of others, and permitting others to know what to expect of us.

Culture regulates our lives at every turn. From the moment we are born until we die there is, whether we are conscious of it or not, constant pressure upon us to follow certain types of behavior that other men have created for us. Some paths we follow willingly, others we follow because we know no other way, still others we deviate from or go back to most unwillingly. Mothers of small children know how unnaturally most of this comes to us—how little regard we have, until we are "culturalized," for the "proper" place, time, and manner for certain acts such as eating, excreting, sleeping, getting dirty, and making loud noises. But by more or less adhering to a system of related designs for carrying out all the acts of living, a group of men and women feel themselves linked together by a powerful chain of sentiments. Ruth Benedict gave an almost complete definition of the concept when she said, "Culture is that which binds men together."

## Part II

### How Men

### Differ

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## CONCLUSION

In age, sex, race, location, natural endowment, and experience men differ from one another. What is the meaning of these differences? Are some differences more important than others? How do these differences affect men's lives?

First, what can we say about race? To quote from one specialist in anthropology, "in all important and major bodily details mankind is one—in brain, in peripheral nerves, in heart, in blood and blood vessels, in all viscera, in muscles, and even in details of skeletal architecture . . . in 99 44/100 per cent of all basic physical characteristics all men are alike."<sup>1</sup>

Differences among men make a difference in two ways. We should keep each way separate in our thinking. Two men, one white the other brown, are different in the color of their skin. This is a biological difference, visible and distinguishing. Because they are different in this manner, many men may think them different in other ways also and thus by their thinking *make* a difference between the two which never originally existed. Purely physiological differences become the occasion and then the cause of social, psychological, and cultural differences. Thus there are differences between men which are founded in unalterable fact and differences which are derived from our interpretations and ideas.

We should not suppose that the latter kind of differences are less important than the former. For social scientists the reverse is true. What men *perceive* as differences between men become in time the *deepest* differences between men and frequently the causes of great social disorder. Also, manmade differences between men have the ability in time to create genuine and nearly unalterable differences in the very substance of human personality. A person who from infancy has been judged inferior by other men because of a difference in color is likely to have had his psychological nature radically changed. The initial and irrelevant difference in color prompted men to make a difference where

<sup>1</sup> Wilton M. Krogman, in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, ed. Ralph Linton, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, p. 41.

none originally existed, but in time one is created which is profound and devastating.

Our readings in this section were largely concerned with differences of the first sort described here. Age produces physiological change. The child is unable to do what the adult can. The male animal is unable to bear children. People who live on tropical islands can never face the problems of desert life. What differences in the thought and actions of men do these differences lead to? How much of our conduct can be traced back to these differences? For example, is the male animal more aggressive than the female because of hormone influences? Are older persons aged in attitude because of physical change in their bodies? Is the Mongoloid more or less resistant to disease than the Caucasian or Negro? Do Nordics or "Aryans" have an inherent mental superiority? Many such questions can be asked. The readings you have just finished have tried to help you to answer some of them.

The next question we must ask and answer concerns those differences which men create out of unalterable differences. Are women feminine because society finds it wise to have gentleness in some of its members and has thus assigned this role to the female sex? Has the Negro been servile because servants were needed, so that society assigned this role to those of dark skin? Are older persons deliberative and wise because caution and wisdom wisely should reside somewhere in the community, just as impetuosity and courage should, and thus older persons were assigned that role? Notice that in all these examples substantial differences in attitudes and behavior develop in certain groups which can be identified by age, race, sex, and the like, but the implications are that age, race, or sex are not the causes of the differences—rather that social conditioning causes them.

It is likely that the differences we observe in mankind result from both types of differences we have considered here and that, indeed, it would be impossible to isolate, let us say, behavior which is culturally induced from behavior solely attributable to physiological condition. Yet it is important for us to keep the two types of differences distinct in our minds. Frequently we witness situations where behavior is attributed to genetic deficiency when it actually results from cultural neglect. Race superiority claims, based on anatomical differences, are more likely the result of fortuitous location, cultural advantage, and the like. In keeping clear the real causes for differences between men, we will preserve the soundness of our social insights.

Linked to this question of what causes the differences between men is another problem, related but separate. What is the relative importance of the causes of human differences? Francis Galton clearly attributes different degrees of success in life to genetic factors. For him good heredity, not cultural opportunity, accounts for greatness. Other men have argued otherwise, that it is education, training, culture which produces greatness or failure. Who is right?

Is it social and psychic conditioning which makes us what we are, or are we the products of microscopic gene and chromosomal arrangement? Is an old man's personality largely the result of physical alterations in his body, or the accumulations of experience and the demands of his group that he behave in a certain manner?

In either case we are confronted with a determinism either of environment or of heredity. However, a third cause of human differences may be said to remain—one hard to describe, but claimed by universal experience. Men are different because they are unique, and unique not simply because they are separate and distinct from other human beings, but because they contain within themselves an originating, creating disposition.

Do you not feel that you are aware of *yourself*, as no one else can know you? Will, thought, and consciousness are unique to each of us. And each of us is different from our neighbors because we choose to be so. It is this area of human difference which concerns the moralist and the theologian as well as the social scientist.

What finally can we say? How do men differ? They differ because they are subjected to different environmental experiences. These may be geographic, they may be organic, they may be cultural. In a sense man makes man, for only in the company of other human beings does the human animal become human. Society creates man by nurturing, educating, developing, and molding the infant animal. Without social influences no human being could be human. The possibility of humanity in each child at birth requires the creating effort of mature men. And men differ too because each man is separate and unique—peculiarly autonomous, self-aware, and self-directing.

## Part III

### Why Men

### Hate

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#### INTRODUCTION

Two children fight tearfully over the right to swing on a battered gate; an ambitious young man slanders his rivals for promotion; a woman greets an acquaintance cattily, "Why, my dear, how dreadful you look! Aren't you feeling well?" Such nasty, hateful people! What makes them delight in tormenting others? What joy is there for us in the suffering of our friends? Why is selfishness so widespread—in young and old, in men and women, in all places and throughout all history?

Observe a young infant. When he is hungry, he cries, even at 2:00 A.M. Nor has he less consideration than the three-year-old who says "No!" to everything. Of course, we teach him manners but see how easily the ten-year-old forgets. He pushes, he taunts, and he fights. At eighteen, the veneer of civilization seems more stable. "Ah, but place a gun in his hand," says the general, "and watch the killer emerge."

And so it goes. The sorority excludes the girl from the wrong side of the tracks and the football team decides to "gang up" on the boy who is different. Why do people behave like this? Is it human nature? Do all of us really *hate* each other?

Look within yourself and find what makes you angry and ready to fight. Examine your favorite beliefs and your dislikes. Try to understand why you don't trust "kikes" or "wops" or "Japs." Is it because you feel superior to them? Or is it because you don't like those who differ with you? Or is it simply an inborn, mechanical reaction which cannot be controlled or eliminated.

In this section, we are concerned with man's hates. We wish to examine the nature of this feeling. The interpretations which follow are attempts to clarify the bases of human hostility. These views of war and destructiveness should be carefully studied. How objective, reasonable, and factual are the presentations? To whom do they apply and under what circumstances?



## Aggression

## Is Natural

SIGMUND FREUD

Here is a name to remember. Sigmund Freud (1833-1939) was one of the great contributors to the modern understanding of mental disorders. He was the founder of psychoanalysis, a theory and a method which quickly became a world-wide movement. His ideas and techniques have been ridiculed and widely adopted, banned in Nazi Germany and honored throughout most of the rest of the world.

In this selection,\* Freud propounds the idea that "aggression is natural." Can you then understand how Freud views the influence of civilization upon man? Some of his other works are available in *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, edited by A. A. Brill in 1938.

The bit of truth behind all this—one so eagerly denied—is that men are not gentle, friendly creatures wishing for love, who simply defend themselves if they are attacked, but that a powerful measure of desire for aggression has to be reckoned as part of their instinctual endowment. The result is that their neighbour is to them not only a possible helper or sexual object, but also a temptation to them to gratify their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without recompense, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him. *Homo homini lupus*; who has the courage to

dispute it in the face of all the evidence in his own life and in history? This aggressive cruelty usually lies in wait for some provocation, or else it steps into the service of some other purpose, the aim of which might as well have been achieved by milder measures. In circumstances that favour it, when those forces in the mind which ordinarily inhibit it cease to operate, it also manifests itself spontaneously and reveals men as savage beasts to whom the thought of sparing their own kind is alien. Anyone who calls to mind the atrocities of the early migrations, of the invasion by the Huns or by the so-called Mongols under Jenghiz Khan and Tamurlane, of the sack of Jerusalem by the pious Crusaders, even indeed the horrors of the last world-war, will have to bow his head humbly before the truth of this view of man.

\* From *Civilization and Its Discontents*, pp. 85-93, by Sigmund Freud, copyright 1930, reissued by the Hogarth Press, Ltd., London, 1949. Reprinted by permission of the Hogarth Press.

The existence of this tendency to aggression which we can detect in ourselves and rightly presume to be present in others is the factor that disturbs our relations with our neighbours and makes it necessary for culture to institute its high demands. Civilized society is perpetually menaced with disintegration through this primary hostility of men towards one another. Their interests in their common work would not hold them together; the passions of instinct are stronger than reasoned interests. Culture has to call up every possible reinforcement in order to erect barriers against the aggressive instincts of men and hold their manifestations in check by reaction-formations in men's minds. Hence its system of methods by which mankind is to be driven to identifications and aim-inhibited love-relationships; hence the restrictions on sexual life; and hence, too, its ideal command to love one's neighbour as oneself, which is really justified by the fact that nothing is so completely at variance with original human nature as this. With all its striving, this endeavour of culture has so far not achieved very much. Civilization expects to prevent the worst atrocities of brutal violence by taking upon itself the right to employ violence against criminals, but the law is not able to lay hands on the more discreet and subtle forms in which human aggressions are expressed. The time comes when every one of us has to abandon the illusory anticipations with which in our youth we regarded our fellow-men, and when we realize how much hardship and suffering we have been caused in life through their ill will. It would be unfair, however, to reproach culture with trying to eliminate all disputes and competition from human concerns. These things are undoubtedly indispensable; but opposition is not necessarily enmity, only it may be misused to make an opening for it.

The Communists believe they have found a way of delivering us from this evil. Man is wholeheartedly good and friendly to his neighbour, they say, but the system of private property has corrupted his nature. The possession of private property gives power to the individual and thence the temptation arises to ill treat his neighbour; the man who is excluded from the possession of property is

to rebel in hostility against the oppres-

sor. If private property were abolished, all valuables held in common and all allowed to share in the enjoyment of them, ill-will and enmity would disappear from among men. Since all needs would be satisfied, none would have any reason to regard another as an enemy; all would willingly undertake the work which is necessary. I have no concern with any economic criticisms of the communistic system; I cannot enquire into whether the abolition of private property is advantageous and expedient.<sup>1</sup> But I am able to recognize that psychologically it is founded on an untenable illusion. By abolishing private property one deprives the human love of aggression of one of its instruments, a strong one undoubtedly, but assuredly not the strongest. It in no way alters the individual differences in power and influence which are turned by aggressiveness to its own use, nor does it change the nature of the instinct in any way. This instinct did not arise as the result of property; it reigned almost supreme in primitive times when possessions were still extremely scanty; it shows itself already in the nursery when possessions have hardly grown out of their original anal shape; it is at the bottom of all the relations of affection and love between human beings—possibly with the single exception of that of a mother to her male child. Suppose that personal rights to material goods are done away with, there still remain prerogatives in sexual relationships, which must arouse the strongest rancour and most violent enmity among men and women who are otherwise equal. Let us suppose this were also to be removed by instituting complete liberty in sexual life, so that the family, the germ-cell of culture, ceased to exist; one could not, it is true, foresee the new paths on

<sup>1</sup> Anyone who has been through the misery of poverty in his youth, and has endured the indifference and arrogance of those who have possessions, should be exempt from the suspicion that he has no understanding of or goodwill towards the endeavors made to fight the economic inequality of men and all that it leads to. To be sure, if an attempt is made to base this fight upon an abstract demand for equality for all in the name of justice, there is a very obvious objection to be made, namely, that nature began the injustice by the highly unequal way in which the endows individuals physically and mentally, for which there is no help.

which cultural development might then proceed, but one thing one would be bound to expect, and that is that the ineffaceable feature of human nature would follow wherever it led.

Men clearly do not find it easy to do without satisfaction of this tendency to aggression that is in them; when deprived of satisfaction of it they are ill at ease. There is an advantage, not to be undervalued, in the existence of smaller communities, through which the aggressive instinct can find an outlet in enmity towards those outside the group. It is always possible to unite considerable numbers of men in love towards one another, so long as there are still some remaining as objects for aggressive manifestations. I once interested myself in the peculiar fact that peoples whose territories are adjacent, and are otherwise closely related, are always at feud with and ridiculing each other, as, for instance, the Spaniards and the Portuguese, the North and South Germans, the English and the Scotch, and so on. I gave it the name of "narcissism in respect of minor differences," which does not do much to explain it. One can now see that it is a convenient and relatively harmless form of satisfaction for aggressive tendencies, through which cohesion amongst the members of a group is made easier. The Jewish people, scattered in all directions as they are, have in this way rendered services which deserve recognition to the development of culture in the countries where they settled; but unfortunately not all the massacres of Jews in the Middle Ages sufficed to procure peace and security for their Christian contemporaries. Once the apostle Paul had laid down universal love between all men as the foundation of his Christian community, the inevitable consequence in Christianity was the utmost intolerance towards all who remained outside of it; the Romans, who had not founded their state on love, were not given to lack of religious toleration, although religion was a concern of the state, and the state was permeated through and through with it. Neither was it an unaccountable chance that the dream of a German world-dominion evoked a complementary movement towards anti-Semitism; and it is quite intelligible that the attempt to establish a new communistic type of culture

in Russia should find psychological support in the persecution of the bourgeois. One only wonders, with some concern, however, how the Soviets will manage when they have exterminated their bourgeois entirely.

If civilization requires such sacrifices, not only of sexuality but also of the aggressive tendencies in mankind, we can better understand why it should be so hard for men to feel happy in it. In actual fact primitive man was better off in this respect, for he knew nothing of any restrictions on his instincts. As a set-off against this, his prospects of enjoying his happiness for any length of time were very slight. Civilized man has exchanged some part of his chances of happiness for a measure of security. We will not forget, however, that in the primal family only the head of it enjoyed this instinctual freedom; the other members lived in slavish thralldom. The antithesis between a minority enjoying cultural advantages and a majority who are robbed of them was therefore most extreme in the primeval period of culture. With regard to the primitive human types living at the present time, careful investigation has revealed that their instinctual life is by no means to be envied on account of its freedom; it is subject to restrictions of a different kind but perhaps even more rigorous than is that of modern civilized man.

In rightly finding fault, as we thus do, with our present state of civilization for so inadequately providing us with what we require to make us happy in life, and for the amount of suffering of a probably avoidable nature it lays us open to—in doing our utmost to lay bare the roots of its deficiencies by our unsparing criticisms, we are undoubtedly exercising our just rights and not showing ourselves enemies of cultures. We may expect that in the course of time changes will be carried out in our civilization so that it becomes more satisfying to our needs and no longer open to the reproaches we have made against it. But perhaps we shall also accustom ourselves to the idea that there are certain difficulties inherent in the very nature of culture which will not yield to any efforts at reform. Over and above the obligations of putting restrictions upon our instincts, which we see to be inevitable, we are imminently threatened with the dangers of a state one may call *la misère*

*psychologique* of groups. This danger is most menacing where the social forces of cohesion consist predominantly of identifications of the individuals in the group with one another, whilst leading personalities fail to acquire the significance that should fall to them in the process of group-formation. The state of civi-

lization in America at the present day offers a good opportunity for studying this injurious effect of civilization which we have reason to dread. But I will resist the temptation to enter upon a criticism of American culture; I have no desire to give the impression that I would employ American methods myself.

# The Stranger Is Our Enemy

WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER

Where the psychologist finds the forces of hate deep within the individual, a sociologist traces them to the group. The explanation by William Graham Sumner (1840-1910) is taken from *Folkways*.<sup>\*</sup> This book has been a classic of social science. In it, Sumner made a thorough study of man's customs—the behavior he learns from other members of his society.

Sumner asks us to compare our feelings toward friends and enemies, family and outsiders, our own nation and other nations. Why do they differ? What is the meaning of in-group, ethnocentrism, chauvinism?

THE CONCEPT OF "PRIMITIVE SOCIETY"; WE-GROUP AND OTHERS-GROUP. The conception of "primitive society" which we ought to form is that of small groups scattered over a territory. The size of the groups is determined by the conditions of the struggle for existence. The internal organization of each group corresponds to its size. A group of groups may have some relation to each other (kin, neighborhood, alliance, connubium and commercium) which draws them together and differentiates them from others. Thus a differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other.

<sup>\*</sup> From *Folkways*, pp. 12-15, by William Graham Sumner, copyright 1906, reprinted by permission of Ginn and Co.

Their relation to all outsiders, or others-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it. If a group is exogamic, the women in it were born abroad somewhere. Other foreigners who might be found in it are adopted persons, guest friends, and slaves.

SENTIMENTS IN THE IN-GROUP AND TOWARDS THE OUT-GROUP. The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the we-group for war. These exigencies also make government and law in the in-group, in order to prevent quarrels and enforce discipline. Thus war and peace have reacted on each other and developed each other, one within the group, the other in the intergroup

relation. The closer the neighbors, and the stronger they are, the intenser is the warfare, and then the intenser is the internal organization and discipline of each. Sentiments are produced to correspond. Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without,—all grow together, common products of the same situation. These relations and sentiments constitute a social philosophy. It is sanctified by connection with religion. Men of an others-group are outsiders with whose ancestors the ancestors of the we-group waged war. The ghosts of the latter will see with pleasure their descendants keep up the fight, and will help them. Virtue consists in killing, plundering, and enslaving outsiders.

*Ethnocentrism* is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. Folkways correspond to it to cover both the inner and the outer relation. Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn. Opprobrious epithets are derived from these differences. "Pig-eater," "cow-eater," "uncircumcised," "jabberers," are epithets of contempt and abomination. The Tupis called the Portuguese by a derisive epithet descriptive of birds which have feathers around their feet, on account of trousers. For our present purpose the most important fact is that ethnocentrism leads a people to exaggerate and intensify everything in their own folkways which is peculiar and which differentiates them from others. It therefore strengthens the folkways.

**ILLUSTRATIONS OF ETHNOCENTRISM.** The Papuans on New Guinea are broken up into village units which are kept separate by hostility, cannibalism, head hunting, and divergences of language and religion. Each village is integrated by its own language, religion, and interests. A group of villages is sometimes united into a limited unity by connubium. A wife taken inside of this group unit has full status; one taken outside of it has not. The petty group units are peace groups within and

are hostile to all outsiders. The Mbayas of South America believed that their deity had bidden them live by making war on others, taking their wives and property, and killing their men.

When Caribs were asked whence they came, they answered, "We alone are people." The meaning of the name Kiowa is "real or principal people." The Lapps called themselves "men," or "human beings." The Greenland Eskimo think that Europeans have been sent to Greenland to learn virtue and good manners from the Greenlanders. Their highest form of praise for a European is that he is, or soon will be, as good as a Greenlander. The Tunguses call themselves "men." As a rule it is found that *nature* peoples call themselves "men." Others are something else—perhaps not defined—but not real men. In myths the origin of their own tribe is that of the real human race. They do not account for the others. The Ainos derive their name from that of the first man, whom they worship as a god. Evidently the name of the god is derived from the tribe name. When the tribal name has another sense, it is always boastful or proud. The Ovambo name is a corruption of the name of the tribe for themselves, which means "the wealthy." Amongst the most remarkable people in the world for ethnocentrism are the Seri of Lower California. They observe an attitude of suspicion and hostility to all outsiders, and strictly forbid marriage with outsiders.

The Jews divided all mankind into themselves and Gentiles. They were the "chosen people." The Greeks and Romans called all outsiders "barbarians." In Euripides' tragedy of *Iphigenia in Aulis* Iphigenia says that it is fitting that Greeks should rule over barbarians, but not contrariwise, because Greeks are free, and barbarians are slaves. The Arabs regarded themselves as the noblest nation and all others as more or less barbarous. In 1896, the Chinese minister of education and his counselors edited a manual in which this statement occurs: "How grand and glorious is the Empire of China, the middle kingdom! She is the largest and richest in the world. The grandest men in the world have all come from the middle empire." In all the literature of all the states equivalent statements occur, although they are not so naively expressed. In Russian

books and newspapers the civilizing mission of Russia is talked about,<sup>1</sup> just as, in the books and journals of France, Germany, and the United States, the civilizing mission of those countries is assumed and referred to as well understood. Each state now regards itself as the leader of civilization, the best, the freest, and the wisest, and all others as inferior. Within a few years our own man-on-the-curbstone has learned to class all foreigners of the Latin peoples as "dagos," and "dago" has become an epithet of contempt. These are all cases of ethnocentrism.

Patriotism is a sentiment which belongs to modern states. It stands in antithesis to the mediaeval notion of catholicity. Patriotism is loyalty to the civic group to which one belongs by birth or other group bond. It is a sentiment of fellowship and cooperation in all the hopes, work, and suffering of the group. Mediaeval catholicity would have made all Christians an in-group and would have set them in hostility to all Mohammedans and other non-Christians. It never could be realized. When the great modern states took form and assumed control of societal interests, group sentiment was produced in connection with those states. Men responded willingly to a demand for support and help from an institution which could and did serve interests. The state drew to itself the loyalty which had been given to men (lords), and it became the object of that group vanity and antagonism which had been ethnocentric. For the modern man patriotism has become one of the first of duties and one of the noblest of sentiments. It is what he owes to the state for what the state does for him, and the state is, for the modern man, a cluster of civic institutions from which he draws secu-

rity and conditions of welfare. The masses are always patriotic. For them the old ethnocentric jealousy, vanity, truculency, and ambition are the strongest elements in patriotism. Such sentiments are easily awakened in a crowd. They are sure to be popular. Wider knowledge always proves that they are not based on facts. That we are good and others are bad is never true. By history, literature, travel, and science men are made cosmopolitan. The selected classes of all states become associated, they intermarry. The differentiation by states loses importance. All states give the same security and conditions of welfare to all. The standards of civic institutions are the same, or tend to become such, and it is a matter of pride in each state to offer civic status and opportunities equal to the best. Every group of any kind whatsoever demands that each of its members shall help defend group interests. Every group stigmatizes any one who fails in zeal, labor, and sacrifices for group interests. Thus the sentiment of loyalty to the group, or the group head, which was so strong in the Middle Ages, is kept up, as far as possible, in regard to modern states and governments. The group force is also employed to enforce the obligations of devotion to group interests. It follows that judgments are precluded and criticism is silenced.

CHAUVINISM. That patriotism may degenerate into a vice is shown by the invention of a name for the vice: chauvinism. It is a name for boastful and truculent group self-assertion. It overrules personal judgment and character, and puts the whole group at the mercy of the clique which is ruling at the moment. It produces the dominance of watchwords and phrases which take the place of reason and conscience in determining conduct. The patriotic bias is a recognized perversion of thought and judgment against which our education should guard us.

<sup>1</sup> Ed. note: The significance of the concept "ethnocentrism" is emphasized by this statement written more than a decade before communism came to power.

## Man Against Man

### A Portrait of Hate

ODD NANSEN

Two readings form this section on "Man Against Man." One writer is a Norwegian, the other a Jew—but both have experienced the Nazi concentration camps. The first of these reports \* is a description of the mistreatment of Jews and the feelings of the Norwegian observer, Odd Nansen.

Consider the author, the tormentors, and the tormented. Then ask yourself whether Freud or Sumner has helped you to understand their behavior.

The language is exhausted. I've exhausted it myself. There are no words left to describe the horrors I've seen with my own eyes. How am I to give even a reflection of the hell I was plunged in yesterday?

It was in the isolation area between Blocks Thirteen and Fourteen, which was filled with Jews from Liberose. Leif Wolfberg was among them. He had sent for me, so I went. I didn't have much talk with him, I saw that he was all right, he had been getting Norwegian parcels the whole time, and looked "well." But the scene around me took up all my interest, all my thoughts, and pretty well all my strength. It was appalling. Dante's inferno couldn't be

worse. There were more than a thousand Jews; that is, they had once been Jews and human beings, now they were living skeletons, beast-like in their mad hunger. They flung themselves on the dustbins, or rather plunged into them, head and shoulders, several at a time; they scratched up everything, absolutely everything that was lying in them, potato peel, garbage, rottenness of every kind. They didn't see what they were eating, simply shoved it into their faces, clawed and tore at it, fought over it. They stuck fast in the dustbins, taking them along when they straightened up again, and off they went like that, two or three skeletons combined into a strange walking caryatid sculpture. But the worst was that the whole time, without a break, the blows from rubber truncheons were hailing down on

\* From *From Day to Day*, pp. 437-40, by Odd Nansen, copyright 1949 by G. P. Putnam's Sons, reprinted by permission of the publisher.



# ODD NANSEN

them. Young lads (SAW lads)<sup>1</sup> thrashed away at them to their hearts' content. But they took no notice. The instant the tormentors turned away to hit out in another direction, they plunged into the dustbins again. The blood was pouring off them, from their faces and hands and legs. Most were barefoot, and the clothes hung round them in shreds; more great wounds from blows shone through rents and openings in the clothes on their bodies.

The tormentors were indescribable. They were only boys, but the act of striking intoxicated them and drove them wild. I followed them, I saw their faces as they struck, they were no longer human, they were living devils, possessed, transported with ecstasy. They struck whatever they saw, not merely those they saw in the dustbins. They hurled themselves on the crowds like roaring lions, and struck out right and left. The wretched victims went down round them by dozens; that only inspired them, and they went on striking at them as they lay, trod upon them, kicked them, while the blood was streaming from mouths, ears, and wounds. Every time they needed a rest, they turned exultantly to their laughing and smiling comrades, laughed back, and gave the truncheon a limber, playful swing round their heads. Then they flew at it again.

A Jew who had been struck ten or twenty times tottered and fell down at my feet. He lay motionless, the blood was running out of his mouth and trickling from one ear. His eyes were bloody and the cheekbones swollen and cracked with blows. One of his lips was cleft and some teeth knocked out. He was barefoot, and his feet covered with frostbite. His trousers had slipped down, so that his matchstick thighs were visible, and through a rent in his shirt one could see his ribs. I bent over him, took him under the arms and raised him; he was light as a child. Wolfberg, who was a little way off, called out don't, it's no use, take care, or something of the kind. Poor Wolfberg, one of them himself, had

grown even more hardened, even more callous. He didn't mind looking on, this was a commonplace, mere daily fare!

I dragged the Jew to the wall and managed to prop him up against it, and he came to again. He looked at me with such eyes—oh God, such eyes; all the white was red, and the red was running down his cheeks—the brown pupils were dull, as though a film had been drawn over them, and the big eyelids hung over them heavily. Some gurgling noises came from him, I thought he had difficulty in breathing, I tried to straighten him up; still the gurgling noises came, more regularly, it sounded as though he were being choked—but he was crying, crying like a child. A friend of his, who had been standing by for some time, came up and helped me to hold him. He explained that he had thought I was going to prop his friend up and kill him, he couldn't believe I only meant to help him. For I wasn't a Jew? What was I? A Norwegian! He smiled, and something that was meant for a smile appeared on his friend's face too, grotesque grimacings and a thicker stream of gurgling sounds. I felt a cur; how could I do otherwise? These two Jews, both maimed with blows, for the friend had also been beaten until the blood was running down his face—they had been struck by men of my race, it was men of my race who were doing this to them, to their fellow prisoners! And there they were smiling happily at the sound of the one word "Norwegian," while I stood helpless. I was forbidden even to be where I was, let alone to help any of the abhorred ones. And reason, cold, odious reason, told me baldly that these men were doomed, nobody could save them, not even the best doctors in peacetime. They were too far gone, had already one foot deep in the grave. Only one thought took shape: May death overtake them speedily! May they be sent into the gas chamber this very night! If I had had veronal in unlimited quantities, I would have given it out to hundreds like bread.

I pulled up the trousers of the poor half-dead Jew, fastened them and arranged his clothes as far as was possible, took out my handkerchief and dried a little of the blood from his face. They simply stared at me, both of them, with big, surprised eyes, then he

<sup>1</sup> SAW—Sonder Abteilung Wehrmacht. The lads had probably been guilty of Kameradendiebstahl and put in a concentration camp for that reason. Here they were supplied with rubber truncheons and the right to strike—the right to kill. They were more than willing.

raised his arm with an effort, as though mustering all his failing strength; his hand reached the level of my head; there he let it sink, and slowly that bony hand of his slid down over my face. *It was his last caress*, and he gurgled something that his friend translated with, "He says you are a decent man." Then he collapsed along the wall and onto the ground, and I think he died there and then, but I don't know, for I was hurrying off with my face burning. "A decent man!" I who hadn't even dared to try and stop his tormentor. I who hadn't even cared to risk my own skin by going out into the camp and collecting food for those starving skeletons! "A decent man!" If only I could ever raise myself up again from this shadow life in this sink of degradation, and be "a decent man!"

I made my way back to Wolfberg and some other Norwegians who were standing round him. They were watching the scene, which still continued, the tormentors striking more frantically than ever, while the victims drew away, crook backed, their hands protecting their heads and faces, or fell and saved their butchers the trouble of running after them. The dustbin offenses were repeated incessantly. They stuffed the garbage into their pockets, under their shirts, in their caps—what they

couldn't stuff in their mouths; they heeded nothing, nothing but food! Food? That beastliness, no pig would have eaten it, no animal, only flies and bacteria would slowly consume it.

A Norwegian said, "Those aren't human beings, they're swine! I've starved myself, but I could never sink to eating sheer filth! It's quite right to keep them off the garbage, and you have to beat them, even that doesn't stop them!" I hurled myself on him and let him have a broadside. It was a solace to see him curl up, for curl he did; he grew quite meek in the end. But a poor, cowardly outlet for all the pent-up forces within me that I felt should have been used for something very different if I had only had the courage. I couldn't stand the place any longer, all I saw increased my impotence, despair, paralysis of dumb disgust at everything, including myself. I got out of it with Arvid, who had come with me. We went to the Revier to see Rolf. Thank heaven, he was much, much better. I hadn't seen him for a fortnight, there was a colossal improvement. We stayed a long time; two or three hours, for that was forbidden too. At night in the block there was concertina-playing, singing, and high spirits. I sang too, and made merry! Can it be possible?

## Man Against Man

### An Analysis of Hate

BRUNO BETTELHEIM

The author of this article has also been a concentration camp inmate. But, as a trained psychologist, he has attempted to *analyze* the situation in which as a Jew he had found himself. Bruno Bettelheim is currently director of the Orthogenic School at the University of Chicago. In this report, he asks whether there was "method or madness" in the treatment of prisoners as reported in the preceding description of the concentration camp.

This reading\* provides an interpretation of the purposes of the Nazis. How does the author explain the Nazi behavior? How does his explanation accord with your ideas of hate and violence? Imagine yourself as soldier-jailer. Would you behave differently?

#### PURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATION

The author spent approximately one year in the two biggest German concentration camps for political prisoners, at Dachau and at Buchenwald. During this time he made observations and collected material, part of which will be presented in this paper. It is not the intention of this presentation to recount once more the horror story of the German concentration camp for political prisoners.

It is assumed that the reader is roughly familiar with it, but it should be reiterated that the prisoners were deliberately tortured.

They were inadequately clothed, but nevertheless exposed to heat, rain, and freezing temperatures as long as seventeen hours a day, seven days a week. They suffered from extreme malnutrition, but had to perform hard labor.<sup>1</sup> Every single moment of their lives was strictly regulated and supervised. They were never permitted to see any visitors, nor a minister. They were not entitled to any medical care, and when they received it, it was rarely administered by medically trained persons.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The daily food the prisoners received yielded approximately 1800 calories, whereas for the labor they were forced to perform the average caloric requirement is from 3000 to 3300 calories.

<sup>2</sup> Surgical operations, for instance, were performed by a former printer. There were many M.D.'s in the camp, but no prisoner was permitted to work in the camp in his civilian capacity because that would not have implied a punishment.

\* From "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations" by Bruno Bettelheim, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 38 (1943), pp. 417-20, 429-33, 447-52. Reprinted by permission.

The prisoners did not know exactly why they were imprisoned, and never knew for how long. This may explain why we shall speak of the prisoners as persons finding themselves in an "extreme" situation.

The acts of terror committed in these camps arouse in the minds of civilized persons justified and strong emotions, and those emotions lead them sometimes to overlook that terror is, as far as the Gestapo is concerned, only a means for attaining certain ends.<sup>3</sup> By using extravagant means which fully absorb the investigator's interest, the Gestapo only too often succeeds in hiding its real purposes. One of the reasons that this happens so frequently in respect to the concentration camps is that the persons most able to discuss them are former prisoners, who obviously are more interested in what happened to them than in why it happened. If one desires to understand the purposes of the Gestapo, and the ways in which they are attained, emphasis on what happened to particular persons would be erroneous. According to the well-known ideology of the Nazi state the individual as such is either nonexistent or of no importance. An investigation of the purposes of the concentration camps must, therefore, emphasize not individual acts of terror, but their trans-individual purposes and results.

Anticipating the results of this discussion and of further investigations, it may be said that the results which the Gestapo tried to

obtain by means of the camps are varied; the author thinks that he was able to recognize some of them. In the context of this presentation it may be mentioned that they were the following different, although intimately related, goals: to break the prisoners as individuals and to change them into docile masses from which no individual or group act of resistance could arise; to spread terror among the rest of the population by using the prisoners as hostages for good behavior, and by demonstrating what happens to those who oppose the Nazi rulers; to provide the Gestapo members with a training ground in which they are so educated as to lose all human emotions and attitudes and learn the most effective ways of breaking resistance in a defenseless civilian population; to provide the Gestapo with an experimental laboratory in which to study the effective means for breaking civilian resistance, the minimum food, hygienic, and medical requirements needed to keep prisoners alive and able to perform hard labor when the threat of punishment takes the place of all other normal incentives, and the influence on performance if no time is allowed for anything but hard labor and if the prisoners are separated from their families.

In this paper, which, considering the complexity of the problem with which it is dealing, is comparatively short, an effort will be made to deal adequately with at least one aspect of it, namely, with the concentration camp as a means of producing changes in the prisoners which will make them more useful subjects of the Nazi state.

These changes are produced by exposing the prisoners to situations particularly suitable for this purpose. Their nature is such as to warrant calling them extreme. By means of their extreme character they force the prisoners to adapt themselves entirely and with the greatest speed. This adaptation produced interesting types of private, individual, and mass behavior. We call "private" behavior that which originates to a large degree in a subject's particular background and personality, rather than in the experiences to which the Gestapo exposed him, although these experiences were instrumental in bringing about the private behavior. We call "individual" behavior that which, although developed by individuals more

<sup>3</sup> The concentration camps for political prisoners are administered by the "Elite" formations of the "SS" groups, called "Deathhead" regiments. Every member of these regiments has to spend at least three months of his training as a guard in these camps. If he does not perform satisfactorily in this capacity, he is transferred back to the non-elite formations of the "SS."

There are many types of concentration camps in Germany. If the author speaks of concentration camps, the meaning is always camps for political prisoners. Up to the time of the war there were three big camps of this type and a few smaller ones, all for men, and one small camp for women. Up to that time the total of prisoners in these camps never exceeded 60,000. Contrary to widespread opinion, only a small minority of them were Jews.

The many other German concentration camps, such as those for forced labor, were not administered by the Gestapo, and the conditions in them were very different.

or less independently of one another, is clearly the result of experiences common to all prisoners. The pattern of these behaviors was similar in nearly all prisoners with only slight deviations from the average, these deviations originating in the prisoners' particular background and personality. We call "mass" behavior those phenomena which could be observed only in a group of prisoners when functioning as a more or less unified mass. Although these three types of behavior were somewhat overlapping and a sharp discrimination between them seems difficult, the subdivision seems advisable for this paper. We shall restrict our discussion mainly to individual and mass behavior, as the title indicates. One example of private behavior will be discussed on the following pages.

If we thus assume that what happens in the camp has, among others, the purpose of changing the prisoners into useful subjects of the Nazi state, and if this purpose is attained by means of exposing them to extreme situations, then a legitimate way to carry on our investigation is by an historical account of what occurred in the prisoners from the moment they had their first experience with the Gestapo up to the time when the process of adaptation to the camp situation was practically concluded. In analyzing this development different stages can be recognized, which will furnish us with appropriate subdivisions. The first of these stages centers around the initial shock of finding oneself unlawfully imprisoned. The main event of the second stage is the transportation into the camp and the first experiences in it. The next stage is characterized by a slow process of changing the prisoner's life and personality. It occurs step by step, continuously. It is the adaptation to the camp situation. During this process it is difficult to recognize the impact of what is going on. One way to make it more obvious is to compare two groups of prisoners, one in whom the process has only started, namely, the "new" prisoners, with another one in whom the process is already far advanced. This other group will consist of the "old" prisoners. The final stage is reached when the prisoner has adapted himself to the life in the camp. This last stage seems to be characterized, among other features, by a definitely

changed attitude to, and evaluation of, the Gestapo.

THE TRANSPORTATION INTO THE CAMP AND THE FIRST EXPERIENCES IN IT. After having spent several days in prison, the prisoners were brought into the camp. During this transportation they were exposed to constant tortures of various kinds. Many of them depended on the fantasy of the particular Gestapo member in charge of a group of prisoners. Still, a certain pattern soon became apparent. Corporal punishment, consisting of whipping, kicking, slapping, intermingled with shooting and wounding with the bayonet, alternated with tortures the obvious goal of which was extreme exhaustion. For instance, the prisoners were forced to stare for hours into glaring lights, to kneel for hours, and so on. From time to time a prisoner got killed; no prisoner was permitted to take care of his or another's wounds. These tortures alternated with efforts on the part of the guards to force the prisoners to hit one another, and to defile what the guards considered the prisoners' most cherished values. For instance, the prisoners were forced to curse their God, to accuse themselves of vile actions, accuse their wives of adultery and of prostitution. This continued for hours and was repeated at various times. According to reliable reports, this kind of initiation never took less than 12 hours and frequently lasted 24 hours. If the number of prisoners brought into the camp was too large, or if they came from nearby places, the ceremony took place during the first day in camp.

The purpose of the tortures was to break the resistance of the prisoners, and to assure the guards that they were really superior to them. This can be seen from the fact that the longer the tortures lasted, the less violent they became. The guards became slowly less excited, and at the end even talked with the prisoners. As soon as a new guard took over, he started with new acts of terror, although not as violent as in the beginning, and he eased up sooner than his predecessor. Sometimes prisoners who had already spent time in camp were brought back with a group of new prisoners. These old prisoners were not tortured if they could furnish evidence that they had already been in the camp. That these

tortures were planned can be seen from the fact that during the author's transportation into the camp after several prisoners had died and many had been wounded in tortures lasting for 12 hours, the command, "Stop mistreating the prisoners," came and from this moment on the prisoners were left in peace till they arrived in the camp when another group of guards took over and started anew to take advantage of them.

It is difficult to ascertain what happened in the minds of the prisoners during the time they were exposed to this treatment. Most of them became so exhausted that they were only partly conscious of what happened. In general, prisoners remembered the details and did not mind talking about them, but they did not like to talk about what they had felt and thought during the time of torture. The few who volunteered information made vague statements which sounded like devious rationalizations, invented for the purpose of justifying that they had endured treatment injurious to their self-respect without trying to fight back. The few who had tried to fight back could not be interviewed; they were dead.

The writer can vividly recall his extreme weariness, resulting from a bayonet wound he received early in the course of transportation and from a heavy blow on the head. Both injuries led to the loss of a considerable amount of blood, and made him groggy. He recalls vividly, nevertheless, his thoughts and emotions during the transportation. He wondered all the time that man can endure so much without committing suicide or going insane. He wondered that the guards really tortured prisoners in the way it had been described in books on the concentration camps; that the Gestapo was so simple-minded as either to enjoy forcing prisoners to defile themselves or to expect to break their resistance in this way. He wondered that the guards were lacking in fantasy when selecting the means to torture the prisoners; that their sadism was without imagination. He was rather amused by the repeated statement that guards do not shoot the prisoners but kill them by beating them to death because a bullet costs six pfennigs, and the prisoners are not worth even so much. Obviously the idea that these men, most of them formerly influential persons, were not

worth such a trifle impressed the guards considerably. On the basis of this introspection it seems that the writer gained emotional strength from the following facts: that things happened according to expectation; that, therefore, his future in the camp was at least partly predictable from what he already was experiencing and from what he had read; and that the Gestapo was more stupid than he had expected, which eventually provided small satisfaction. Moreover, he felt pleased with himself that the tortures did not change his ability to think or his general point of view. In retrospect these considerations seem futile, but they ought to be mentioned because, if the author should be asked to sum up in one sentence what, all during the time he spent in the camp, was his main problem, he would say: *to safeguard his ego in such a way, that, if by any good luck he should regain liberty, he would be approximately the same person he was when deprived of liberty.*

He has no doubt that he was able to endure the transportation, and all that followed, because right from the beginning he became convinced that these horrible and degrading experiences somehow did not happen to "him" as a subject, but only to "him" as an object. The importance of this attitude was corroborated by many statements of other prisoners, although none would go so far as to state definitely that an attitude of this type was clearly developed already during the time of the transportation. They couched their feelings usually in more general terms such as, "The main problem is to remain alive and unchanged," without specifying what they meant as unchanged. From additional remarks it became apparent that what should remain unchanged was individually different and roughly covered the person's general attitudes and values.

All the thoughts and emotions which the author had during the transportation were extremely detached. It was as if he watched things happening in which he only vaguely participated. Later he learned that many prisoners had developed this same feeling of detachment, as if what happened really did not matter to oneself. It was strangely mixed with a conviction that "this cannot be true, such things just do not happen." Not only during

the transportation but all through the time spent in camp, the prisoners had to convince themselves that this was real, was really happening, and not just a nightmare. They were never wholly successful.<sup>4</sup>

This feeling of detachment which rejected the reality of the situation in which the prisoners found themselves might be considered a mechanism safeguarding the integrity of their personalities. Many prisoners behaved in the camp as if their life there would have no connection with their "real" life; they went so far as to insist that this was the right attitude. Their statements about themselves, and their evaluation of their own and other persons' behavior, differed considerably from what they would have said and thought outside of camp. This separation of behavior patterns and schemes of values inside and outside of camp was so strong that it could hardly be touched in conversation; it was one of the many "taboos" not to be discussed. The prisoners' feelings could be summed up by the following sentence: "What I am doing here, or what is happening to me, does not count at all; here everything is permissible as long and insofar as it contributes to helping me to survive in the camp."

One more observation made during the transportation ought to be mentioned. No prisoner fainted. To faint meant to get killed. In this particular situation fainting was no device protecting a person against intolerable pain and in this way facilitating his life; it endangered a prisoner's existence because anyone unable to follow orders was killed. Once the prisoners were in the camp the situation changed and a prisoner who fainted sometimes received some attention or was usually no longer tortured. The result of this changed

attitude of the guards was that prisoners who did not faint under the more severe strains during the transportation, in the camp usually fainted when exposed to great hardships, although they were not as great as those endured during the transportation.

**SUMMARY.** During the transportation the prisoners were exposed to physical and mental tortures, the purpose of which seemed to be to break any ability to resist the Gestapo. They seemed, moreover, to serve the purpose of overcoming the Gestapo members' fear of the prisoners who were more intelligent and belonged usually to a higher social group. During the transportation the prisoners developed a state of detachment, feeling as if what happened did not really happen to them as persons.

THE FINAL ADJUSTMENT TO THE LIFE IN THE CAMP. A prisoner had reached the final stage of adjustment to the camp situation when he had changed his personality so as to accept as his own the values of the Gestapo. A few examples may illustrate how this acceptance expressed itself.

The Gestapo considered, or pretended to consider, the prisoners the scum of the earth. They insisted that none of them was any better than the others. One of the reasons for this attitude was probably to impress the young guards who received their training in the camp that they were superior to even the most outstanding prisoner and to demonstrate to them that the former foes of the Nazis were now subdued and not worthy of any special attention. If a formerly prominent prisoner had been treated better, the simple guard would have thought that he is still influential; if he had been treated worse, they might have thought that he is still dangerous. This was in line with the desire to impress the guards that even a slight degree of opposition against the Nazi system led to the entire destruction of the person who dared to oppose, and that the degree of opposition made no difference in this respect. Occasional talks with these guards revealed that they really believed in a Jewish-capitalistic world conspiracy against the German people, and whoever opposed the Nazis participated in it and was therefore to be destroyed, independent of his role in the con-

<sup>4</sup> There were good indications that most guards embraced a similar attitude, although for different reasons. They tortured the prisoners partly because they enjoyed demonstrating their superiority, partly because their superiors expected it of them. But, having been educated in a world which rejected brutality, they felt uneasy about what they were doing. It seems that they, too, had an emotional attitude toward their acts of brutality which might be described as a feeling of unreality. After having been guards in the camp for some time, they got accustomed to its inhuman behavior, they became "conditioned" to it; it then became part of their "real" life.

spiry. So it can be understood why their behavior to the prisoners was that normally reserved for dealing with one's vilest enemy.

The prisoners found themselves in an impossible situation due to the steady interference with their privacy on the part of the guards and other prisoners. So a great amount of aggression accumulated. In the new prisoners it vented itself in the way it might have done in the world outside the camp. But slowly prisoners accepted, as expression of their verbal aggressions, terms which definitely did not originate in their previous vocabularies, but were taken over from the very different vocabulary of the Gestapo. From copying the verbal aggressions of the Gestapo to copying their form of bodily aggressions was one more step, but it took several years to make this step. It was not unusual to find old prisoners, when in charge of others, behaving worse than the Gestapo, in some cases because they were trying to win favor with the Gestapo in this way but more often because they considered this the best way to behave toward prisoners in the camp.

Practically all prisoners who had spent a long time in the camp took over the Gestapo's attitude toward the so-called unfit prisoners. Newcomers presented the old prisoners with difficult problems. Their complaints about the unbearable life in camp added new strain to the life in the barracks, so did their inability to adjust to it. Bad behavior in the labor gang endangered the whole group. So a newcomer who did not stand up well under the strain tended to become a liability for the other prisoners. Moreover, weaklings were those most apt eventually to turn traitors. Weaklings usually died during the first weeks in the camp anyway, so it seemed as well to get rid of them sooner. So old prisoners were sometimes instrumental in getting rid of the unfit, in this way making a feature of Gestapo ideology a feature of their own behavior. This was one of the many situations in which old prisoners demonstrated toughness and molded their way of treating other prisoners according to the example set by the Gestapo. That this was really a taking-over of Gestapo attitudes can be seen from the treatment of traitors. Self-protection asked for their elimination, but the way in

which they were tortured for days and slowly killed was taken over from the Gestapo.

Old prisoners who seemed to have a tendency to identify themselves with the Gestapo did so not only in respect to aggressive behavior. They would try to arrogate to themselves old pieces of Gestapo uniforms. If that was not possible, they tried to sew and mend their uniforms so that they would resemble those of the guards. The length to which prisoners would go in these efforts seemed unbelievable, particularly since the Gestapo punished them for their efforts to copy Gestapo uniforms. When asked why they did it they admitted that they loved to look like one of the guards.

The identification with the Gestapo did not stop with the copying of their outer appearance and behavior. Old prisoners accepted their goals and values, too, even when they seemed opposed to their own interests. It was appalling to see how far formerly even politically well-educated prisoners would go in this identification. At one time American and English newspapers were full of stories about the cruelties committed in the camps. The Gestapo punished the prisoners for the appearance of these stories, true to their policy of punishing the group for whatever a member or a former member did, and the stories must have originated in reports of former prisoners. In discussions of this event old prisoners would insist that it is not the business of foreign correspondents or newspapers to bother with German institutions and expressed their hatred of the journalists who tried to help them. The writer asked more than one hundred old political prisoners the following question: "If I am lucky and reach foreign soil, should I tell the story of the camp and arouse the interest of the cultured world?" He found only two who made the unqualified statement that everyone escaping Germany ought to fight the Nazis to the best of his abilities. All others were hoping for a German revolution, but did not like the idea of interference on the part of a foreign power.

When old prisoners accepted Nazi values as their own they usually did not admit it, but explained their behavior by means of rationalizations. For instance, prisoners collected scrap in the camp because Germany was



low on raw materials. When it was pointed out that they were thus helping the Nazis, they rationalized that through the saving of scrap Germany's working classes, too, became richer. When erecting buildings for the Gestapo, controversies started whether one should build well. New prisoners were for sabotaging, a majority of the old prisoners for building well. They rationalized that the new Germany will have use for these buildings. When it was pointed out that a revolution will have to destroy the fortresses of the Gestapo, they retired to the general statement that one ought to do well any job one has to do. It seems that the majority of the old prisoners had realized that they could not continue to work for the Gestapo unless they could convince themselves that their work made some sense, so they had to convince themselves of this sense.

The satisfaction with which some old prisoners enjoyed the fact that, during the twice daily counting of the prisoners, they really had stood well at attention can be explained only by the fact that they had entirely accepted the values of the Gestapo as their own. Prisoners prided themselves of being as tough as the Gestapo members. This identification with their torturers went so far as copying their leisure-time activities. One of the games played by the guards was to find out who could stand to be hit longest without uttering a complaint. This game was copied by the old prisoners, as though they had not been hit often and long enough without needing to repeat this experience as a game.

Often the Gestapo would enforce nonsensical rules, originating in the whims of one of the guards. They were usually forgotten as soon as formulated, but there were always some old prisoners who would continue to follow these rules and try to enforce them on others long after the Gestapo had forgotten about them. Once, for instance, a guard on inspecting the prisoners' apparel found that the shoes of some of them were dirty on the inside. He ordered all prisoners to wash their shoes inside and out with water and soap. The heavy shoes treated this way became hard as stone. The order was never repeated, and many prisoners did not even execute it when given. Nevertheless there were some old prisoners

who not only continued to wash the inside of their shoes every day but cursed all others who did not do so as negligent and dirty. These prisoners firmly believed that the rules set down by the Gestapo were desirable standards of human behavior, at least in the camp situation.

Other problems in which most old prisoners made their peace with values of the Gestapo included the race problem, although race discrimination had been alien to their scheme of values before they were brought into the camp. They accepted as true the claim that Germany needed more space ("Lebensraum"), but added "as long as there does not exist a world federation," they believed in the superiority of the German race. It should be emphasized that this was not the result of propaganda on the side of the Gestapo. The Gestapo made no such efforts and insisted in its statements that it was not interested in how the prisoners felt as long as they were full of fear of the Gestapo. Moreover, the Gestapo insisted that it would prevent them from expressing their feelings anyway. The Gestapo seemed to think it impossible to win the prisoners for its values, after having made them subject to their tortures.

Among the old prisoners one could observe other developments which indicated their desire to accept the Gestapo along lines which definitely could not originate in propaganda. It seems that, since they returned to a child-like attitude toward the Gestapo, they had a desire that at least some of those whom they accepted as all-powerful father-images should be just and kind. They divided their positive and negative feelings—strange as it may be that they should have positive feelings, they had them—toward the Gestapo in such a way that all positive emotions were concentrated on a few officers who were rather high up in the hierarchy of camp administrators, but hardly ever on the governor of the camp. They insisted that these officers hid behind their rough surfaces a feeling of justice and propriety; he, or they, were supposed to be genuinely interested in the prisoners and even trying, in a small way, to help them. Since nothing of these supposed feelings and efforts ever became apparent, it was explained that he hid them so effectively because otherwise

he would not be able to help the prisoners. The eagerness of these prisoners to find reasons for their claims was pitiful. A whole legend was woven around the fact that of two officers inspecting a barrack one had cleaned his shoes from mud before entering. He probably did it automatically, but it was interpreted as a rebuff to the other officer and a clear demonstration of how he felt about the concentration camp.

After so much has been said about the old prisoners' tendency to conform and to identify with the Gestapo, it ought to be stressed that this was only part of the picture, because the author tried to concentrate on interesting psychological mechanisms in group behavior rather than on reporting types of behavior which are either well known or could reasonably be expected. These same old prisoners who identified with the Gestapo at other moments defied it, demonstrating extraordinary courage in doing so.

**SUMMARY.** In conclusion it should be emphasized again that this essay is a preliminary report and does not pretend to be exhaustive. The author feels that the concentration camp has an importance reaching far beyond its being a place where the Gestapo takes revenge on its enemies. It is the main training ground for young Gestapo soldiers who are planning to rule and police Germany and all conquered nations; it is the Gestapo's laboratory where it develops methods for changing free and up-right citizens not only into grumbling slaves, but into serfs who in many respects accept their masters' values. They still think that they are following their own life goals and values, whereas in reality they have accepted the Nazis' values as their own.

*It seems that what happens in an extreme fashion to the prisoners who spend several years in the concentration camp happens in less exaggerated form to the inhabitants of the big concentration camp called greater Germany. It might happen to the inhabitants of*

occupied countries if they are not able to form organized groups of resistance. The system seems too strong for an individual to break its hold over his emotional life, particularly if he finds himself within a group which has more or less accepted the Nazi system. It seems easier to resist the pressure of the Gestapo and the Nazis if one functions as an individual; the Gestapo seems to know that and therefore insists on forcing all individuals into groups which they supervise. Some of the methods used for this purpose are the hostage system and the punishment of the whole group for whatever a member of it does; not permitting anybody to deviate in his behavior from the group norm, whatever this norm may be; discouraging solitary activities of any kind, etc. The main goal of the efforts seems to be to produce in the subjects childlike attitudes and childlike dependency on the will of the leaders. The most effective way to break this influence seems to be the formation of democratic groups of resistance of independent, mature, and self-reliant persons, in which every member backs up, in all other members, the ability to resist. If such groups are not formed it seems very difficult not to become subject to the slow process of personality disintegration produced by the unrelenting pressure of the Gestapo and the Nazi system.

Inasmuch as the concentration camp is the laboratory of the Gestapo for subjecting not only free men, but even the most ardent foes of the Nazi system, to the process of disintegration from their position as autonomous individuals, it ought to be studied by all persons interested in understanding what happens to a population subject to the methods of the Nazi system. It is hoped that by understanding what happens to the unhappy persons under Nazi domination it will be possible to devise methods by means of which they will be helped to resurrect within a short time as autonomous and self-reliant persons.

## *Hatred at Home*

### *The Custom of Hate*

#### PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS

Ethnocentrism may persuade us that we couldn't become as viciously inhuman as the Nazis. Our study of the evacuation of the Japanese should remind us that it not only *can* happen, but to some extent it *has*. Nor can we claim that it was a single "slip." This extract from the report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, *To Secure These Rights* (October, 1947), is concerned with experiences of the American Negro. Can you list some of the "customs" of hate that are found in our own society? How do you account for them? How are feelings and emotions related to customs? Can such customs be altered? Are laws ineffective when opposed to powerful traditions?

Vital to the integrity of the individual and to the stability of a democratic society is the right of each individual to physical freedom, to security against illegal violence, and to fair, orderly legal process. Most Americans enjoy this right, but it is not yet secure for all. Too many of our people still live under the harrowing fear of violence or death at the hands of a mob or brutal treatment by police officers. Many fear entanglement with the law because of the knowledge that the justice rendered in some courts is not equal for all persons. In a few areas the freedom to move about and choose one's job is endangered by attempts to hold workers in peonage or other forms of involuntary servitude.

#### THE CRIME OF LYNCHING

In 1946 at least six persons in the United States were lynched by mobs. Three of them had not been charged, either by the police or anyone else, with an offense. Of the three that had been charged, one had been accused of stealing a saddle. (The real thieves were discovered after the lynching.) Another was said to have broken into a house. A third was charged with stabbing a man. All were Negroes. During the same year, mobs were prevented from lynching 22 persons, of whom 21 were Negroes, 1 white.

On July 20, 1946, a white farmer, Loy Harrison, posted bond for the release of Roger

Malcolm from the jail at Monroe, Georgia. Malcolm, a young Negro, had been involved in a fight with his white employer during the course of which the latter had been stabbed. It is reported that there was talk of lynching Malcolm at the time of the incident and while he was in jail. Upon Malcolm's release, Harrison started to drive Malcolm, Malcolm's wife, and a Negro overseas veteran, George Dorsey, and his wife, out of Monroe. At a bridge along the way a large group of unmasked white men, armed with pistols and shotguns, was waiting. They stopped Harrison's car and removed Malcolm and Dorsey. As they were leading the two men away, Harrison later stated, one of the women called out the name of a member of the mob. Thereupon the lynchers returned and removed the two women from the car. Three volleys of shots were fired as if by a squad of professional executioners. The coroner's report said that at least 60 bullets were found in the scarcely recognizable bodies. Harrison consistently denied that he could identify any of the unmasked murderers. State and federal grand juries reviewed the evidence in the case, but no person has yet been indicted for the crime.

Later that summer, in Minden, Louisiana, a young Negro named John Jones was arrested on suspicion of housebreaking. Another Negro youth, Albert Harris, was arrested at about the same time, and beaten in an effort to implicate Jones. He was then released, only to be rearrested after a few days. On August 6th, early in the evening, and before there had been any trial of the charges against them, Jones and Harris were released by a deputy sheriff. Waiting in the jail yard was a group of white men. There was evidence that, with the aid of the deputy sheriff, the young men were put into a car. They were then driven into the country. Jones was beaten to death. Harris, left for dead, revived and escaped. Five persons, including two deputy sheriffs, were indicted and brought to trial in a federal court for this crime. All were acquitted.

These are two of the less brutal lynchings of the past years. The victims in these cases were not mutilated or burned.

The record for 1947 is incomplete. There has been one lynching, one case in which the victim escaped, and other instances where

mobs have been unable to accomplish their purpose. On February 17, 1947, a Negro youth named Willie Earle, accused of fatally stabbing a taxi driver in the small city of Greenville, South Carolina, was removed from jail by a mob, viciously beaten and finally shot to death. In an unusual and impressive instance of state prosecution, 31 men were tried for this crime. All were acquitted on the evening of May 21, 1947. Early the next morning, in Jackson, North Carolina, another Negro youth, Godwin Bush, arrested on a charge of approaching a white woman, was removed from a local jail by a mob, after having been exhibited through the town by the sheriff. Bush succeeded in escaping from his abductors, and, after hiding for two days in nearby woods, was able to surrender himself safely into the custody of FBI agents and officers of the state. The Committee finds it encouraging to note that the Governor of North Carolina has made vigorous efforts to bring to justice those responsible for this attempted lynching.

While available statistics show that, decade by decade, lynchings have decreased, this Committee has found that in the year 1947 lynching remains one of the most serious threats to the civil rights of Americans. It is still possible for a mob to abduct and murder a person in some sections of the country with almost certain assurance of escaping punishment for the crime. The decade from 1936 through 1946 saw at least 43 lynchings. No person received the death penalty, and the majority of the guilty persons was not even prosecuted.

The communities in which lynchings occur tend to condone the crime. Punishment of lynchers is not accepted as the responsibility of state or local governments in these communities. Frequently, state officials participate in the crime, actively or passively. Federal efforts to punish the crime are resisted. Condonation of lynching is indicated by the failure of some local law enforcement officials to make adequate efforts to break up a mob. It is further shown by failure in most cases to make any real effort to apprehend or try those guilty. If the federal government enters a case, local officials sometimes actively resist the federal investigation. Local citizens often combine to impede the effort to apprehend the

criminals by convenient "loss of memory"; grand juries refuse to indict; trial juries acquit in the face of overwhelming proof of guilt.

The large number of attempted lynchings highlights, even more than those which have succeeded, the widespread readiness of many communities to resort to mob violence. Thus, for seven of the years from 1937 to 1946 for which statistics are reported, the conservative estimates of the Tuskegee Institute show that 226 persons were rescued from threatened lynching. Over 200 of these were Negroes.

Most rescues from lynchings are made by local officials. There is heartening evidence that an ever-increasing number of these officers have the will and the courage to defend their prisoners against mob action. But this reflects only partial progress toward adequate law enforcement. In some instances lynchers are dissuaded by promises that the desired result will be accomplished "legally" and the machinery of justice is sometimes sensitive to the demands of such implied bargains. In some communities there is more official zeal to avoid mob violence which will injure the reputation of the community than there is to protect innocent persons.

The devastating consequences of lynchings go far beyond what is shown by counting the victims. When a person is lynched and the lynchers go unpunished, thousands wonder where the evil will appear again and what mischance may produce another victim. And every time lynchers go unpunished, Negroes have learned to expect other forms of violence at the hands of private citizens or public officials. In describing the thwarted efforts of the Department of Justice to identify those responsible for one lynching, J. Edgar Hoover stated to the Committee: "The arrogance of most of the white population of that county was unbelievable, and the fear of the Negroes was almost unbelievable."

The almost complete immunity from punishment enjoyed by lynchers is merely a striking form of the broad and general immunity from punishment enjoyed by whites in many communities for less extreme offenses against Negroes. Moreover, lynching is the ultimate threat by which his inferior status is driven home to the Negro. As a terrorist device, it reinforces all the other disabilities placed upon

him. The threat of lynching always hangs over the head of the southern Negro; the knowledge that a misinterpreted word or action can lead to his death is a dreadful burden.

## POLICE BRUTALITY

We have reported the failure of some public officials to fulfill their most elementary duty—the protection of persons against mob violence. We must also report more widespread and varied forms of official misconduct. These include violent physical attacks by police officers on members of minority groups, the use of third degree methods to extort confessions, and brutality against prisoners. Civil rights violations of this kind are by no means universal and many law enforcement agencies have gone far in recent years toward stamping out these evils.

In various localities, scattered throughout the country, unprofessional or undisciplined police, while avoiding brutality, fail to recognize and to safeguard the civil rights of the citizenry. Insensitive to the necessary limits of police authority, untrained officers frequently overstep the bounds of their proper duties. At times this appears in unwarranted arrests, unduly prolonged detention before arraignment, and abuse of the search and seizure power. Cases involving these breaches of civil rights constantly come before the courts. The frequency with which such cases arise is proof that improper police conduct is still widespread, for it must be assumed that there are many instances of the abuse of police power which do not reach the courts. Most of the victims of such abuses are ignorant, friendless persons, unaware of their rights, and without the means of challenging those who have violated those rights.

Where lawless police forces exist, their activities may impair the civil rights of any citizen. In one place the brunt of illegal police activity may fall on suspected vagrants, in another on union organizers, and in another on unpopular racial or religious minorities, such as Negroes, Mexicans, or Jehovah's Witnesses. But wherever unfettered police lawlessness exists, civil rights may be vulnerable to the prejudices of the region or of dominant local groups, and to the caprice of individual

policemen. Unpopular, weak, or defenseless groups are most apt to suffer.

Considerable evidence in the files of the Department of Justice supports this assertion. For example, in one case in 1945 a group of white juvenile offenders made an abortive effort to escape from a midwestern prison. The attempt was quickly and fairly easily subdued. In the course of the attempt a trusty was injured. The prison officials, after rounding up the boys, allowed other trusties to vent their anger at the injury to their comrade by physically attacking the defenseless prisoners. After this had occurred the boys were then severely beaten, one by one, by the prison officials.

Much of the illegal official action which has been brought to the attention of the Committee is centered in the South. There is evidence of lawless police action against whites and Negroes alike, but the dominant pattern is that of race prejudice. J. Edgar Hoover referred, in his testimony before the Committee, to a particular jail where "it was seldom that a Negro man or woman was incarcerated who was not given a severe beating, which started off with a pistol whipping and ended with a rubber hose."

The files of the Department abound with evidence of illegal official action in southern states. In one case, the victim was arrested on a charge of stealing a tire, taken to the courthouse, beaten by three officers with a black-jack until his head was a bloody pulp, and then dragged unconscious through the streets to the jail where he was thrown, dying, onto the floor. In another case, a constable arrested a Negro, against whom he bore a personal grudge, beat him brutally with a bullwhip and then forced his victim, in spite of his protestations of being unable to swim, to jump into a river where he drowned. In a third case, there was evidence that officers arrested a Negro maid on a charge of stealing jewelry from her employer, took her to jail and severely beat and whipped her in an unsuccessful effort to extort a confession. All of these cases occurred within the last five years.

There are other cases in the files of the Department of Justice of officers who seem to be "trigger-happy" where weak or poor persons are concerned. In a number of instances, Negroes have been shot, supposedly

in self-defense, under circumstances indicating, at best, unsatisfactory police work in the handling of criminals, and, at worst, a callous willingness to kill.

Toward the end of the work of this Committee a particularly shocking instance of this occurred. On July 11, 1947, eight Negro prisoners in the State highway prison camp in Glynn County, Georgia, were killed by their white guards as they allegedly attempted to escape. The Glynn County grand jury exonerated the warden of the camp and four guards of all charges. At later hearings on the highway prison camp system held by the State Board of Corrections, conflicting evidence was presented. But one witness testified that there was no evidence that the prisoners were trying to escape. In any case, he said it was not necessary to use guns on them in the circumstances. "There was no justification for the killing. I saw the Negroes where they fell. Two were killed where they crawled under the bunkhouse and two others as they ran under their cells. The only thing they were trying to escape was death. Only one tried to get over the fence." The warden and four guards were indicted by a federal grand jury on October 1, 1947.

It is difficult to accept at face value police claims in cases of this type that action has been taken against prisoners in "self-defense" or to "prevent escape." Even if these protestations are accepted, the incidence of shooting in the ordinary course of law enforcement in some sections of the country is a serious reflection on these police forces. Other officers in other places seem able to enforce the law and to guard prisoners without resort to violent means.

The total picture—adding the connivance of some police officials in lynchings to their record of brutality against Negroes in other situations—is, in the opinion of this Committee, a serious reflection on American justice. We know that Americans everywhere deplore *this violence*. We recognize further that there are many law enforcement officers in the South and the North who do not commit violent acts against Negroes or other friendless culprits. We are convinced, however, that the incidence of police brutality against Negroes is disturbingly high.

## ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

In addition to the treatment experienced by the weak and friendless person at the hands of police officers, he sometimes finds that the judicial process itself does not give him full and equal justice. This may appear in unfair and perfunctory trials, or in fines and prison sentences that are heavier than those imposed on other members of the community guilty of the same offense.

In part, the inability of the Negro, Mexican, or Indian to obtain equal justice may be attrib-

uted to extrajudicial factors. The low income of a member of any of these minorities may prevent him from securing competent counsel to defend his rights. It may prevent him from posting bail or bond to secure his release from jail during trial. It may predetermine his choice, upon conviction, of paying a fine or going to jail. But these facts should not obscure or condone the extent to which the judicial system itself is responsible for the less-than-equal justice meted out to members of certain minority groups.

## *Organized Hate*

### AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

What men do by custom differs from what men do by intent. Of course, custom may be the source of intentions. But social practices are always the result of individual wills, strivings, and cooperation. Some men seem disposed to take a more active part in hate, not only Hitler but also the Americans described below. And these men, leaders if you will, are the nucleus of organizations created to arouse hostility. Here is a curious contradiction: men brought together, united and cooperative toward a common goal—hated of others. Does this sound familiar?

This selection \* analyzes the current forms of bigotry in the United States. Can this report be unbiased? What does it tell us of the members, methods, and purposes of the organized hate-mongers? What pictures must be in their minds? Why?

Bigotry has flared from time to time ever since colonial days. The Salem witch hunt of the seventeenth century and the "Know-Nothings" of the nineteenth are examples. With the exception of the Ku Klux Klan, virtually none of the early bigots groups included Jews among their targets; their fire was mainly turned on Negroes, Catholics, the foreign-born, and others. The deliberate provocation of anti-Semitism by an aggregation of groups and publications is a phenomenon that dates back only 25 years.

Suspect from the start for their flagrant disregard of American decency and fair play, the anti-Semitic agitators and their followers often were popularly characterized as "the lunatic fringe." In the years before Pearl Harbor, this

movement reached new dimensions as several hundred groups, many activated with Nazi money, conducted frenzied meetings and street demonstrations, and circulated reams of scurrilous literature.

With America's entry into the war, most rabble-rousers took cover and remained quiescent for the duration.

The advent of the cold war brought many back into the open. Quick to leap on the bandwagon of anti-communism, some resumed their rabid fulminations against the Jews, defaming them as Reds. The more skillful developed a greater sense of public relations. Instead of running numerous meetings, they produced pamphlets, periodicals and flyers ostensibly devoted to legitimate controversial issues of the day. Thus, the streamlined anti-Semite sets his sights for the general public, rather than the lunatic-fringe following of pre-Pearl Harbor days.

\* From *Bigotry in Action: Anti-Semitic Activity in the United States Today*, a Report of the American Jewish Committee, 1958, pp. 2-12, 14-16, and 19. Reprinted by permission.





*Frank L. Britten's anti-Semitic news-  
paper exploits Southern tensions.*

Since 1950, the level of bigot activity has remained fairly constant—well below that of 1940, its peak year, but considerably higher than the low point of 1947. At present, fewer than one hundred groups devote themselves primarily to fomenting anti-Jewish prejudice. Their strength, however, is considerably augmented by cooperation from other organizations whose first interests lie elsewhere. For example, the newly revived Ku Klux Klan, although primarily anti-Negro, is also anti-Jewish or anti-Catholic in some localities.

Since 1954, when the Supreme Court outlawed public school segregation, bigots have been enjoying their greatest successes in the South, where the deepest social changes are taking place.

### WHO ARE TODAY'S BIGOTS?

The promoters of anti-Semitism are a variegated company. Still active today are such old-timers as Elizabeth Dilling and Lyl Van Hyning, who have continued to push their Nazi-style lines with hardly a deviation since the days before Pearl Harbor. Others, like Robert H. Williams, joined the movement after World War II and have plugged tirelessly at new ways of selling old canards. Newcomers in the movement spring principally from the Klan, certain White Citizens Councils, and similar groups.

Some bigot leaders, like Frederick John Kasper, are frustrated individuals who achieve, through rabble-rousing, a measure of the "recognition" they crave. Others have more material aims: Gerald L. K. Smith reported to the

Clerk of the House of Representatives that his Christian Nationalist Crusade had grossed almost \$174,000 in 1956. Men like James Madole are moved by the excitement which their unabashed adoration of Hitler still engenders.

While a large proportion of today's bigots are properly classified as "crackpot," it would be a mistake to thus characterize all. For some are persons of once outstanding attainment—college professors, retired military officers, bankers, industrialists. Indeed, the acknowledged "dean" of bigoted leaders and organizations is a retired Army general, George Van Horn Moseley, who attempts to counsel them on their activities from his home in Atlanta, Georgia. Other bigots of similar stature are John O. Beaty, a retired Southern university professor; John G. Crommelin, a retired admiral; Pedro del Valle, a retired Marine Corps general.

This curious assortment, loosely gathered in the anti-Semitic "movement," has been making headway among clearly definable circles. The most disturbing advances in recent years have been among three groups: (1) pro-segregationists in the South; (2) political extremists; and (3) pro-Arab apologists. The clearest view of anti-Semitic activity in the United States today may be secured within these three settings.

### THE SOUTH: A FERTILE FIELD

Religious bigotry feeds and grows on community tensions. None exploit this phenomenon more vigorously than the professional

bigots. They have been quick to capitalize on desegregation tensions in the South, charging that "Jews and Communists" are responsible for the region's present plight. Most of these propagandists are non-Southern opportunists—virtually "carpetbaggers in reverse"—pandering to extremist sentiment in the South. This infection of anti-Semitism, generated out of a local or regional situation, has the grave potentiality of spreading throughout the nation.

Who are the principals in this divisive work? How do they operate? What has been the extent of their success so far?


### FREDERICK JOHN KASPER: A CASE STUDY IN BIGOTRY

Perhaps the most notorious agitator on the Southern scene is youthful Frederick John

Kasper of Camden, New Jersey. His incitements in the South finally brought a one-year Federal prison term which began in October, 1957. He was released August 1, 1958.

Kasper began his career with a bookshop in New York's Greenwich Village, where he stocked anti-Semitic propaganda, together with more reputable literature. From 1953 to 1955, this shop served as a social center for Kasper's friends—among them many Negroes, including his sweetheart who helped run the store. The young firebrand was also hobnobbing with anti-Semitic pamphleteers and traveling periodically to Washington to visit his Fascist idol, poet Ezra Pound, an inmate of St. Elizabeth's Hospital there.<sup>1</sup>

In 1956, Kasper left Greenwich Village and moved to Washington, D.C., where he opened another bookshop. But no Negro



Cartoon from *Segregation or Death*, pamphlet issued by Seaboard White Citizens Council while leader Frederick John Kasper was in jail.

friends were connected with this endeavor. In Washington, Kasper launched his Eastern Seaboard White Citizens Councils and turned his talents to writing and circulating inflammatory literature. During this period he wrote

*The Ballad of John Kasper*: "No Jew Supreme Court justice gonna make my laws for me . . ."

In the same year, Kasper began his trouble-making forays into the South. In August, he figured prominently in the disorders that blocked the hitherto peaceful integration of the Clinton, Tennessee, public high school.

In connection with these tensions, Kasper was convicted of civil and criminal contempt of court. In October, 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected his appeal and he went to jail.

<sup>1</sup> Pound was released, after 12 years of confinement, in April, 1958. An indictment for treason against him was dismissed that month to clear the way for his release on a finding that he was hopelessly insane and could never stand trial. During World War II, Pound delivered anti-American broadcasts from Italy. On July 9, 1958, in a press interview in Naples, he told reporters that "all America is an insane asylum."

## AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

While at large on bond, awaiting determination of the Clinton proceedings, Kasper visited other trouble spots. When the schools reopened in September, 1957, he concentrated his efforts on Nashville, Tennessee, where an elementary school which had enrolled one Negro child in the first grade was bombed. In connection with disturbances there, Kasper was arrested for inciting to riot.

## OTHER NORTHERN RACISTS

Most of the anti-Semitic literature flooding the South today is published in such non-Southern cities as Los Angeles, Denver, St. Louis, New York, and Union, New Jersey. At least one "wholesaler" is making an excellent living traveling about that region, delivering merchandise and taking orders for more.

The chief single source of this inflammatory prose is Conde McGinley's Christian Educational Association, located in Union, New Jersey. Main item of export is *Common Sense*, McGinley's vitriolic semi-monthly newspaper, which hammers repeatedly at the charge that Communists and Jews were behind the Supreme Court desegregation decision. A typical issue (August 1, 1957) features photos of Justice Felix Frankfurter and former Senator Herbert H. Lehman under the caption, "NAACP Leaders and Their Communist Front Citations." The bigot line is further spelled out in a second heading: "The NAACP, Supposedly Negro, Controlled by Zionists."

Frank L. Britton of Inglewood, California, is another successful publicist. His specialty is a crude, one-page leaflet designed for shock effect, with lurid photographs of Negroes and whites in intimate poses.

Gerald L.K. Smith's periodical, *The Cross and the Flag*, devotes considerable space to the segregationist cause. Smith has been for more than fifteen years one of America's most notorious anti-Semites. His many racist materials, including his booklet, *White Man Awaken*, turn up frequently in Southern troublespots.

John W. Hamilton, a former Smith cohort who works out of St. Louis, adds still another periodical, *The White Sentinel*, to the bigot reading list.

Additional non-Southerners exploiting Southern tensions include Kenneth Goff at Denver, Colorado, one-time Smith disciple; and Merwin K. Hart of New York, head of the ultra-conservative National Economic Council.

These outside efforts to stir hatred have been welcomed, in varying degrees, by substantial elements within two Southern movements—the White Citizens Councils and the Klan.

## WHITE CITIZENS COUNCILS

With some noteworthy exceptions, White Citizens Councils, representing a membership sometimes estimated as high as 500,000, claim they are not anti-Semitic. Yet some elements within this movement have proved receptive to anti-Semitic literature. Robert B. Patterson, for example, executive secretary of the Mississippi unit which now seeks to serve as national clearing center for the Council movement, states that he is not anti-Semitic; nevertheless, he recommended the literature of Conde McGinley and Gerald L.K. Smith to White Citizens Council members.

The White Citizens Councils headed by Asa "Ace" Carter, former Birmingham radio commentator, are most vitriolic. In 1956, members of his chapter leaped on the stage of a Birmingham theatre to assault Negro singer Nat "King" Cole. "Ace" Carter is a Klansman and collaborates with Kasper. His Council broke with the statewide group largely over the anti-Semitic bias of the Carter faction. Other patently anti-Semitic groups are the Tennessee White Councils and the Eastern Seaboard White Citizens Councils, both headed by Kasper.

## KU KLUX KLAN

The White Citizens Councils are, on the record, pledged to oppose integration "by all legal means." The Ku Klux Klan is traditionally terrorist. Though lacking the organization and cohesion of its earlier counterpart, the newly revived hooded fraternity, with a membership estimated as high as 100,000, has shown considerable growth, particularly in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas.

Within the Klan movement, the specific targets of religious bigotry vary from one community to another. In southern Alabama, for instance, the Klan has proved predominantly anti-Catholic; in Florida, the emphasis is on anti-Semitism.

The aim of the resurrected Klan, unequivocally expressed by Imperial Wizard Eldon L. Edwards, is to attack "Catholics, Jews, Communists, Negroes, and Northern agitators" for menacing "the white heritage."

In keeping with this goal, numerous Klan cross-burnings have occurred during the past several years, not only at churches and schools, but also at homes of prominent Americans—Supreme Court Justices Warren and Frankfurter, Speaker Sam Rayburn, and Archbishop Rummel of New Orleans, among others.

In 1956 and 1957, an interracial farm colony at Americus, Georgia, was subjected to a series of Klan bombings, shootings, and cross-burnings. In the Carolinas, Klan violence was highlighted in December, 1956, by the flogging of a Camden, South Carolina, high school instructor for "teaching integration."

Klansmen have also perpetrated such heinous crimes as the castration of a Negro victim chosen at random by five Birmingham Klansmen. The atrocity was committed to prove one of the group worthy of the high Klan office of Cyclops, and to serve as a warning to those favoring school integration. During 1957 and 1958, four of the Klansmen were sentenced to 20-year terms for their part in the crime.

At Maxton, North Carolina, in January, 1958, an outdoor Klan rally aimed at Indians of the Lumbee tribe, native to the area, was ignominiously routed by the Indians. Klan leader James W. Cole received an 18-to-24-month sentence for inciting the Indians to riot. Also in 1958, a State Legislative Investigating Committee in Florida heard testimony that Klansmen had been storing ammunition in several cities.

Between November, 1957, and May, 1958, there were six bombings or attempted bombings of synagogues and Jewish centers in the South. In Charlotte, North Carolina, on November 11, 1957, a dynamite bomb placed outside the synagogue where a meeting was

in progress, failed to go off. On February 9, 1958, another unexploded dynamite bomb was found in a valise outside the temple in Gastonia, North Carolina. On March 16, the religious school of a Miami synagogue was bombed in the early morning hours, while on the evening of the same day, in Nashville, Tennessee, the Jewish Community Center was bombed. Fortunately, no loss of life or limb resulted. Again, on April 28, two terroristic acts were aimed at Jewish houses of worship. Early in the morning, a synagogue at Jacksonville, Florida, was bombed, followed within an hour by the blasting of a Negro school. Later that day, in Birmingham, Alabama, a dynamite and nitroglycerin bomb was discovered in a rain-soaked valise in the window well of Temple Beth-El. Had it gone off, the entire structure would have been demolished.

Accompanying several of the incidents were anonymous phone calls. In Nashville, the caller informed a rabbi: "This is the Confederate Union. We have just bombed the Jewish Community Center. Next will be the temple and next will be any other nigger-loving person or place in Nashville. . . ."

In Jacksonville, the caller told a reporter of a newspaper: "I am a member of the Confederate Underground, and have just blasted the Jewish Center and a Negro school, and another school will be bombed during the night. . . . The bombings will continue until segregation is restored everywhere in the South. . . ."

These messages epitomize the result of bigotry—spilling over, in its attack on one group and then another, until it attacks the community as a whole. . . .

## HATEMONGERS ON THE POLITICAL SCENE

Anti-Semites have entered into politics, particularly during Presidential and major Congressional campaigns. Their appeals are mainly directed to elements of the population who feel that both major parties "have moved to the far left," and who seek some kind of coalition, perhaps even a third party, that would give numerous splinter groups a sizable influence in crucial political races.

## AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

## TARGET: THE EXTREME RIGHT

One of the major organizations dedicated to a political amalgam of extremist groups is the Congress of Freedom. Its annual conventions bring together a number of honest advocates of rightist economic and political views, plus some outright batemongers. Officially, the Congress' April, 1957, convention frowned at bigotry; nevertheless, according to the anti-Semitic publication, *Don Bell Reports*:

In unscheduled talks in unannounced spots, truth-seekers listened to such "marked" men as *Admiral Crommelin*, *Conde McGinley*, *Elizabeth Dilling* . . . and others who dared to speak the whole truth as they saw the truth. (Emphasis added.)

What ideological platforms are used by bigots to inject themselves into respectable political circles? One is the position taken by many honest critics of national policy that whatever policies they oppose are "Communist" or "Socialistic." Another is the blanket advocacy of "states' rights." In the South, the U.S. Supreme Court's desegregation decisions—even the Justices themselves—are attacked both as "Communist" and as violating Southern "states' rights."

Isolationism offers another propaganda springboard for bigot appeals to critics of U.S. policy. The UN is attacked as the creation and instrument of the Communists, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is termed a subversion of American sovereignty.

Often these attacks come from citizens who are simply expressing their political views and who may never have given the slightest aid or comfort to anti-Semitism—a circumstance which does not deter the bigot from attempting to woo them.

During the 1952 Presidential campaign, the bigots made a concerted effort to organize a potent political force. Gerald L.K. Smith's Christian Nationalist Party ran State Senator Jack B. Tenney as its Vice Presidential nominee and reported an all-time high of more than \$200,000 in contributions. Other agitators held pre-convention warm-up and briefing sessions in Chicago which drew more than one hundred participants from every part of

the country. Eisenhower, Dewey, and other candidates of both major parties were denounced as "Jew dominated" and "Communist-controlled." President Eisenhower and Chief Justice Warren have remained the primary targets of the hatemongers.

Merwin K. Hart, head of the National Economic Council, gains an attentive hearing with his assaults on "the Socialistic income tax" and the Eisenhower Administration, while exposing readers to the patent anti-Semitism of his *Economic Council Letter*. The March 15, 1958, issue is headed "The Jews in Our Midst" and charges, among other things, that "Jews are taking a leading part in the making of several policies which threaten our involvement in foreign war. . . ."

The National Economic Council, an ultra-conservative group containing many reputable individuals, has been dominated by Hart since 1931. It was investigated by the House Committee on Lobbying Activities in 1950. The Committee's interim report read, in part:

One of the National Economic Council's techniques for example, is to disparage those who oppose its objectives by appeals to religious prejudice, often an ill-concealed anti-Semitism. While it might be argued that NEC's contributors share some responsibility for its activities, it is more likely that many of the corporate officials—and particularly the directors and stockholders of the corporate contributors—would be opposed to NEC's appeals to unreason if they were fully apprised of them.

Pamphleteer Joseph P. Kamp, head of the Constitutional Educational League, who went to jail in 1950 for contempt of Congress rather than reveal the names of his contributors, has been widely acclaimed by anti-Semites for almost a generation. Ever alert to a timely theme, Kamp has lately revamped his line to exploit Southern tensions.

In a tract entitled *The Lowdown on Little Rock and the Plot to Sovietize the South*, Kamp takes mocking issue with "some intemperate Southern leaders" who "have compared Dwight Eisenhower to Adolf Hitler because the President ordered Federal troops to invade and occupy a part of the Sovereign State of Arkansas." According to Kamp, "they are wrong. Hitler had the constitutional right

to use Nazi storm troopers in any way he pleased. Mr. Eisenhower has no such right."

In his literary assaults, Kamp frequently conjures a "Communist conspiracy" embracing prominent Americans of Jewish faith and reputable Jewish organizations, along with other pro-democratic spokesmen and groups.

The intrusion of Kamp's anti-labor literature into the 1958 California gubernatorial campaign was rejected and repudiated by the national chairmen of both major parties.

New Yorker Russell Maguire, an industrialist with well-known anti-Semitic leanings, emerged from the 1957 convention of the Congress of Freedom as the new national chairman<sup>2</sup> of the revived Constitution Party. In 1952, he put up money to distribute Professor John O. Beaty's textbook of anti-Semitism, *Iron Curtain Over America*. In the same year, he purchased the national magazine, *American Mercury*; several members of its editorial staff departed when Maguire insisted on injecting his bias into the magazine. By July, 1957, the *Mercury*, boasting more than 100,000 circulation, said:

Privately, the international Zionists claim they

<sup>2</sup> Maguire relinquished this post after a short time.

have the power and the concentrated wealth to do as they please throughout the world. Then why haven't they destroyed international communism instead of financing it?

At the San Francisco convention of the newly revived Constitution Party in May, 1957, Maguire denounced "the international conspiracy" and the "international bankers" plotting "to destroy the United States and Christianity." General Del Valle was another speaker emphasizing the same theme. *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a proven anti-Semitic forgery, and other materials of the same nature were widely distributed through the courtesy of Conde McGinley an "unofficial" visitor.

In spite of these frantic endeavors, the bigots have not succeeded in welding extremist groups into a significant political force. However, unwary citizens who are honestly dissatisfied with aspects of our political and economic climate may be exploited unless the tactic is thoroughly exposed.

In 1952, two chairmen of the Constitution Party resigned because of the group's bias. Others have become similarly disenchanted. Public awareness is the hate-monger's Achilles heel.

## Competition for Status

W. LLOYD WARNER AND PAUL S. LUNT

The seriousness of lynchings, concentration camps, and war should not divert us from the recognition of less important forms of hostility. Indeed, more common than hate are envy, resentment, and rivalry. These are distinctively human feelings. But they may be accentuated by our manner of living.

To illustrate some milder forms of hate, we have picked a description of a hypothetical, and composite, social gathering. The selection \* is taken from the first volume in a series that reports an anthropological study of a modern American community. The authors claim to have found six distinct social classes there: upper upper (UU), lower upper (LU), upper middle (UM), lower middle (LM), upper lower (UL), and lower lower (LL). Does this pattern fit your community? Do you know any people like them? Why do people resent and exclude others, those "above" or "below" them on the social ladder?

The present chapter introduces some of the human types who are members of the six classes. The several sketches which follow are intended to do no more than illustrate how the several social levels appear to the observer and how it feels to live in the class system of Yankee City. The people described, as well as their families, cliques, associations, political and economic institutions, are presented as examples of what the researcher observes while doing his field work.

Each person, each institution, and each incident in each essay is a composite drawing. No

one actual individual or family in Yankee City is depicted, rather the lives of several individuals are compressed into that of one fictive person. The personnel of all families has been changed. In the "New Family" story (Section 4), for example, the Phillip Stars are an amalgam of many individuals who are socially like them. The Patriotic Order of United States Veterans of All Wars is not one but a number of organizations and the events assigned to it are a composite of happenings from many associations. The justification for these changes lies in our attempt to protect our subjects and to tell our story economically. We have not hesitated to exclude all material which might identify specific persons in the community; and we have included generalized

\* From *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (Yankee City Series, Vol. 1), pp. 127-34, by W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, copyright 1941, reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

material wherever necessary to prevent recognition. The people and situations in some of the sketches are entirely imaginary. In all cases where changes were introduced in the reworking of our field notes, we first satisfied ourselves that they would not destroy the essential social reality of the points of the original interview. Only then were such materials included in our text.

This chapter relates some of the more critical or revealing happenings in the lives of typical Yankee City people. Successful and unsuccessful upward mobility within several classes is illustrated. The methods of including and excluding people from significant class groupings are portrayed. The outward symbols of class are given; and the negative and positive evaluations of the several classes are expressed in the actions and words of the participants. The upper classes are treated first, followed by the middle and lower ones.

## 1. THEY ALL CAME

On that autumn evening Mrs. Henry Adams Breckenridge was sitting in a large wing chair by the fireplace whose dying embers occasionally flared and lighted her pale face and white hair. Behind her, numerous used teacups were scattered on the table. Of her fifty-odd guests all but two had departed. Their automobiles, which had spread out along Hill Street and overflowed down the side streets, had disappeared.

The home of Mr. and Mrs. Henry Adams Breckenridge (UU) where the tea had been given is a square white house which sits well back from the street. It has three stories and is topped by a captain's walk which increases its height. During most of the year large trees and a tall thick hedge obscure the house from the street. A gravel drive cuts through the center of the hedge and, passing the front of the house, continues to a large barn (now a garage) one hundred yards to the rear. In front of the house the drive forms a circle almost too sharp to allow automobiles to turn. Mrs. Breckenridge has often commented that the "circle" was made for carriages and should now be enlarged to accommodate automobiles; "but I like it the way it is and I won't have it changed."

The lawn runs from the hedge back to the barn. The garden stretches one hundred yards from the front circle on one side of the house to the adjoining property, owned and occupied by Mr. Breckenridge's brother and his family (UU). The latter grounds are also well kept, but they do not have an elaborate garden.

There are many old rose bushes in the Breckenridge garden, in which Mr. Breckenridge shows some interest. He occasionally picks off dead flowers and sprays the roses with a home-made solution to kill the rose bugs. Mrs. Breckenridge very rarely cares for the garden although she enjoys walking through it and telling visitors about the flowers. Back of the barn lie apple orchard and meadow. The trees are sprayed occasionally, but little effort is made to make them produce.

For years Mrs. Breckenridge and her sister drove about the town in horse-drawn carriages as did their friends, the Marshalls (UU). Mrs. Breckenridge's chief girlhood interest, in fact, was in horses; and she is still so fond of them that she grudgingly accepts the automobile as a necessary convenience.

Inside the house "very good colonial furniture" is mixed indiscriminately with mid-Victorian. This is a common occurrence in the houses of families whose means made it possible to add furniture during the period when the Victorian superseded the earlier colonial style. There are no reproductions. A few family portraits—two signed by famous artists—have prominent places.

When inspecting the shiny appearance of a new house built by a lower-upper, Mrs. Breckenridge said that one of the things she liked about her own home was that it always had the feeling of having been lived in. This is perhaps the first and most lasting impression that one has of the Breckenridge residence.

"It was nice of you to stay on," she said to the woman and man who sat with her by the fireplace. "I find these large teas a little exhausting. I always hate to give them but I couldn't get out of this one. Several of the members of the committee had given teas and they were afraid that Mrs. Starr (LU) would try to give the last one. She always gives the most perfect and elaborate ones but I am afraid everyone talks about them because they're just a little too-too. She was the one



that you saw sitting in the library telling John Alton (UU) about sailing ship days. It was amusing to listen in on that. I confess I eavesdropped on some of it. As you know, John belongs to one of the oldest families in Yankee City, and John's great-grandfather built and sailed more ships out of this harbor than almost anyone."

"Of course, the Starrs are new shoe people," said Mrs. Wentworth (UU). "No one ever heard of him until he made his fortune manufacturing shoes."

"All of John's knowledge about the days of the sailing ships," remarked Mrs. Breckenridge, "came from his father and his grandfather. And I suppose he heard some of it from my father (UU) and from my Uncle George (UU). You could tell that all of what Mrs. Starr said she had learned from books she had read. Somehow it annoys me. I just can't help it. You could almost see her memorizing it all so she could use it on people like John and my brothers. I wouldn't mind so much if I thought she really cared about such things, but I know that she doesn't. She thinks it will help her socially to talk to them about things in which they have a genuine interest."

"Mrs. Starr is a social climber. I don't think that the fact of her recent arrival in Yankee City has anything to do with it. She is too aggressive—she is a social climber. She can be very nice, though, and her children are nice. Some of them are very good-looking, but the daughter isn't so much now because she is beginning to look like her mother."

Mrs. Breckenridge continued, "Mrs. Starr is very pushy and she tries to get into everything. I don't dislike her just because she's new. Everybody in the House and Home Club (UU-LU) hates her. If it hadn't been for Miss Churchill (UU) she would never have got in, but she was always very nice to Miss Churchill. When we started the club and sent out invitations, Mrs. Starr was not included; and when I was having it at my house, she called up just as if she were a bosom friend of mine, which she never was, and asked if she could come. I was embarrassed to death and I said, 'Why, no, Mrs. Starr. Mrs. Marshall started the club, and I don't feel I have any right to ask anyone, but if you would like to

send in your name you may.' She said, 'All right, very well,' and she sent in her name. Everyone objected, but they all liked Miss Churchill so they said all right."

"When Mrs. Sinclair (UU) had the meeting last year," said Mrs. Wentworth, "Mrs. Starr called up and asked if she might bring her daughter; whereupon the daughter and her friends went to the club and Mrs. Sinclair was simply furious, and she said, 'What sort of person is this that you have in the House and Home Club?'"

"When Frederica Alton (UU) started a bridge club, Mrs. Starr called her and asked why she wasn't invited to the club and attempted to get in. She is just like that in everything that she does."

"Mrs. Breckenridge said that Mrs. Starr 'was certainly smart. She was right on the spot. We were so mad that we had to let her into the House and Home Club, but you can just bet that none of her friends will get in.'"

"The things the Starrs do sometimes are unbelievable," Mrs. Wentworth went on. "You know, they have the most valuable ship model in Yankee City. It used to belong to the Altons; Mr. Starr bought it when Frederica Alton needed money and sold some things after her husband died. Frederica took them up to Boston and sold them on the quiet so no one would know about it and so people like that wouldn't get them. But Mrs. Starr's dealer sent her word that he had acquired these things; and do you know that Phillip Starr (LU) went into Boston and actually bought the model? Everyone was annoyed, but Frederica said, 'What could you expect?'"

1 All the above evidence demonstrates how an ambitious, socially mobile person can manipulate an associational structure for the purpose of climbing in the community. It also shows how a given association can be used by an individual to climb and by the society to prevent further mobility. In the case of Mrs. Starr, there was a definite progression in the associations which she joined as she moved upward in the social hierarchy. She was at first active in an organization which included the three uppermost classes. As she became more successful in achieving social status, she lost interest in this association. She later joined another organization which had a smaller number of UM people and finally became a member of an organization which had no one outside of the two upper classes. Her interests decreased in the first two organizations and increased in the last.

"I've always made fun of birth and old families, but they do mean something. Mrs. Starr has learned a lot from her books and by being on the *qui vive*; but breeding is something that doesn't come out of a book or by imitating your betters."

"You should have learned a lot about our city this afternoon," the hostess said to the man. "All sorts of people were here. People one hardly knows. Wouldn't you know, not one of the women on the committee or their husbands stayed away. They all came. The Camps (UM), the Frenches (UM), and the Flahertys (UM) were here. They were the people who stood off in one corner pretty much by themselves. They were the ones who were so polite when you tried to talk to them. They always agreed with everything you said. You know, I was just thinking that this is the first time that any of those three women has ever been in my house."

"Yet," said the second woman, "with the exception of Mrs. Flaherty, they were born and reared here. But, you see, at this time an election is too important."

"Yes," the hostess said. "Aunt Caroline saw the governor at Uncle Ned's the last time she was in Boston, and he said that the election was going to be very close. That awful Mr. Meaghan may get back in again."

"Diane, did you notice how those Kimbles (LU), Waltons (LU), and Starrs patronized the Frenches and the Camps? It was really funny to see how snooty some of those new shoe families can be when they're talking to people who haven't got as far as they have."

"Those poor Starr children (LU) were here," said Mrs. Wentworth. "Katherine was looking a little beaten and worn and Johnny apparently was suffering from a hangover. I don't care what people say. I can't dislike them. I always remember when they were growing up how badly they were treated. I've actually seen people turn their backs on them when the two of them came in. It's not as bad as that any more, but it's bad enough. This town does something to children like them."

"We invited the Flahertys (UM) because they are the nice type of Irish," Mrs. Breckenridge remarked. "My grandfather remembered when Flaherty's grandfather came here and worked as a common laborer, but they've al-

ways been a good honest family. We once had an Irish maid, and she called them 'lace-curtain Irish.' Fred Flaherty put himself through school. He went to Boston College when he failed to get into Harvard. He was very ambitious and he later went to law school and came back here to practice. Uncle George said that he has one of the best practices in town."

While they talked, the man smoked and added appropriate remarks and seeming assent whenever necessary. The second woman left. The man accepted an invitation to stay a bit longer and have a drink.

"You know," the hostess continued, "every time Diane Wentworth and I talk like that I'm just a little ashamed afterward but somehow that's the way I honestly feel when I do it. I wish someone like Sinclair Lewis would write up this town. I am afraid it would be like washing our mouths out with soap but it would do us good."

"I always think of the chapter in *Babbitt* after gossiping the way we've been doing.<sup>2</sup> Babbitt invited the *nouveau riche* McKelvey family to dinner; and they treated him so terribly that he and his wife were miserable. And then the Babbitts reversed it all by doing the same thing to the little people who were socially below them and made them feel miserable. Have you ever read *Babbitt*?"

The man said that he had.

"Don't you think that it is something like we are here?"

Her companion said that there were many resemblances, but that *Babbitt* was set in a Middle Western town.

"I am afraid we feel ourselves superior. In fact, I sometimes think this town feels superior even to Boston and London. No one here would admit that New York is better than we are. New York is a good place to make money in and that's all. You hear people talking of Middle Westerners as though they were country cousins. Many of us here have never been west of the Connecticut River. Somehow we're proud of it."

"The people of Yankee City are peculiar. They don't seem to be interested in anyone but themselves. Sometimes new people come

<sup>2</sup> The part of *Babbitt* to which she refers is Chap. XV. In it Lewis outlines several of the social levels of Zenith.

in here and leave town before anyone knows about them. I remember a very nice family who were here for over a year, but no one knew them. And they met the wrong people. People say they left because no one picked them up. That's always happening here. You need the right kind of sponsors when you come into this town."

While she continued talking, Mrs. Breckenridge searched among the books which filled the shelves on the wall opposite the fireplace.

"Yes, I know that Babbitt's Zenith is Middle West. We people in Yankee City like to think ourselves superior to the Middle West, and it pleases us to laugh at those people when we read Mr. Lewis' books; but fundamentally we are very much like them. Middle Westerners like to think they are much more democratic, but I think Sinclair Lewis has them absolutely right.

"The Babbitts and their crowd were socially below the McKelveys and their circle, and the McKelveys felt inferior to what Lewis calls 'the Old Families' of Zenith. Then, Babbitt was above those little people where the Babbitts went to dinner."

"We speak of old families here in Yankee City, too. People like the Breckenridges and the Marshalls, the Wentworths, the Treppingtons, some of the Talbots (UU), and my own family, for that matter, are old family here; and people like the Starrs and the Waltons (LU), the Tolmans (LU), and those other

\* It is quite clear that "the McKelveys" are similar to "the new people" of the LU class in Yankee City, and that the old families—to whom they feel inferior—are what we have called UU. Babbitt and his crowd are UM, and they admit inferiority to the LU McKelveys.

new people belong to the *nouveau riche* crowd like the McKelveys in Lewis' Babbitt.

"And there are scores of Babbitts here. Some I like and some I don't. Ezra Rodgers (UM) and Alexander French (UM), for instance. They were here this afternoon.

"Mr. Ezra Rodgers was that odd little man who sat in the love seat all the time. As plain and simple as he can be. He and his wife are just what they are. They're not trying to push in where they're not wanted. They're good solid Homeville and don't want to be anything else. He's awfully well liked by the men. All of them say that he is always doing something worth while for our town. He belongs to everything, but I must confess he sometimes embarrasses me with his booster spirit. He's a Rotarian. He's in the Chamber of Commerce. He belongs to all the civic associations and all of the improvement associations. And he's very active in the Baptist Church. I believe he's a member of the Lowell Club.

"He's just the opposite of Alexander French. Alec and his wife (UM) are 'pushers' and climbers. They're always scheming to get into your house by being on a church committee or by being more Republican than anyone else on the committee. We had to have them here this afternoon, and, believe me, if there's a Babbitt in this town, he's the one. He actually believes all of these things that you read in the Boston Herald about our businessmen being superior to anybody else. I think he's still surprised there's not grass growing in our streets now that Roosevelt is in.

"Then there's the Camps (UM), the Flahertys, and the Joneses (UM). They all seem to know each other and stick together at large teas like this."

## Learning Who's Nice— and Who's Not

MARY ELLEN GOODMAN

In one large Eastern city live three-quarters of a million people, people who differ in many ways—in race, religion, national origin, income, and social standing. During the 1940's a social scientist and her staff visited and studied this community. Their main concern was children—*Race Awareness in Young Children* was their subject and became the title of the book written by Mary Ellen Goodman.

The extract from this book \* presents several instances of learning about race. How important are these experiences? What do they tell us about human antagonisms?

### 1. DIANE T. AND HER MOTHER: "AIM HIGH—"

Diane is as blond as her mother, and she has her mother's devotion to the enhancing of her porcelain prettiness with pretty clothes, appropriately ladylike manners, and coy, feminine ways. Children who don't "play nice" are to be avoided. Mother wouldn't like them.

Mother *didn't* like them, and mother didn't like the nursery school. Diane sometimes came home with her clothes in a mess and wearing the marks of most unladylike battles. A woman alone in the world, a woman who has given her husband to the defense of his country, sees her first obligation to herself and her child.

\* From *Race Awareness in Children*, pp. 94-97, by Mary Ellen Goodman, Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., Cambridge, copyright 1952, reprinted by permission of the Anti Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

She cannot afford to jeopardize a precarious grip on the ways and the society of "the nicer class of people" by unnecessary contacts with the less-nice class, or by allowing her daughter to develop any undesirable attachments or any peculiar ideas. Furthermore, the nursery school staff proved itself quite unappreciative of the benefits of having people of the T.'s calibre associated with the institution. They not only made no special concessions but behaved as though they had quite failed to recognize superior people when they saw them. It was a really intolerable situation!

It is not, of course, that Mrs. T. is a snob. It is just that the T.'s, mother and daughter, "expect nice things, and aim high."

It was not the interracial character of the nursery school milieu so much as its lower class character which made it impossible for them. But Mrs. T. concludes that:

"Naturally, when you have so many Negroes, it is not going to be a very high class

group. . . . Now to Diane a colored child is no different than a white child, and I don't mind her playing with the colored children. They're the cutest things when they're young! . . . She plays with them at school and even in our neighborhood she sees a little colored girl now and then. Of course our neighborhood is white—some rather nice old homes and a few apartment houses like ours that aren't pretentious, but better than what you find anywhere else in Lower Harding. I suppose this colored child lives a few streets away. Anyway Diane is very sweet to her when we meet her on the street, but one day the child asked to come upstairs with us and Diane said 'no, no, honey—don't come up.'

"Now of course I wouldn't want my child to treat them any differently. She knows that I stop and chat a little with the colored mothers at the nursery school myself. We'll talk about school and so on and I'll even walk up to the corner with them, but it stops right there. I don't know why—I just don't have any interests with those mothers. I certainly wouldn't encourage them. I don't mind chatting but socially I draw the line. The colored should stay with the colored and the white with the white.—Of course at the nursery school they uphold the colored race—the Director herself leans to the colored! It's hardly the way to run a nice school.

"As I said, I don't mind Diane playing with the colored children, so long as they're clean and decently behaved, and she doesn't either. She can't stand being dirty you know, and I can see that even some of the white children aren't as clean as they might be nor as nice as they might be either. That's what you get when you have such a mixture. But it isn't so much the mixture that I mind, not now, while Diane is little. But I must say that I feel in my own heart that I hope she will never find companionship with them after she leaves high school. I can't imagine being attracted to a colored man myself and I don't think my daughter ever would be, but I wouldn't want her to get interested. I certainly wouldn't sanction a mixed marriage! Diane would say to me —Which side am I on?—Where do I belong? —Her child would be very unhappy—only Negroes would accept her. It isn't so bad for

the parents as it is for the children. It's very unfair for them.

"The whole thing is to know your own kind and stay with them, white with white and colored with colored, and the better class of whites together. Now we may not be in the social register, but we know some nice people and we're at home with them. They're the kind we should be with. You know you have to be very careful—especially a woman alone—not to lower yourself. And when you have a nice child like Diane, you owe it to her to see that she has the right associations. I've been giving these things a lot of thought lately, and I know one thing I'm going to do. I'm going to take Diane out of that nursery school."

## 2. YVONNE'S PARENTS: "PEOPLE LIKE US—"

"She's the funniest child," says Mrs. G. of her daughter, "She's little and skinny and kind of mousy—don't have much to do with the other kids, but she likes them all right. Comes home and chatters on to me like a magpie about this one and that one, but to see her at school you wouldn't think she knew from nothin'.

"And clumsy! What with bein' such a little thing, you wouldn't think so, but as my mother says, she has two left feet. I wouldn't be bothered with it myself, but this friend of mine takes her little girl some place for dancin' lessons and I've let her take Vonnice a couple of times. Thought it might be good for her, but she don't like it much.

"Maybe it's because she's been with me so much, but she gets along with grown ups better. She's never paid much attention to her little brother. Thinks he's too fresh and rough and he musses up her hair—I curl it sometimes and boy does she love herself with curls! The neighbors think she's wonderful. Such a little lady! Well they don't know her as well as I do—but I don't mean to say she's not a good kid. Vonnice's all right, but I don't know where she gets some of her ideas.

"She gets around and talks to people, of course, that's part of it. She chins with all the women around here and brings me the news—in case I've missed anything. I get around and do some chinning myself of

course. Sure, I like to talk—my husband's the quiet type—he says he don't get in a word edgeways, but gee, I'd go crazy if I couldn't get out and see people. He comes home dead tired from drivin' the truck all day and he don't even pay much attention to the kids. Me—I like to be sociable, sit down and have a cup of coffee with one of the other mothers on the way home from nursery school—have a beer and relax in the afternoon—enjoy life a little. I keep my place clean and I make the kids pick up their stuff and not throw magazines around all over the place and so on, but I don't see no point in knockin' yourself out. Life's too short. As my mother says—if you don't have a little fun while you're young, you never will.

"My mother lives just a little way from us you know. I grew up right here in this neighborhood—right where my mother lives now. It used to be kinda nice around here but now everybody's poor like us. Houses all fallin' down around our ears, and a lotta new people comin' in. The priest was tellin' me the other day that it's not just us Irish around here now—everything else you can think of, even 'niggers' comin' in, but not right around us yet.

"Well I'm used to them from down at the nursery school. Of course most of the mothers there are all right, and I can be nice to them, but I wouldn't go any farther. I always say there are 'niggers' an' then there are Negroes. Now people like Vonnie's teacher and most of those mothers—they're Negroes. Why Helen's mother—I've been real friendly with her and what if she didn't go and get huffy one day

about some little thing I said—she and that Jewish woman she pals around with. That's the way they are—ready to take offense. I didn't mean nothing—all I did was tell them about what happened the other day when Vonnie and me were goin' home from school. We passed this black man, and he just about butted me off the sidewalk. Well I was so mad—I guess I said somethin' to him—not very loud, but when we got home, Vonnie wanted to know what I said. So I tried to pass it off and told her I hadn't said anything much. Well she's pretty sharp sometimes—I had to laugh. She says, 'Oh yes you did say something mama, you said "nigger."' At school we don't say that—we say "colored people.'" Well now, I ask you—wasn't that one for the book—and funny part is I didn't even know she knew the word 'colored' but I knew she saw the difference all right, and I thought sometimes she stood back a little.

"Well anyways these two mothers acted like I'd committed a crime after I told 'em this story. It just goes to show you can't get along with 'em—not people like me anyways. Of course the lower classes—people who don't care what they do—will intermarry and associate. And then the upper classes—people who've been to college and so on—they will associate. They find a Negro who's been educated and speaks their language, and they can get along with him all right. But the middle classes—and I don't know, but I think that's people like us—they just don't mix. That's all there is to it—mixin' is no good for people like us."

## Part III

### *Why Men*

### *Hate*

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#### CONCLUSION

Why do men hate and fight? If we are to control destructiveness, we must understand the basis of human hostility. Our ever-increasing capacity to hurt and destroy makes this understanding an urgent necessity. Yet human history presents a recurrent picture of war and battles, armies and generals, intrigue and exploration. Hatred appears to be a universal phenomenon, evident in all times and in all places. Today's predicament, accentuated by guided missile and hydrogen bomb, appears to be a contemporary evidence of some basic hostile impulse.

How easy it is to arouse our anger. How difficult it is to apologize. How much more difficult to express our love, even for friends, sweetheart, and family. Why does *hated* come out so easily? We are told that men possess a basic need for strife and war. Indeed, who is not stirred by marching soldiers, by tales of heroism in battle, and by victories over the foe? Such glory, however, is accompanied by concentration camps, hungry civilian populations, and napalm-charred bodies. These are consequences of hatred. Do we desire these consequences, as well?

Hatred seems to appear in many forms and in differing degrees. Are they all manifestations of the same inner force, an "enmity complex" or warring instinct? The case for such an impulse is persuasive, especially for those who begin their study with this picture in their minds. As we have seen, there is much evidence to support the idea—war, competition for status, race intolerance, and aggressiveness. Objectivity, however, requires that we avoid hasty conclusions. Let us therefore reconsider the nature and the causes of hatred.

Our study of the origins of man has shown that man has many facets. Whether we accept the Greek, the primitive, the evolutionary, or the Biblical version of origins, we arrive at similar conclusions. Man possesses capacities for love and hate, good and evil, mercy and intolerance. What we need to learn is why men so often behave like *lexus* or devils, rather than angels or even human beings.

We know too that humans differ among themselves, in their behavior, ability, and appearance. So too we must expect to find variability in goodness and badness. More—

over, we have noted that while some of the differences are traceable to inborn differences (e.g., sex, skin color, and intelligence), individual experiences and social conditions are also responsible for human variability. If we can do little to modify innate characteristics, we can do more to reshape our social environment. Methods of child rearing, school procedures, business practices, and international relationships are constantly changing. Perhaps we can change these social influences upon the behavior of mankind in more desirable ways.

The custom of hatred plays a major part in maintaining hostility and fostering conflict. Our belief in the inferiority of others becomes the distorting glass through which we filter our perceptions. Thus, we are ambitious, they are "pushy"; we are thrifty, they are "stingy"; we are religious, they are superstitious. Our social institutions come to reflect these biases offering one standard for us, another for "them." Hatred breeds hatred in ourselves, our community, and our world.

Frustration is a breeding ground for hatred. Unsatisfied wishes can lead to a smoldering hostility that seeks an outlet through friend or scapegoat. In this sense, aggression is natural though perhaps not inevitable. It is said, too, that "uneasy lies the head that wears the crown." Success may not mean security, particularly for those who have trampled over others, for those who fear that others are as hostile as themselves. In a "dog eat dog" atmosphere, the top dog is the most appetizing to the pack.

The effects of hatred warrant our concern. In a shrinking world, do we dare mistreat the stranger? Can we possibly rear people to be unafraid of strange customs and unfamiliar faces? Or must we resign ourselves to human torments in the executive suite, segregated school, and relocation center? World War II cost the world hundreds of billions of dollars, twenty to thirty million lives, and inestimable suffering. How much other expressions of hatred cost mankind is wholly beyond evaluation.

What can we do about hate and its consequences? Above all, we need to study further and to understand better its nature and its cause. We need to find what has been called "the functional equivalents of war." Can we expend our hostility in socially constructive, rather than destructive, ways? Can we redirect these energies in play and games, in hammering and painting, in producing and consuming? War is not the only alternative to a stagnant peace. Indeed, men have engaged in humane wars against disease, poverty, and even against war. Surely society can find many ways of channeling the hostile impulses of mankind.

There is something more to be said about the human relationship. War occurs from time to time, but peace is more common and sought for. Men must be drafted to fight. What impulse makes "parting such sweet sorrow"? Kindness, love, loyalty, and generosity are also part of the human vocabulary of emotions. The bonds of friendship, marriage, and community are powerful ones. Indeed, our very wars are presumed to protect our loved ones, "for God and Country" or "to make the world safe for democracy." To evaluate the forces that place man against man, we must therefore explore the ties that hold them together.



## Part IV

# Why Men Live Together

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### INTRODUCTION

The existence of hatred hardly needs cataloging. All of us are fully aware of envy and bitterness, distrust and resentment. Family quarrels, race riots, and world wars seem to be characteristic of human relationships. Indeed, history is a record of recurrent torment, persecution, and destructiveness. Hate cannot be denied. Crude or subtle, it is readily revealed to us.

Are human beings therefore to be considered as beast-like creatures? Is it true that we live in a "dog-eat-dog" world, that we are engaged in a bloody struggle for survival? True, we resemble animals in our need for food and shelter. We compete for jobs and for promotion. We try to "get ahead," that is, to have more than our neighbors and friends. But is this wholly animal in form and purpose?

If men are truly ravening beasts, how is it that men do in fact live together in harmony? Some neighbors cannot live peacefully side by side, but others—the vast majority—do trust, help, and share with each other. Struggles take place but friendliness too is a fact of human existence.

However human beings may feel about one another it is a curious fact, and a significant one, that men everywhere do live *together*. The solitary individual is a rarity—a strange, perverse oddity somehow not truly human. For human implies "social" and our very emotions are importantly *interpersonal*—love, envy, resentment, admiration, affection, and trust. What are therefore the "pulls" that draw humans together, the bonds that hold them in continuing association?

Why don't men live apart? At times, we wish we could get away and just be alone. But we do not want to be totally alone. Those who are alone—the unwed, the friendless, the shy ones, and the strangers—long for human association and personal contact. For men must somehow live together. How and why are the fundamental questions that this section seeks to consider.

## The Social Contract

### Nature and Commonwealth

THOMAS HOBBES

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was an English philosopher whose name is associated with the "social contract" theory of society. Exiled to France because of his political convictions, he wrote a series of books attempting to analyze and explain the nature of government. Why do men obey laws? Why do men give up their freedom and accept the rule, even the tyranny, of others? What would men be like without the rule of law? Indeed, what is the "natural" condition of man?

These questions are considered by Hobbes in this selection.\* Can you imagine human beings in the "state of nature"? How could they get together without a common language, a common trust and a common understanding? What does Hobbes mean by "covenant," by "Leviathan"? Does this selection offer an explanation of man's hate as well as man's ability to live together?

Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.

And as to the faculties of the mind, setting

aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules, called science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, as prudence, while we look after somewhat else, I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength. For prudence is but experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For

\* From *The Leviathan* by Thomas Hobbes, London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1885, pp. 63-65, 82-84.

such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything, than that every man is contented with his share.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an invader hath no more to fear than another man's single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company, where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate

he sets upon himself: and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares, (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contempters, by damage; and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.

The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. For "war" consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of "time" is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is "peace."

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious buildings; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time;

no arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things, that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade and destroy one another; and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house, he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws, and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow-subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow-citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.

It may peradventure be thought there was never such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world, but there are many places where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government, use to degenerate into a civil war.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual

jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects; there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men.

To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no "mine" and "thine" distinct; but only that to be every man's, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason.

The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement.

The final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown in chapter xiii, to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of

Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.

For the laws of Nature, as "justice," "equity," "modesty," "mercy," and, in sum, "doing to others, as we would be done to," of themselves, without the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the laws of Nature, which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely, if there be no power created, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one another, has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of Nature, that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no other laws therein, but the laws of honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. And as small families did then; so now do cities and kingdoms, which are but greater families, for their own security, enlarge their dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders, and endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after ages with honour.

Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion. The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of war, as to move him to attempt.

And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to

their particular judgments and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing; whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other laws of Nature, without a common power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be any civil government or commonwealth at all; because there would be peace without subjection.

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed and directed by one judgment, for a limited time: as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst themselves.

It is true that certain living creatures, as bees and ants, live sociably one with another, which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures; and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgments and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signify to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some men may perhaps desire to know, why mankind cannot do the same. To which I answer,

First, that men are continually in competition for honour and dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war; but amongst these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the

common good differeth not from the private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not, as man, the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common business; whereas amongst men, there are very many that think themselves wiser, and abler to govern the public, better than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making known to one another their desires and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others that which is good in the likeness of evil; and evil in the likeness of good; and augment or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil; discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure.

Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between "injury" and "damage"; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease; for then it is that he loves to show his wisdom, and control the actions of them that govern the commonwealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men is by covenant only, which is artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting: which is a common power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit.

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of

one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, "I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner." This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a "commonwealth," in Latin *civitas*. This is the generation of the great "leviathan," or rather, to speak more reverently, of that "mortal god," to which we owe under the "immortal God," our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which, to define it, is "one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence."

## *The Social Contract*

### *Civil Government*

JOHN LOCKE

Born some forty years after Hobbes, John Locke (1632-1704) also felt that human association was the consequence of a "social contract." Like Hobbes, Locke had to flee his native England for political reasons. However, unlike Hobbes, Locke was an advocate of liberal ideas and of parliamentary government.

Compare the viewpoints of these two important interpreters of the question, why men live together. Note that both agree upon the existence of a "pre-social" condition of man.\* How differently they perceive that condition! Which viewpoint seems most persuasive? Are these ideas the only alternatives?

Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left, as they were, in the liberty of the state of Nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.

For, when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a com-

munity, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority. For that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being one body, must move one way, it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority, or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see that in assemblies empowered to act by positive laws where no number is set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines as having, by the law of Nature and reason, the power of the whole.

And thus every man, by consenting with

\* From *Second Treatise of Civil Government* by John Locke, ch. 8, first published in 1690.

others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporate into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact if he be left free under no other ties than he was in before in the state of Nature. For what appearance would there be of any compact? What new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society than he himself thought fit and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state of Nature, who may submit himself and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.

For if the consent of the majority shall not in reason be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual, nothing but the consent of every individual can make anything to be the act of the whole, which, considering the infirmities of health and avocations of business, which in a number though much less than that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly; and the variety of opinions and contrariety of interests which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, it is next impossible ever to be had. And, therefore, if coming into society be upon such terms, it will be only like Cato's coming into the theatre, *tantum ut exiret*. Such a constitution as this would make the mighty leviathan of a shorter duration than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in, which cannot be supposed till we can think that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved. For where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.

Whosoever, therefore, out of a state of Nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals that enter into or

make up a commonwealth. And thus, that which begins and actually constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of majority, to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.

Every man being, as has been showed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent, it is to be considered what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent to make him subject to the laws of any government. There is a common distinction of an express and tacit consent, which will concern our present case. Nobody doubts but an express consent of any man, entering into any society, makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds—i.e., how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it at all. And to this I say, that every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government doth hereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it, whether this his possession be of land to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and, in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government.

... it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name—property.

The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting.

Firstly, there wants an established, settled,



known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.

Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law. For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness, make them too remiss in other men's.

Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.

Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of Nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniences that they are therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them, and by such rules as the community, or those authorised by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and

rise of both the legislative and executive power as well as of the governments and societies themselves.

For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers. The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law of Nature; by which law, common to them all, and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society distinct from all other creatures, and were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other, no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and associate into lesser combinations. The other power a man has in the state of Nature is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular political society, and incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind.

The first power—viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of Nature.

Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, which he might before employ in the execution of the law of Nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit, to assist the executive power of the society as the law thereof shall require. For being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniences from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength, he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require, which is not only necessary but just, since the other members of the society do the like.

## Mutual Aid

PRINCE PETR KROPOTKIN

The ideas of Prince Kropotkin need to be studied in conjunction with those of Hobbes and Locke. Though best known as a social philosopher, Kropotkin (1842-1921) was also an eminent geographer who made early explorations in Finland, Siberia, and Manchuria. He was also an ardent anarchist and revolutionist. From this selection,\* can you determine why? How would Kropotkin explain the emergence of laws, of government, of society?

The first thing which strikes us as soon as we begin studying the struggle for existence under both its aspects—direct and metaphorical—is the abundance of facts of mutual aid, not only for rearing progeny, as recognized by most evolutionists, but also for the safety of the individual, and for providing it with the necessary food. With many large divisions of the animal kingdom mutual aid is the rule. Mutual aid is found even amidst the lowest animals, and we must be prepared to learn some day, from the students of microscopical pond-life, facts of unconscious mutual support, even from the life of microorganisms. Of course, our knowledge of the life of the invertebrates, save the termites, the ants, and the bees, is extremely limited; and yet, even as regards the lower animals, we may glean a few facts of well-ascertained cooperation. The numberless associations of locusts, vanessae, cicindelae, cicadae, and so on, are practically quite unexplored; but the very fact of their existence

indicates that they must be composed on about the same principles as the temporary associations of ants or bees for purposes of migration. As to the beetles, we have quite well observed facts of mutual help amidst the burying beetles (*Necrophorus*). They must have some decaying organic matter to lay their eggs in, and thus to provide their larvae with food; but that matter must not decay very rapidly. So they are wont to bury in the ground the corpses of all kinds of small animals which they occasionally find in their rambles. As a rule, they live an isolated life, but when one of them has discovered the corpse of a mouse or of a bird, which it hardly could manage to bury itself, it calls four, six, or ten other beetles to perform the operation with united efforts; if necessary, they transport the corpse to a suitable soft ground; and they bury it in a very considerate way, without quarrelling as to which of them will enjoy the privilege of laying its eggs in the buried corpse. And when Gleditsch attached a dead bird to a cross made out of two sticks, or suspended a toad to a stick planted in the soil, the little beetles

\* From *Mutual Aid* by Prince Petr Kropotkin, Alfred A. Knopf and Co., 1925. Reprinted by permission of William Heinemann, Ltd., London.

would in the same friendly way combine their intelligences to overcome the artifice of Man. The same combination of efforts has been noticed among the dung-beetles.

Even among animals standing at a somewhat lower stage of organization we may find like examples. Some land-crabs of the West Indies and North America combine in large swarms in order to travel to the sea and to deposit therein their spawn; and each such migration implies concert, co-operation, and mutual support. As to the big Molucca crab (*Limulus*), I was struck (in 1882, at the Brighton Aquarium) with the extent of mutual assistance which these clumsy animals are capable of bestowing upon a comrade in case of need. One of them had fallen upon its back in a corner of the tank, and its heavy sauce-pan-like carapace prevented it from returning to its natural position, the more so as there was in the corner an iron bar which rendered the task still more difficult. Its comrades came to the rescue, and for one hour's time I watched how they endeavoured to help their fellow-prisoner. They came two at once, pushed their friend from beneath, and after strenuous efforts succeeded in lifting it upright; but then the iron bar would prevent them from achieving the work of rescue, and the crab would again heavily fall upon its back. After many attempts, one of the helpers would go in the depth of the tank and bring two other crabs, which would begin with fresh forces the same pushing and lifting of their helpless comrade. We stayed in the Aquarium for more than two hours, and, when leaving, we again came to cast a glance upon the tank: the work of rescue still continued! Since I saw that, I cannot refuse credit to the observation quoted by Dr. Erasmus Darwin—namely, that “the common crab during the moulting season stations as sentinel an unmoulted or hard-shelled individual to prevent marine enemies from injuring moulted individuals in their unprotected state.”

Facts illustrating mutual aid amidst the termites, the ants, and the bees are so well known to the general reader, especially through the works of Romanes, L. Büchner and Sir John Lubbock, that I may limit my remarks to a very few hints. If we take an ants' nest, we not only see that every descrip-

tion of work-rearing of progeny, foraging, building, rearing of aphides, and so on—is performed according to the principles of voluntary mutual aid; we must also recognize, with Forel, that the chief, the fundamental feature of the life of many species of ants is the fact and the obligation for every ant of sharing its food, already swallowed and partly digested, with every member of the community which may apply for it. Two ants belonging to two different species or to two hostile nests, when they occasionally meet together, will avoid each other. But two ants belonging to the same nest or to the same colony of nests will approach each other, exchange a few movements with the antennae, and “if one of them is hungry or thirsty, and especially if the other has its crop full . . . it immediately asks for food.” The individual thus requested never refuses; it sets apart its mandibles, takes a proper position, and regurgitates a drop of transparent fluid which is licked up by the hungry ant. Regurgitating food for other ants is so prominent a feature in the life of ants (at liberty), and it so constantly recurs both for feeding hungry comrades and for feeding larvae, that Forel considers the digestive tube of the ant as consisting of two different parts, one of which, the posterior, is for the special use of the individual, and the other, the anterior part, is chiefly for the use of the community. If an ant which has its crop full has been selfish enough to refuse feeding a comrade, it will be treated as an enemy, or even worse. If the refusal has been made while its kindred were fighting with some other species, they will fall back upon the greedy individual with greater vehemence than even upon the enemies themselves. And if an ant has not refused to feed another ant belonging to an enemy species, it will be treated by the kinsfolk of the latter as a friend. All this is confirmed by most accurate observation and decisive experiments.

Going now over to higher animals, we find far more instances of undoubtedly conscious mutual help for all possible purposes, though we must recognize at once that our knowledge even of the life of higher animals still remains very imperfect. A large number of facts have

structure of the individuals; it is cultivated for the benefits of mutual aid, or for the sake of its pleasures. And this, of course, appears with all possible gradations and with the

greatest variety of individual and specific characters—the very variety of aspects taken by social life being a consequence, and for us a further proof, of its generality.

## The Gregarious Instinct

WILLIAM McDUGALL

"Birds of a feather flock together"—so goes the proverb, and, indeed, when the robins and the blue jays migrate in the autumn, they do not join company. The migratory instinct is linked to the ties of species and genus. Does the same instinct apply to man? Does "instinct" generally apply to man? A current definition of instinct is "an unlearned, complex pattern of behavior involving the whole organism."<sup>1</sup> Is joining a fraternity, going to a dance, or enrolling in a college course instinctive?

William McDougall (1871-1938), the author of this selection,\* was a distinguished psychologist. He was convinced of the existence of human instincts. Can you list some examples which "fit" the definition?

It is sometimes assumed that the monstrous and disastrous growth of London and of other large towns is the result of some obscure economic necessity. But, as a matter of fact, London and many other large towns have for a long time past far exceeded the proportions that conduce to economic efficiency and healthy social life, just as the vast herds of bison, or other animals . . . greatly exceed the size necessary for mutual defence. We are

often told that the dulness of the country drives the people to the towns. But that statement inverts the truth. It is the crowd in the towns, the vast human herd, that exerts a baneful attraction on those outside it. People have lived in the country for hundreds of generations without finding it dull. It is only the existence of the crowded towns that creates by contrast the dulness of the country. As in the case of the animals, the larger the aggregation the greater is its power of attraction; hence, in spite of high rents, high rates, dirt, disease, congestion of traffic, ugliness, squalor, and sooty air, the large towns continue to grow at an increasing rate, while the small towns diminish and the country villages are threatened with extinction.

That this herding in the towns is not due to any economic necessities of our industrial

<sup>1</sup> Hunger and thirst would not be considered instinctive. But the nest-building of the oriole and the blue-jay is so designated. See, for example, Norman L. Munn, *The Evolution and Growth of Human Behavior*, New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955, p. 62.

\* From *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 303-8, by William McDougall, copyright 1923 by John W. Luce and Co., Boston. Reprinted by permission of Bruce Humphries, Inc., Boston.

organisation, is shown by the fact that it takes place to an equally great and regrettable extent in countries where the industrial conditions are very different. In Australia, where everything favours an agricultural or pastoral mode of life, half the population of a continent is crowded into a few towns on the coast. In China, where industry persists almost entirely in the form of handicrafts and where economic conditions are extremely different from our own, we find towns like Canton containing three million inhabitants crowded together even more densely than in London and under conditions no less repulsive.

In England we must attribute this tendency chiefly to the fact that the spread of elementary education and the freer intercourse between the people of the different parts of the country have broken down the bonds of custom which formerly kept each man to the place and calling of his forefathers; for custom, the great conservative force of society, the great controller of the individual impulses, being weakened, the deep-seated instincts, especially the gregarious instinct, have found their opportunity to determine the choices of men. Other causes have, of course, cooperated and have facilitated the aggregations of population; but without the instinctive basis they would probably have produced only slight effects of this kind.

The administrative authorities have shown of late years a disposition to encourage in every possible way this gregarious tendency. On the slightest occasion they organise some show which shall draw huge crowds to gape, until now a new street cannot be opened without the expenditure of thousands of pounds in tawdry decorations, and a foreign prince cannot drive to a railway station without drawing many thousands of people from their work to spend the day in worse than useless idleness, confirming their already over-developed gregarious instincts. There can be no doubt that the excessive indulgence of this impulse is one of the greatest demoralising factors of the present time in this country, just as it was in Rome in the days of her declining power and glory.

In this connection we may briefly consider the views of Professor Giddings on "the consciousness of kind," which he would have us

regard as the basic principle of social organisation. He writes, "In its widest extension the consciousness of kind marks off the animate from the inanimate. Within the wide class of animals it marks off species and races. Within racial lines the consciousness of kind underlies the more definite ethnical and political groupings, it is the basis of class distinctions, of innumerable forms of alliance, of rules of intercourse, and of peculiarities of policy. Our conduct towards those whom we feel to be most like ourselves is instinctively and rationally different from our conduct towards others, whom we believe to be less like ourselves. Again, it is the consciousness of kind, and nothing else, which distinguishes social conduct, as such, from purely economic, purely political, or purely religious conduct; for in actual life it constantly interferes with the theoretically perfect operation of the economic, political, or religious motive. The working man joins a strike of which he does not approve rather than cut himself off from his fellows. For a similar reason the manufacturer who questions the value of protection to his own industry yet pays his contribution to the protectionist campaign fund. The Southern gentleman, who believed in the cause of the Union, none the less threw in his fortunes with the Confederacy, if he felt himself to be one of the Southern people and a stranger to the people of the North. The liberalising of creeds is accomplished by the efforts of men who are no longer able to accept the traditional dogma, but who desire to maintain associations which it would be painful to sever. In a word, it is about the consciousness of kind that all other motives organise themselves in the evolution of social choice, social volition, or social policy."

All that attraction of like to like, which Giddings here attributes to the "consciousness of kind" is, I think, to be regarded as the work of the gregarious impulse, operating at a high level of mental life in conjunction with other impulses. That "consciousness of kind," the recognition of degrees of likeness of others to one's self, underlies all such cases as Professor Giddings mentions, and is presupposed by all social life, is true only if we use the words in a very loose sense. If we would state more accurately the facts vaguely implied by this

phrase, we must say that the gregarious impulse of any animal receives satisfaction only through the presence of animals similar to itself, and the closer the similarity the greater is the satisfaction. The impulse of this instinct will bring and keep together in one herd animals of different species, as when we see horses and bullocks grazing together, or birds of several species in one flock; but it brings and keeps together much more powerfully animals of one species. Just so, in any human being the instinct operates most powerfully in relation to, and receives the highest degree of satisfaction from the presence of, the human beings who most closely resemble that individual, those who behave in like manner and respond to the same situations with similar emotions. An explicit "consciousness of kind" in any literal sense of the words implies a relatively high level of mental development and a developed self-consciousness, and this is by no means necessary to the operation of the gregarious instinct. And such "consciousness of kind" can of itself do nothing, it is not a social force, is not a motive, can of itself generate no impulse or desire. It is merely one of the most highly developed of the cognitive processes through which the gregarious instinct may be brought into play. If this instinct were lacking to men, the most accurate recognition of personal likenesses and differences would fail to produce the effects attributed to "consciousness of kind."

It is because we are not equally attracted by all social aggregations, but find the greatest satisfaction of the gregarious impulse in the society of those most like ourselves, that a segregation of like elements occurs in all communities. Among uncivilised people we usually find communities of the same tribe, and tribes closely allied by blood, occupying contiguous areas; and the effects of this tendency persist in the civilised countries of the present day in the form of local differences

of physical and mental characters of the populations of the various counties or other large areas.

The same tendency is illustrated by the formation in the United States of America of large, locally circumscribed communities of various European extractions; and in our large towns it manifests itself in the segregation of people of similar race and occupation and social status, a process which results in striking differences between the various districts or quarters of the town, and striking uniformities within the limits of any one such quarter. In this tendency we may find also an explanation of the curious fact that the traders dealing in each kind of object are commonly found closely grouped in one street or in neighbouring streets—the coach-builders in Long Acre, the newsvendors in Fleet Street, the doctors in Harley Street, the shipping offices in Leadenhall Street, and so on. This segregation of like trades, which might seem to be a curious economic anomaly under our competitive system, is not peculiar to European towns. It forced itself upon my attention in the streets of Canton, where it obtains in a striking degree, and also in several Indian towns.

We may briefly sum up the social operation of the gregarious instinct by saying that, in early times when population was scanty, it must have played an important part in social evolution by keeping men together and thereby occasioning the need for social laws and institutions; as well as by providing the conditions of aggregation in which alone the higher evolution of the social attributes was possible; but that in highly civilised societies its functions are less important, because the density of population ensures a sufficient aggregation of the people; and that, facilities for aggregation being so greatly increased among modern nations, its direct operation is apt to produce anomalous and even injurious social results.

## *The Neighborhood, the Gangster and the Politician*

JOHN LANDESCO

Between 1925 and 1927, at least 760 murders took place in Cook County, Illinois. To determine the extent and the nature of crime in this area, the Illinois Association for Criminal Justice supported a crime survey. This selection is taken from the volume *Organized Crime in Chicago* by John Landesco of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. The report is based upon actual study of the underworld.

Our purpose in examining this description is to further consider the bonds of human association. Is it instinct that organizes the gang, that brings together the politician and the gangster? What function does the "athletic club" hold for its members? Why is the gangster in the "in-group"?

The relation of the gangster and the politician becomes most obvious to the public on election day. Post-election contests and recounts expose the election frauds committed by the gangsters in behalf of the politicians. The manipulation of elections by machine politicians with underworld assistance is an old practice in the river wards of Chicago and has been gradually spreading to other districts. But, election frauds do not disclose the entire picture of the reciprocal relations of politician and gangster.

Residents of the so-called bluestocking wards frequently receive the erroneous impression that if the ballots in the river wards were freely cast and honestly counted they would show a majority against the ward boss, his henchmen, and his gangster allies. Nothing

could be farther from the truth. Even if all the election frauds committed in the recent primary of April 10 were disclosed, the extent of the fraudulent vote would not greatly exceed twenty thousand votes. What needs to be appreciated is the element of the genuine popularity of the gangster, home-grown in the neighborhood gang, idealized in the morality of the neighborhood. An understanding of the element of genuine leadership and loyal following may be gained from a study of the Ragen Colts and the morality of the Yards.

**THE RAGEN COLTS.** The Ragen's Athletic and Benevolent Association is chosen as the first example of the gang in politics because it has a continuous history during a period of over thirty years. It began as a baseball team, "The Morgan Athletic Club," with